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ABSTRACT 
The 'cogni.tive model' tn this treatise ie proposed as 
a·n original method of understanding, describin g and ex-
plaining the acute grief process and out come. TI1e n1odel 
suggests that t he pri mary i mpact of a sudd ~n death event 
is upon the survivor's conceptual frame-of-referenc e . Thi s 
differs from the traditional psychoanalytic view of' mourning 
which emphasizes the emotional impact as bein g foremost. 
Man's typical functioning is assumed to be dependent 
on the cognitive dimensions or categories by which he com-
prehends those events which he encounters. These dimeP~ions 
are postulated as forming a cognitive structural matrix , in 
which dimensions relating to significant others are central 
or core elements. The development of such a matrix is belie ve d 
to result from increased differentiation, organization anrl 
integration of the dimensions during gro ~~h. This process 
tends to . increase the individual's adaptiveness and effective-
ness and, therefore, increases his survival potential. 
When the sudden death of a significant other occurs, the 
matrix is postulated as being traumatically disrupted, since 
a core dimension has been unexpectedly damaged by the loss. 
This disruption creates a state of cognitive inadequacy and 
initiates a process of cognitiv.e regression to less refined 
and less ade quate methods of understanding events. The regres-
sion is analyzed in the dissertation, along four principle 
criteria processes, (a) disjunction (the separation of cogni-
tion from affect and conation)s (b) modification-absorption 
(the openness to change of the dimensions), (c) dilation­
constriction (the variations of cognitive activity from 
�.matrix expansion to matrix compression, respet:!t:ively) ands 
(d) subjectivity-objectivity (the extent to which under­
standing is channelled through self-reference). 
Using changes in these cognitive developmental processes� 
the influence of cognitive disruption (following a sudden 
death event) upon cognitive. somatic, affective and behavioral 
functioning is discussed. The symptomology of acute grief that 
occurs in these spheres is reviewed,and then is described in 
terms of being postulated derivatives of cognitive disruptionQ 
The general symptom categories discussed i�cludet (a) cogni• 
tive confusion, cognitive defenses (denial, distort1.on and 
depersonalization) and pre-occupation with the deceaseds 
(b) somatic symptoms l.n respiratory, circulatory, digestive
J
musculo-skeletal and neurological systems, as well as overall 
morbidity and mortality effects, (c) affective fear and anxi• 
ety, anger and hostility, guilt, depressionr and(d) behavior• 
ally, interpersonal changes, activity level changes and search• 
ing. 
Finally, major determinants of healthy versus pathological 
grief outcome are reviewed, and their effects upon bereavement 
are explained from the perspective of the cognitive model. TI1is 
is done with pa.rti.cular regard t:o the determinant's influence 
upon QOgnitive disruption,and the meaning attribution by the 
survivor to the death event. n� determinant factors examined 
.. 
include (a) ruoda of deaLh 1 such as anticipsted deat~, sudden 
death, suicide, accident and Sudden Infant Death Syndromes 
(b) the relationship of survivor to the deceased, such aa 
spouse or parent of the deceased, and{c) character1.stics of 
the survivor, such as age and sex. 
In memoritmts 
SHERYL ADELMAN 
August 9, 1958 • December 2, 1973 
My niece, who enriched the lives 
of others for 15 years. Not long 
enough. We wanted so much more time. 
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PREFACE 
Man1 8 physical, cognit i ve and emotional relation sh ip 
with death has changed cons id erably during the past gener-
ation (Choron, 1964s Fulton , 1965; Feifel, 1959)e There 
are, undoubtedly, multiple de termi.nants for these cha nge s . 
They include longer life span s, organ and tissue trans-
. . 
plantations, vicarious invo lv ement with death throug h a 
decade-long war, the incre ase d possibilities o~ death on 
the nati .on's highways or in nuclear holocaust, and the con-
frontation of death by newly revived and popularized ph il• 
osophies and belief systems s uch as existentialism, mysti• 
cism and witchcraft. 
Nonetheless, these conf r ontations with death as a con• 
cept provide soire distance be t ween the individual a.nd t he 
abstraction. Psychologists. however. have become increa s in g• 
ly interested in studying ma n's behavior when the individual 
is in more direct contact wit h his own imminent death as a 
result of aging (Kastenbaum & Eisenberg, 1972), terminal 
illness (Bri m et al~ 19701 Hinton, 1967, Kubler-Ross, 1969) 
or suicidal behavior (Farbe r ow, 19721 Resnik, 1969). In 
addition to the considerab le investigative efforts and out• 
put on pre-death behavior. ·~here has also been a rene wed 
interest in the post-death behavior of bereaved survivors 
. . 
(e.g.,Kutscher, 19691 Par kes , 1972). This seems motivated, 
in part, by recent clinica l emphases in family therapy 
(e.g.,Ho well s , 1971) 9 cris is intervention (Parad, 1965) 
and the af orementioned tre nd to ward study i ng death related 
beh avior when it is a concre te re ality rather than when it 
is abstract, distant an.d hypothetical. 
This dissertation will add to t he understanding of the 
post~death behavior of the bereaved by providing a novel 
conceptual model of acute grief in adulthood. By developing 
this 'cognitive• model of mourning, I propose to offer a 
more concise and relevant framework than now exists for the 
explanation and treatment of acute grief, The literature on 
bereavement will be reviewed with regard to the syrnpto mology 
of grief and the determinants of a normal versus pathologi• 
cal course of mourning, In order to demonstrate the applica-
bility of the cognitive model, these symptoms and determinants 
will be accounted for by this original cognitive perspective, 
In order to give the reader a useful expectation of what 
follows, a summary of ~he plan of the dissertation is pre-
sented here. After a brief Introduction (PartI), the cognit iv e 
model of acute grief is developed (Part II). The latter begins 
with an overall description of man's general cognitive func-
tioning, followed by a developmental analysis of those pro-
cesses postulated as important for attaining an adult level 
of cognitive functionin g . The processes proposed are (a ) dis-
junction, (b) absorption and modification, (c) dilation and 
constriction, and (d) objectivity - subjectivity. These will 
be defined and exemplified in the text, and then applied to 
bereavement. .. 
Turning to the structure of the hypothetical cognitive 
frame-of-reference, a rationale is offered for the central 
ix:,, 
importance cf intimate interpersonal relationships, on t he 
basis of their. survival and adaptivity value, thei.r lon g 
developmental history, and their quantitative centrality 
regarding other conceptual dimensions. The unique qualit ie s 
of a sudden death event as a disruptor of co~nitive function-
• V 
ing and stability is then provided. 
Part II concludes with an explanation of the influence 
of cognitive disruption, subsequent to a sudden death, upon 
the four major spheres in which grief symptoms are manifeste d. 
These are the cognitive, somatic, affective and behavioral 
spheres. 
Part III is a review of the relevant literature of 
mourning, with particular regard ·to the symptomology that 
occurs within these major spheres of functioning. Each 
symptom group is further described according to the termin-
ology and concepts derived from the cognitive model previously 
detailed. 
Part IV offers a literature review of those principle 
determinants which appear to influence a healthy versus a 
pathological outcome of grief. These determinant factors are 
analyzed undel.'." the general categories of (a) Mode of Death, 
(b) Relationship of Survivor to the Deceased, and (c) Char-
acteristics of the survivor. In addition, there is proposed 
for each factor, a cognitive model explanation for its posit i ve 
or negative influence upon the grief process. 
A doctoral dissertation is, -in itself, a major en• 
deavor. However, my perspective on this 'last hurdle' is 
that it really stands as a culminating linkage for a 5-year 
process which required much support, guidance and stimulation 
from ,many p~ople, I wish to acknowedgle a few of them speci• 
fically. 
Dr. James Prochaska has accompanied me through the five 
years as my major professor••• through courses, clinical 
cases, comprehensive exams, a master's thesis, an abortive 
and a completed doctoral dissertation, My committee, Drs. 
Larry Grebste1n, Albert Lott and Richard Travisano, have 
likewise adviaed and supported me at critical points. I am 
indebted to each of them. 
Along the way, various other faculty members have ex-
tended themselves to me personally and intellectually, help• 
ing me to grow in both these dimensions. I must especially 
thank Dr. Alan Willoughby, my clinical mentor, who never 
stopped reminding me that psyches live in a body, and the 
body, i .n turn, lives in an enviromental context •••• and that 
the person must be viewed in this totality. I have learned 
much at his side. I shall return to him often for counsel. 
Though my peers have always been a source of stimula• 
tlon and ideas, particular acknowledgement must be directed 
toward two colleagues. Herb Wax was an initial and continuing 
catalyst: for my thlru-.in~ about man. He helped me to cohese 
a philosophy and world view, both congruent with my own 
values and functional i n unde rst anding t he indi vid ua l from 
his own existential st ances Ira Sil verman has been my con• 
sistent supporter and critic, co-planner for the future and 
co-Monday-mornin~•quarterback of the past, reality tester, 
idea reflect:or, indi~nation sharer. We have learned to trust 
each other. I believe it is very difficult t:o survive Graduate 
School without a .reliable friend. Ira has been my friend. 
When I embarked on this road, my parents embraced the 
decision and committed themselves to its achievement. The 
road could not have been traveled at all without their sus-
tained involvement. They have been unflinching. At each pla-
teau, they've expressed their pride ip roe. At this juncture, 
I want them to know how proud I am of them. Dana and Kim, my 
daughters, have literally grown up with my schooling, always 
understanding, concerned and caring about me and what I was 
trying to accomplish. They've given me joy, warmth, insight 
and peace as .they have grown. I have needed these ~ifts to 
make it thru. 
In talking about: the Ph.D,, I'm frequently questioned 
on my usa~e of "we", when the 1.lstener expects the pronoun "I". 
\ 
My usage is neither error, nor manuveur, but rather a genuine 
(and for me, a very automatic) expression of the partnership 
which exists between my wife, Carole, and myself. She has been 
my primary resource in all ways. We've spent five years togeth• 
er in this task. We've laughed,cried, fought, loved, been joy-
ously exhilirated and profoundly disap pointed. We have spent 
endless days and exhaustiM niAAts talkin~, sharing, reflecti~, 
deciding, sometimes .1ust sitting and not knowirtg what to do. My 
Xi.i.. 
woman has gtven me much coffee, much effort and much sacrific e 
for my goals • We a~e very uiuch in love. 
I. I~'TRObUCTION 
Tradithu 1ally, the obs~rvation of grief has been made 
frGm a rather well-defined per~pective based 0n a psyche-
analytic ,model of man (Freud, 1917). This model and its 
medern variations (e.g., Bowlby, 1960a Pollack, 1961) have 
had considerable influence on the understandint, explana-
tion and amelioration of bereave ment. Since this pervasive 
psychodynamic understanding ~f grief is founded on challenge• 
able assumptions about the nature of man's functioning, it 
ls possible to pose an alternate set of assumptiene and to 
deduce an alternative understanding of the bereavement phen-
emenon. Such a purpose is the primary thrust ef this dis• 
sertation. 
It is not my intention to initiate a co11frontati.cm 
with psycheanalytic notions - en aimply a new battlegr~und, 
grief• although the learning theerists (e.g., Salter, 1963) 
and others have shewn how enticing this is te de. Rather, my 
intention is t• develop a medel f•r the understanding of 
grief which prevides a more cogent and eemprehensible ex-
planatien of this experience than has been provided by the 
traditional psychoanalytic paradigm. Whether my medel is 
'better' than the older one is left, aa it must be, te the 
ev~luative criteria of the reader. Hawever, it oan be c•nfi• 
dently stated that my notions are, in fact, censiderably 
different from the psychean.alytic description and, therefere, 
prevlde a distinct and optional framework fer viewing be• 
reavement. 
Ids intend to suppert the viability ef my medel 
.c1long th� dirnen.n im1s (1f ( .a) intt�r.nl'l-1 14'1e;ic and consistency, 
(i:>) it8 0xtern�l cog�:o.cy, (c) its dest�ript:ive p�wer for 
the knewn sympttHi.olc.{!;y uf grief, as WtSll �s (d) its explnn• 
atory power ft,r the ir.1pGrtant determinant f;actGre influenctn� 
grief eutco11e11 
Fellewi� a brief descriptien bel•w of the general 
traditional n(jt:i.ens ab�ut grief, the emphasis in the bal• 
ance ef this treatise will be upen the building of my ewn 
model, rather than th� presentatien •fa point-by-point 
comparison. The basic psycheanalytic assumptiens about man 
are available threughaut the literature (e.g., Cameron, 
1963, Fenichel, 1945) and w�n•t be repeated here. Th� 
description belew is a fair and reas•nable summary of the 
grief phenomenon from the psychoanalytic viewpeint. Hewever, 
my ewn bias Sh4:>uld be stated at this peint and can be put 
forth succinctly. I disagree, respectfully, but firmly, 
with a deterministic philosophy about the nature ef man. 
As a censequence, my choice of assumptiens are different 
and, therefore, my explanatien and eenclusiGns are different. 
Id• nat intend te diligently argue agairu1t the psycho• 
analytic medel ef grief, I perceive my major responsibility 
here as ene of presenting and establishing the rationale 
and support for a new paradigm of meurning, without neces­
sarily attempting te unseat the old representative. The 
purpose of pres'!,nt:in� the t:raditi4)nal bereavement descrip• 
tion to which I'll now turn is ene ef simple jluctaposition, 
net competitien. This will be followed by the main bedy cf 
the work ai.med at pregressing toward an original model of 
normal and p;;.t h (;ll~gic :a'!-. m~ur ning., 
Historic.i.lly, gri~f and ra1»urn .ing have b~en essenti.a.lly 
viewed as acute depressive r~actions t'.G .n int.erperscn2.l 
less, with ·•cc.sienal extension ef the term t• include ether 
fem.a of loss, such as job, status or limbs (Buss, 1966; 
Parkes, 1972). The explanation ef why such a less should 
result in this type ef reaction has generally been framed in 
affecti 11,.1e terms. The paradigm is one ,af emotienal ,.b•ndin~. 
The individual is described as having been emetionally btt1.md 
to the deceased (•cathected') because the latter h~d fulfilled 
a variety ef emotional and practical needs •f the mourner. 
The less is construed to be representative and reminiscent 
ef ether peri~ds in the person's developmental history during 
which the security of need gratification was, for seme r~asen. 
absent. As a result ef the, perhaps unc•nscieus, reminiscent 
experience plus the current episode ef need frustratien and 
security less, the meurner is pestulated as experiencing ever~ 
whelming and primitive (i.e., histerical) anxiety which 
approaches panic and forbedes d~em, Thus, the rupture of a 
highly intense, energized emetisnal bending (based •n need 
gratificati•n) yields a highly intense, energized emetienal 
set ef sympt•ms ••• anxiety and despair, Other affective 
symptems are alse included in the dominant pertrait ef the 
meurning syndrome. Anger is explained as the emotional 
resp•nse t• being abandened by the l•ved ener a rage expressed 
t•ward the deceased fer having arbitrarily severed a mutual 
bond. Guilt is explained either as a reacti@n to the exper-
ienced, yet unacceptable, rage toward the deceased er as re~ret 
feir n~t meeting the n~eds t,f th~ aece~.s~d 11 
The emphasis througheut this par .2di.sm is upon the em"• 
tier1al ties t0 the deceased, often postulated 2s parallel to 
the e11oti.cnal ties ef the infant/child te its parents (Bowlby, 
1961,1963). The los~ is that ef emotional gratificatien, a 
breaking •fan affective link with a significant, security 
preducing, need fulfilling other person. The symptoms ef 
grief are, therefore, viewed as prim«rily ~ffective or at 
least affectively derived. It is a m~del which focuses en 
the dependenc~ of <>ne individual in relation te another ~long 
the emetienal dimerusien, and it is presumed to be based en 
his pret•typic emotienal relationships of earlier years. 
As an alternative perspecti.ve, I will put forth a model 
of mourning which fecuses en the cegnltive, rather than the 
em•tional, integrity ef the individual. In its explanatien 
ef the grief precess, my medel leans heavily upon the impert-
. ance ef the individual's cenceptual framework, rather than 
his need-fulfilling emotional-bonding to anether. The em-
phasis is upen the structural conceptualizatien of the persen's 
werld, from his peint ef view. For this reasen, I've chosen 
te term my paradigm a 'cognitive model' ef acute grief. 
Cegnitive is defined here as referring to the conceptual 
meanings and categeries which the individual applies t• 
events (persons, places, things, eccurrences) that he en-
c•unters and which permit him to erganize his experiences 
into seme c~mprehensible ferm. 
Altheugh my cognitive model shares some bas ic pre-
suppositions with cognitive theeries and orientati~ns that 
have be~n i5lp1'i.~d te @ther. psychfi1i!{4gic ~1 phermmena, it is ~ 
my intent t(!) i.rrt.~6r ~t ~ t:ht~ ~xta n.t llt .er.at.,.::.re Gf cognitive 
psychology or c ngnit'l.ve the a ry.. My p .. trp ~se is to dem~nstrate 
the WiDrthwhU.e application c f this particular perspective to 
an event, acute grief, :,1hich has net yet been explained frcm 
this viewpotnt:. This ls net a superfluous re-application of 
a standard rn~del to si..mply another area.. Rather, the cogni-
tive medel ef acute grief will be presented as a more 
cemprehensive and more comprehensible explanation of this 
experience than are ~ther paradigms which have been previously 
applied to meurning. It is my general premise that the 
cognitive meaning and effect of sudden death is m(!)re relevant: 
te the survivor's experience than is the emotional impact .ef 
this trauma~ic event. 
II. TOWARD A COG~1ITIVE MODEL OF' GRIEF 
The sudden d~a.th cf~ signific~nt other person preeipi-
tates a varie ·ty of co gni ti ve , s omatic, affect:i.ve and 
behavieral ch&1nges in the bll!reaved. The content and extent 
of these changes will be detailed at length in Part III of 
this dissert:.ation. However, in order to recognize and 
underst;ind that the bereave -ment experien-c~ is actually a 
unique, atypical conditi.011 for the individual, it is first 
necessary to postulate the persen's normal, routine functioning. 
In addition, this pe$tulatien of routine functioning serves as 
a useful vehicle for explaining my assumptions, perspectives 
and concepts concerning the cognitive n.ture of man. 
A. ~ Basi,g pogpi,t,ly~ ~ework 
1. Functional Value of Cognitive Framework 
A basic asa,...mtption ef the madel is that the individual 
funtions within a self-developed framework of meanings and 
interpretations of his world, similar tG Kelly's (1963) theory 
of "personal constructs". It is a framework which the persQn 
strives to maintain lest it deteriorate and c-.use his caigni ... 
zance of his life to become meaningless and chaotic. Yet it 
is als .o a framework which he attempts to gradually expand 
and extend in erder to secure greater predictive control 
over events which he encounters and events whtch influence 
his geal attainment (Kelly, 1963). Thus,'man is basically 
postulated as being motivated (a) to make sense out ef inter-
actions with his environment, (b) to minimize ambiguity and 
uncertainty, (c) te be able to entertain experi~nces within 
his scope of understanding; and (d) te sufficie ntly grasp 
the meaning and r~lev anc@ ~f ~vent9 en ~st~ bet ter predict, 
and thereby cen tr~l, the outco me of his decisi~ns and actif'.ms. 
To accomplish these ends, the individu.il builds and refines 
during his develop ment (as discussed in the next chapter) a 
eyste11 or meth ~d fer comprehending the events that inevitably 
impinge upon him. In effect~ he learns to cope with life's 
contingencies by devel~ping a pers tmalized method ef concept• 
ualizingt interpreting and applying meaning te events (Bruner, 
1957a Harvey et al, 1961; Kelly, 1963; Miller et al, 19601 
Piaget, 1961, Shapiro, 1965r Shneidman, 1970). 
Since this cognitive system of censtruing events is 
postulated as the foundation for the individual's interaction 
with the werld, it is therefore essential that the framework 
be protected, or at the least, maintained. If it is not main• 
tained, then the alternative is confusion, an inability to 
understand what is going en areund him, a sequence ef chaotic 
interactions with the environment for which there is no con• 
ceptual reseurce for adequate coping. This hypothesized need 
te maintain and pretect ene's cognitive perspective of the 
werld is partially supported by the 'cognitive consistency' 
theorists in the field of attitude change (e.g., Abelsen & 
Rosenberg, 1960; Festinger, 1964s Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1943, 
Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). 
2, Validation 
In order te achieve this maintenance of hia cognitive 
framework, man exerts considerable effort at obtaining valid-
ation and support for the particular way in which he censtrues 
events. He does thi.s by subjecting his interpretations te 
7. 
tests, in c,rdt!r t:0 learn whether his framework satisfacterily 
explains his experience&.. This fom of cognitive system valid­
ation has been discussed at length by Kelly (1963). Validati0n 
is said te occur when the predictiam based en the system is 
cenfirmed by the experiential eut�ome. For example, people 
who talk softly are conceptualized as cooperative and friendly� 
Therefore, encounters with-soft-spoken persons are expected 
and predicted to be cooperative and friendly meeti.ngs. 
Validation is a form of subjective hypethesis testing 
in the individuat•s day-te•day activities which permits him 
te confirm and thereby maintain his c�gnitive framework. This 
confirmatien, in turn, keeps him in stable equilibrium with 
the world ef events that he reutinely encounters, since he 
then pessesses an appropriate framework for understanding 
these events (e.g., understanding and expecting that as a 
persen's veice rises, he predictably becomes less cooperative 
and friendly). His particular c0nceptual stance has been 
re-affirmed, his cognitive structure proven useful and accurate. 
The individual can then use that understanding ef his environ­
ment to (a) oh�ese between a variety of optional actions that 
may lead him cleser to his valued goals (e.g., attempt to 
increase the frequency of his interactiens with soft-speken, 
and therefore cooperative, persons)1 or (b) he can use the 
understanding to increase his predictive pr0babilities regarding 
future events (e.g., be able to assess the likelih0od of 
eventual coeperation of an�ther person by the velume ef his 
conversation), or (c) he can use it ta confirm and be reassured 
regarding th�se persenal meanings whlch he has assigned to 
aspe~ts of hie own li fe (~. g;, t ·viewing hi.mself as cooper at iv e 
and friendly since he, to o, is s.gft•s poken ). In other words, 
in addition t (O fu1 fiil i ng th~ b&:sic need ~f understanding one's 
WG>rld and av oiding confusion in relation to it, the validated 
cognitive framewerk serves functional purposes: (a) of aiding 
goal attainment, (b) of increasing the likelihood that expecta• 
tion will match actuality, and (c) ef pr~viding meaningfulness 
to one's life. 
3. Invalidation 
When one's cognitive framework is not validated by 
reality (i.e,, the predicti0n is not confirmed), then the 
individual must either reject 0r accept this incongruity 
(Festinger, 1964, Kelly, 1963; R11gers, 1951). For example, 
the individual interacts with someone who speaks seftly, but 
who is neither coeperative, nor friendly. He m.y either 
accept 0r reject this invalidatien ef his cognitive system's 
prediction. 
If he chooses rejection, then he may either distort or 
deny the . actual outcome of his prediction (Rogers, 1951), 
Distortion involves the fitting ef the event into his pre-
conceived notions, even though it does not really match (e.g., 
by rationalizing that the unfriendly person's soft voice was 
due to a sere thr eat or the fact they were in a public place). 
Or the distortien may take the extreme form ef a denials denial 
that the particular event even occurred or denial that his 
framework's validation is in any way affected by the outcome, 
such aD by disbelieving the lack of coc,peration. 
If the individual chooses te accept the incongruence 
between pred l cti @n and $Ut\' )eme , t.h~n h~~ mus t experie nce an 
adjustment or m0dificat:ion fJf his ct!>gnitive sys tem in or de r .. 
te accommodate tht! une ::irpecte d eutce me (Festin ge r, 1964, 
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Kelly, 19631 Rogers, 1951). In the 1-.tter case, the framework 
is changed rather than the expert ence distGrted er dented. 
Fer example, by delineating coeperatien and friendliness, such 
that soft spoken pers ons are expected te be coeperative and/ er 
friendly, but not necessarily both. Such change in one's . 
conceptual system is the basis fer cognitive development, 
. growth and expansion. 
Whether there is experiential distortion or cegnitive 
medification appears to be a functien of the ~~ount ef struc-
tural change required ef the system by the events and a 
function of the tolerance tc change that the framew0rk 
possesses at a particular ti me, beyond which there•s risk of 
breakdewn (Mehrebian, 1968). If soft speken -others were 
expected to be not only coeperative and friendly, but alse 
affectienate, cempassi~nate, intelligent and attentive, then 
invalidation weuld involve readjustment &f more cognitive 
dimensi ons. If the individu al could only cope with 4 si mul-
taneeus CGgnitive matrix medificatien~ then the situatienal 
demand f e r 6 simultaneous chan ges weuld overload the pers on's 
abilities. Since the cogniti ve framework's self-maintenance 
is p•sed as a basic motive, any significant threat t• the 
integri ty of the system will prebably be pr otected against. 
The threat may take the ferm ~fan envir cnmental interaction 
that demands multiple, simult aneous adjustments which are 
beyond the change•telerance l imits ef the system (e.g., arrival 
in a new coun t ry with a d i fferent culture); 01· · it may take 
the form of a sir..guiar, but overw helming evenc which requires 
major framework overhaul in order to be accommodated (e.g., 
sudden death of a significant other). These types of threats 
may result in gradual and prolonged readjustment or protec-
tive distortion/deni.e.1 or (if there's insufficient protection) 
cognitive system breakdown. The consequences of such a break-
down are detailed later. 
4. Multi-Dimensional Structure 
Leaving the interaction and validation ideas for awhile 
and turning to the cognitive framework itself, it appears 
that a single, or even several, dimensions of such a cognitive 
system would be relatively insufficient for dealing with the 
complexities of living. Living involves interaction with more 
than soft spoken persons. The multiple and varied events that 
daily confront the individual, each of which must be perceived, 
comprehended, interpreted and given meaning, results in an 
overall demand for a complex, rather than simple, set of cog-
nitive dimensions (Kelly, 1963D. It is postulated that one 0 s 
set of cognitive dimensions is, in fact, a complex matrix and 
that it is never complete or finite. It is always subject to 
expansion and growth, either by the addition of new dimensions . 
or the refinement of old ones. This notion of a multi-dimension-
al cognitive matrix is derived from the earlier assumption 
concerning the individual's need to maintain and protect his 
frame of reference. The expa~ion of his cognitive matrix 
has an adaptive and an anti-threat function because it allows 
the individual to interact with a greater number of environmental 
phen~men~ (e .. g ., t h~se wh~ spes.l< s tift1.y itnd harsh ly and 
moderately), since he '$ *P(e.na.ttng .fr~:11 .a br cade r conceptual 
base. The refin ement a ls t'> redu ces the pr0bability ef 
encountering .;.n event fGr whic h he has no ,a.dequate conceptual 
dimensien (e.g., assess ment e f technic ~l skill rather chan 
cef)peratien). 
In the more adva.ncl'!d or expanded f errns of cognitiv e 
framework as they nermally exist in the adult, it can be 
assumed that the system ~f viewing the world is multi• 
dimensional and rather intricate, aptly termed a 'matrix'. 
It is prep•sed as an interwoven and integrated matrix of 
c~nceptual di mensions which previde the framewerk er frarae-
•f-reference for making s eme organized and comprehensible 
sense out of csmplicated interactiens with the werld. The 
individual's cognitive matrix forms the basis f • r the pers on's 
perceptual and interpretive stance vis-a-vis the environment. 
It is the structural array of cenceptual dimensions upon which 
events impinge. 
In the adult, it is assumed that the cemponents ef this 
structural array are refined and cemprised of erganized sets 
and subsets {Dabrowski, 1964; Piaget, 1960J Werner, 1957). 
This delineation permits the individual to perceive the world 
in a selective, s ~phisticated fashion, rather than indiscrim• 
inately in a crude, gl~bal manner. It also allows him t• give 
dlfferent:ial interpretati on and meaning to events, rather than 
forcing experiences into br ea d and relatively meaningless 
categeries. 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This developmental chapter is aimed at offertng an 
ontogenetic foundation for my position of adult man being 
basically motivated by and affected in the cognitive sp here. 
My intent is to postulate so me _  developmental processes that 
would explain how the individual attains the state .of adult 
cognitive functioning discussed in the preceding pages. 
I also intend to use the processes of the developmenta l 
sequence as tools for the description and explanation of 
certain aspects of acute grief. In other words, the survivor's 
experience of and sympto mology consequent to a sudden death 
event, can be partially explained and Ui~derstood by using 
terminology of and reference to the more general rules of 
cognitive system development. For example, there are some 
similarities (e.g., temporary confusion; readjustment) be-
tween the cognitive aftermath of a sudd~n death and that of 
other epigenetic crises, such as initial schooling, puberty 
and marriage (Cumming & Cumming, 1962, Dabrowski, 1964). By 
a general discussion of how life's encounters are experienced 
and adjusted to, it is possible to arti.culate some elements 
of a basic pattern of development -which can then be applied 
to the acute grief phenomenon. 
The particular mixt ure of ideas presented in this section 
is my own, although I have l e aned heavily upon and am indebte d 
to several theorlsts for pr oviding key ingredients for my 
brew (Dabro wski, 1964! Mehrabian, 19681 Piaget, 1960; 
Werner. 1957). 
2. Survival and Adaptat io n 
It is assumed that a basic function of living organis ms 
is survival, and that continued survival is necessarily con• 
tingent on the organism's ability to adapt to its environ-
ment. Such adaptation is interactional in nature, since it 
involves mutual, though not always equal, effects on both 
organism and the environs. For example, the intake and 
digestion of food involves changes upon the nutrient itself 
and the body chemistry of the organism. The converse is not 
necessarily true, since some interactions may not result in 
the organism's survival potential being enhanced (e.g., 
poisoned food). These would not be considered adaptive. 
Nonetheless, overall adaptation activities for survival 
purposes is seen as a primary function o.f living organisms, 
including man. The necessity to adapt in order to survive 
is also postulated as an energizer for the developmental drive, 
since developmental progress (as defined below) increases the 
organism's adaptive options and possibilities, thereby in• 
creasing its survival potential. 
Development, by definition (Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language, Unabridged Edition) means "to bring to 
a more advanced or effective state, to cause to grow, elab• 
orate or expand in detail; to cause to go through the process 
of natural evolution from a previous lower••• to a later and 
more complex stage, to undergo differentiation in ontogeny•••"• 
Werner (1957a) has applied this definition to the natural 
develo pment of man. namely that ..... wherever development 
occurs. it proceeds from a state of relative globality and 
lack of differentiation to a s tate of increasing differentia• 
tion, articulation and hierarchal integration~. 
These notions are borro wed from biology where phylogen ·• 
etically and ontogenically more advanced states are more 
highly differentiated and, as a corollary, more organized, 
They are also typically more adaptive because they enable the 
organism to successfully cope with more complex stimuli 
(Dabrowski, 1964). The psychological equivalents of this 
biological metaphor (e.g., of cells, tissues, organs and 
systems) are postulated to be the cognitive units, categories, 
conceptual dimensions and systems which make up the overall 
cognitive framework of man. These units have been referred to 
by other theorists as schemas (Piaget, 1960), constructs (Kelly, 
1963), perceptual sets (Bruner, 1957), plans and strategies 
(Miller et al, 1960) and concepts (Harvey et al, 1961). They 
are the cognitive, rather than biological, mechanisms by which 
the individual knows about, interacts with, adapts to and 
survives in his world, 
The developmental progress of this cognitive sphere has 
important adaptation and survival function since it enables 
the individual to interact with increasingly complex environ-
mental impingements (Dabrowski, 1964), as well as enhancing 
his predictive and controlling abilities in relation to 
external events (Kelly, 1963). The manner of this cognitive 
developmental progress from the global undifferentiated state 
of the neonate to the complex, multi-dimensional state of the 
adult is relatively straightforward. It involves continual 
differentiation and delineation such that the cognitive 
ci,mponents become more detailE 1d and become integrated at a 
more advanced level of hiera r chal orgar1;ization (Dabrowski, 
1964, Piaget, 19601 Wern€r, 1957) , The payoff for cognitive 
development is the continued improvement of the individual's 
ability to make better sense out of the disorganized stimuli 
input coinci.dental to living. It also provides concomitant 
survival advantages in the control or management of his expe r -
iences and his environmental interactions. 
3. Actively Cognizing Events 
Implicit in this description is the assumption that man 
takes a highly active role in the construing of his world, 
that he is not simply the passive recipient and reactor to 
external stimuli. He structures the incoming experiences and 
stimulations according to the cognitive dimensions which a r e 
available to him (for example, see Bruner, 1957). This acti ve 
construing of events is partially necessitated by the disorgan-
ized way in which the environment impinges on a person and the 
functional benefits of making sense out of the chaos. The 
greater the refinement or development of the cognitive dimen-
sions, the more effectively and efficiently can the individual 
organize the data, exert influence over its effect on him, and 
modify his im:eractions to maximize his gain, growth and survival . 
Since the individual can actively construe or structure 
events only within the limits of his cognitive framework, 
it is important to explore the processes by which those limits 
are broadened. Based on the discussion thus far, it is 
assumed that matrix expansion is an adaptive and desirable 
change. This chan ge can occur th r ough greater separation/ 
differentiation of components (e.,go� delineating soft­
spoken males from soft-spoken females): or through more 
eloquent organization of sub-ordinate and super-ordinate 
dimensions (e.g., organizing the concepts so that coopera­
tion is more tmportant than and.subsumes friendliness), 
. or through more refined and intricate integration/inter­
relation of cognitive categories (e.g., cooperation and 
friendship are delineated and related to business and social 
interactions, respectively). Conversely, constriction of· 
one's cognitive system, or inertia, when environmental 
demands require expansion, may be considered either non­
adaptive or rnal-adaptive. 
4. Stages of Cognitive Development
Considering the actual process of cognitive development, 
both Werner (1957) and Piaget (1960) suggest: that the 
neonate's cognitive dimensions are relatively few in number 
and globally undifferentiated. Quite probably, there is not 
even a clear distinction between environmentally and self­
generated stimuli (Piaget, 19601 Werner, 1957). Sensa-
tions are experienced without categorization. As he develops, 
there is gradual delineation of elements in the infant's 
cognitive sphere as crude distinctions emerge, such as 
between self and not-self. Further growth results in still 
additional refinements so that persons, things or occur• 
rences which were initially experienced as non-distinct 
sensations soon begin to form particular sensation patterns. 
These become familiar sensate categories and may be con­
sidered distinct 'percepts'. 
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The progress of. the tnfant • s cognH:i've development 
from the experiencing of global sensations to the experien­
cing of sets of sen.�ations as distinct percepts has been 
explored at length by Werner (1957) and particularly Piaget 
(1960). The latter has adopted the aforementioned defini­
tion of development in his description of the forward 
movement from primi.tive cognition (i.e., global sensations) 
through percept formation (i.e., grouped and di.stinctive 
sensations) to the more advanced cognitive stage of concept 
formation. According to Piaget (1960), the ontogeny of 
cognition involves the advancement through increasingly 
differentiated, organized and adaptively efficient stages 
which he terms sensorimotor, perceptual and conceptual. 
The adaptive value of this progressive advancement into 
the conceptual stage of functioning is that abstract con­
ceptualization frees the individual from being bound to the 
immediate presence of sensory stimulation for utilization 
of his cognitive categories. Sensorirnotor dimensions require 
the presence of the objects being cognizeds perceptual 
dimensions require direct sensory stimulations however, 
conceptual categories can operate without such direct contact 
with or stimulation by the particular object. The object, 
person or event being considered can be •re-presented' to 
the individual by a conceptual, rather than tangible, repli­
cation. E.ither an image ·of the object is generated (e.g., 
mentally picturing one's spouse), or the salient features 
of the object (i.e., the conceptual dimension criteria by 
which it is categorized) are abstractly defined (e.g., spouse's 
, 
affection, calmness, li kes antl dislikes, idea s ). Inter• 
action with the environment is no longer contingent upon 
the requirement of actually acting upon or manipulating 
direct and concrete stimulations. 
Furthermore, representation permits the individual to 
deal with events which are hypothetical, conditional and 
possibile, rather than only the concrete givens of actual• 
lty. This cognitive ability to inquire into the realm of 'if' 
results in a significant adaptive gain, for it opens the 
arena of future prediction to the individual. It provides 
the tools for weighing outcome probabilities for certain 
future (non-concrete) actions and thereby improves both 
predictive and controlling capabilities. 
These developmental notions are summarized in Figure 2. 
c. Assessment Criteria 12£ Cognitive Develop ment and Functionin,.g 
After a brief narrative regarding (1) individual 
differences and (2) cognition, conation and affection, I 
will describe four proposed criteria of cognitive functiona 
ing which I've termed (3) disjunction, (4) absorption -
modification, (5) constriction-dilation, and (6) objectivity-
subjectivity. I believe these are t~e principle developw 
mental dimensions along which regression occure during acute 
grief. They are the basic concepts that I will use later 
to describe and explain the symptoms and determinants of 
the mourning process. 
1. - Individual Differences 
These notions about cognitive development convey some 
important implications concerning the state of the cognitive 
Figure 2. Summary Chart of the Development~ of the Cognitive Matrix 
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framework of the adult, especially regarding differences 
between individuals. It is reasonable that the numerous 
developmental experiences of different individuals will 
result in various idiosyncratic conceptual categories 
that are distinctive for each person, Differentiation 
may break the event into novel components, organization may 
take a variety of structural forms, and integration of ele-
ments may be based on person-specific cognitive relationships. 
By adulthood, people are likely to have available some 
similar cognitive categories, as well as their own unique 
dimensions for construing events and coping with life. Those 
shared cognitions are exemplified by the comprehension of 
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simple physical events (e.g., a chair) in which the common 
cultural influence is the main factor affecting the individual's 
understanding. The idiosyncratic constructions of events 
typically involve those interactions which are complex and 
ambiguous, that is, in which there are no significant cult-
ural anchors for understanding the phenomenon (e.g., many 
interpersonal relationships and interactions). It is in 
these ambiguous situations that the individual is likely to 
exert a more pronounced, active and personalized effort in 
the cognitive structuring of his experience (Mehrabian, 1968), 
· 2. Cognition, Affection and Co11ation 
There are also probable differences, both between people 
and within the same individual, as a function of the partic• 
ular content area under consideration, During development, 
not only are content areas delineated from one another 
(e.g., global cognition "other people" is differentiated 
into derivati.ve dimensions «malf.l'~ and female" other people), 
but within each content area itself, there is further intraN 
separation into cognitive, cona.tive and affective elements. 
The latter distinctions are common ways of describing a 
person's relationship with others, objects and events in his 
world. Cognition, as already mentioned, refers to the manner 
in which the individual comprehends or knows his world (e.g., 
recognizes a woman by her figure), conation refers to the 
per-son's desire or wish (or lack of it) for objects/others 
(e.g., desiring to touch a woman's hand), and affection 
refers to the person's positive and negative feelings or 
emotions toward elements in his world (e.g., experiencing 
pleasure at touching her hand). Analagous to the general 
differentiation process described above, within a given 
content area, these three modes of relating to the environ-
ment progress from a merged state (e.g., recognition, desire 
and pleasure experienced simultaneously at sighting a woman) 
to a defi.ned triadic state (as exemplified above). Originally, 
there is a lack of differentiation of cognition from conation 
and affection. With ontogenetic advance, there's increased 
independence between one's cognitive, conative and affective 
relationship to events (Mehrabian, 1968). 
Thus, in infancy, comprehension of an object is strongly 
influenced by the infant's desire and feelings toward that 
object. In adulthood, assuming normal development, compre• 
hension of an object according to available cognitive dimen-
sions (e.g., blue car) can be accomplished without regard 
to one's like or dislike (affection) for the item or the 
desire for/re je ction of the i t em (conatio n). There is 
undoubtedly bet ween- i ndi vi dua l vari ance regarding the degree 
of separation of cogni t ion, conation and affection in 
relation to objects. Some people are emotionally aroused 
by a news article. Others a re not. There is also within-
individual variance depending en the particular content 
area. For every individual, there are most probably given 
content areas where the merging of thoughts, feelings and 
desires is very strong and minimally differentiated. 
3. Disjunction 
These ideas yield some c r iteria for assessing the degree 
of cognitive development in the individual. The yield also 
includes terminology and approaches for describing some 
general types of cognitive styles or frameworks (i.e., typical 
stances which people assume in their interaction with the 
world). For example, we may consider the separation of 
cognition from conation and affection as a process of 
"disjunction". This concept is similar to Freud's (1917) 
notion of isolation and to Piaget's (1960) description of 
dis-engagement. 
By definition, greater disjunction (or separation) of 
these modes of relating to events is indicative of a higher 
level of developmental growth, resulting in more successful 
adaptation and an increased s urvival potential. The individual 
who has disjcined a variety of content areas is hypothetically 
better able to cope with life, such as the businessman whose 
decisions are based on info rmation (i.e., cogn i tions) about 
his clients rather than his emotional feelings {i.e.; 
affe~ti cms) toward t hem. 
By postulating deg ree - of -disjunction as a continuum, 
it is pos sible to compare ~he ontogenetic gro wth between 
individ ua ls on this crite r ion. Some individuals are emo-
tionall y ,aroused by many different events. Others are 
aroused by relatively few encounters. It is also possible 
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to asse s.rs which cognitive categories within an individual are 
more su sc eptible (due to a low degree of disjunction) to 
conative and affective influence, such as categories involving 
interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, this criterion 
permits a description of the particular person in terms of 
disjunc ti on, which portray his degree of cognitive indepen-
dence from the bias of his feelings and desires. For example, 
a perso n can be depicted as highly disjunctive (i.e., emo-
tionall y unbiased) regarding the contents of his automobile 
driving experience, but minimally disjunctive {i.e., emotion-
ally in volved) regarding nis girlfriend. Or an overall 
descrip ti on can be evoked, for example, by the 'high-
moderate1disjunctive person who is gen~rally able to construe 
and int er act with events (e.g., business decisions) irres-
pective of his desires or emotions in relation to the events. 
Product io n of such a 'disjunction scale' is beyond the scope 
of this - ·writing, but may be a relevant empirical follow-up. 
My purp ose here is simply to provide a few cognitive develop-
mental -cr iteria which can be used and understood by the 
reader 1a ter when the consequences of sudden death are 
detaile d in cognitive terms. The notion of disjunction is 
one suc h criterion. 
4. Adaptatton, Absorption-Modification 
Another cri.terion dimension derives from the nature of 
adaptation. As noted earlier regarding food intake, adapt• 
ation is always a mutual interaction between the individual 
and his environment in which each has some effect on the 
other. The balance of these effects can be analyzed from 
the standpoint of the individual. (see Flavell, 1963). As 
he interacts with his milieu, the person typically strikes 
some compromise between total absorption of the event into 
his pre-existing cognitive framework without any substantial 
change to the framework (as in the paranoi.d's incorporation 
of information into his delusional system), or total 
modification of the relevent framework structures so as to 
accommodate the event without changing the event at all 
(as in the highly suggestible state of a deep hypnotic 
trance). Such total or pure absorption and modification is 
highly improbable. However, these extremes may be considered 
as the anchoring ends of a continuum of relative absorption 
versus modification, similar to Piaget's (1960) assimilation/ 
accommodation, respectively; and with some parallel between 
modificati.on and Cameron's (1938) term of overinclusiveness. 
Since adaptation, by definition, is a function with 
mutual effects, absorption and modification must be viewed 
as simultaneous occurrences during any particular inter-
action. They are conceptually, but not actually, separable. 
An alternate way to characterize this same criterion 
refers to the openness-to-change of an individual. A person 
who -is 'highly absorptive• tends to be relatively closed to 
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cognitive ch anges influenc ed by his wor l dly encounters. 
His cognitive f ramework is s tiffen ed or 'rigid' against 
invasion from non-fitting st i muli, which are either 
rejected outright as untrue or irrelevant to him (i.e., 
denied); or the s.timuli are forced to fit by grossly 
distorting them. There ls no readiness to or capability 
of dealing with novel information exc ep t by processing it 
according to the dimensions of the existing matrix, even 
if those dimensions are inap propriate. Cognitive growth 
is stifled because cognition and behavior is dominated by 
repeated and unchanging reap plication of old concepts, 
inappropriate dimensions and anachronistic patterns of 
comprehension. This is perhaps exemplified in its extreme 
by the paranoid individual who force fits reality information 
into his delusional concept s ystem by distorting some or 
all aspects of the data. Those which cannot be distorted 
in this way are simply rejec t ed (denied). 
On the other hand, the person who functions at the 
'highly modifying• extreme of the continuum is overly open• 
to-change. His cognitive structure is too 'labile', too 
highly susceptible and respo ns ive to environmental influence 
with regard to how he construes an event. He is likely to 
form and then re-form cognit i ve dimensions that are unstable, 
with loose and limited intra-structural associations. In 
the . extreme, the non-paranoi d schizophrenic demonstrates 
this looseness of associatio ns and inability to focus his 
attenti on on selected envtro runental stimuli. He is overly 
accessible to the varied su gge stions and impingements of 
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his surroundings, 
In effect, the hi ghly mod i f i abl e individual has a 
shifting and fragile cognitive · framework, which is as non-
adaptive as the stiff and brittle framework of the highly 
absorptive person. As such, both extremes of closedness/ 
openness of the cogniti .ve system to environmental influence 
are representative of relatively low levels of cognitive 
growth, both having limited adaptive effectiveness. 
On this criterion, a more functional position from 
which to comprehend events, persons and objects is one of 
relative equilibrium. In that instance, the individual is 
able to absorb salient and relevant aspects of the encounter 
without distorting them, by modifying those available and 
applicable cognitive dimensions. He can make these changes 
while maintaining his basic cognitive stability and sense 
of continuity. Novel experiences are dealt with 'flexibly' 
by construing them according to existing structural dimen-
sions (absorption), while simultaneously allowing moderate 
changes (modification) of some dimensions to accommodate 
non-fitting aspects of the event. For example, a person 
may meet a homosexual for the first time. He is able to 
deal with many aspects of the interaction with existing 
dimensions (absorption), including the knowledge that this 
person has sexual desires. However, his previous 'sexual 
partner preference' dimension regarding others may be 
modified (via differentiation) to include heterosexual and 
homosexual preferences. 
Adaptive cognitive functioning is, therefore, a 
co ncurrent and prop ort:: i ona te bal ar :ce bet ween e.bsorption 
and mod.i f"i ca tion . It r e:1u lts Ln effective const ruing of 
events, a s well as sti mulating fu rther co gn iti ve development 
in res pon se to the event's modera te demand for cognitive 
change. The growth ca n occur from a new differentiation 
of conc ep ts or from a reorganization of some concepts or 
from t he formation of new integration links of cognitive 
units. 
S. Di lationuConstriction 
A th :ird criterion for assessing and describing the 
develo p1mental stage of the cognitive framework is suggested 
by Kell y {1963). He refers to the axis of dilation-const:ric-
tion up on which an individual may move in response to 
demands fo r expansion or cohesion, respectively, of his 
cogniti ve frame-of-reference. 
At their extremes, dilation is similar to a manic's 
flight «:ll"f ideas, while constriction is similar to an obses-
sive' s na rrowing of his attention to a single theme. 
Dilatio ~/ constriction are cognitive activities, not behavior-
al ones . though there may well be concurrent and similar 
behavio r-al activity (e.g., aimless agitation and compulsivity, 
respect i vely). Dilation/constriction are related to modifi-
cation/ ab.s orption, but are not synonomous with these con cepts. 
Dilati on/ constriction refer to the matrix boundaries as a 
whole, th e number and scope of the dimensions. Modification/ 
absorpt ~o n refer to the readjustment potential or openness 
to cha ng e of the ind ividu al dimensions within the matrix. 
When a person broadens his area of concern or atte ntion 
in order to make better 1;er1se out: of t he onrush of events ~ 
this expansive movement is referred to as dilation of th e 
cognitive matrix. It invol ve s an inten:tioned ~arch ~ng 
for new categories which will aid the person in comprehending 
or explainin g an encounter (e.g., meeting a man dressed in 
woman's clothing, the cognizer searches for conceptual 
understanding by adding dimensions of actor, practical 
joker and transvestite to his cognitive matrix). The activity 
is not a priori .adaptive, for it may take the form of indis-
criminate, non-productive searching for new cognitive 
dimensions (e.g., manicy thinking). Planned, consistent 
and specific goal directed dilation tends to be more eff ec -
tiye, more adaptive and more developmentally mature than is 
disorganized, inconsistent and random dilation. 
1 Constriction involves cognitive activity in the oppos'ite 
direction; that is, an effort to consolidate one's cog nit ive 
framework, to shrink the di mensions and conceptual li mits 
to a more manageable size. The effort is toward protecting 
one's framework by compression, by narrowing the cognitive 
boundaries. Instead of hav in g separate cognitive dimensions 
for comprehending men by their hair color, the dimensions 
are reduced to men with hair and bald men. When this is 
extreme, the pattern of cons t riction can lead to a very 
limited focus cognitive structure (e.g., obsessive concern 
with the presence of hair, with out concepts for dealing 
with other aspects of men's app earance). However, constric-
tion can be quit:e adaptive when the end result is a matrix 
that is more refined and ar ti culated, for example, when. 
irrelevant oi~· poorl y d if f e r entiate d units have been .consoli• 
dated into more meaning fu l cognitive dimensions. 
Extremes of cognitive dilation and constriction activity 
are consi.dered non-adaptive because they tend to be either 
too distended (e.g.,, as occurs with psychedelic drugs) or 
too restrictive (e.g., obsessive rumination). And rapid, 
violent oscillation between dilation and constriction is 
similarly non-adaptive because it creates cognitive confusion 
and represents a lack of stability in the cognitive structure. 
Note that this criterion assesses and describes the individe 
ual in cognitive motion (i.e., dilating or constricting his 
view of the world), rather than addressing his state of 
disjunction or the tendency of his cognitive dimensions to 
be absorptive or modifiable. 
6. Subjectivity-Objectivity 
A final measure of cognitive development to be discussed 
here focuses on the criterion of subjectivity-objectivity. 
The individual who is subjectively biased in his construing 
of experiences tends to conceptualize events only as they 
relate to him. For instance, he hears an advertisement for 
the latest model car and cognitively relates this to his 
spouse's auto death. A neighbor's pet dies and he is reminded 
of his own loss. All cognitive mediation is channelled 
through self, although the differentiation between self and 
not-self dimensions may actually be available. This is, at 
its extreme, a very undeveloped cognitive state, since the 
person fails to exercise a very fundamental distinction. 
Such individuals are often described as 'self-centered' or 
in its pathological form, as having 'idea� of reference'. 
In contrast, a higher level of functioning includes · 
differentiations of the environment·along dimensions external 
to self•reference. These are termed objective, since they 
-·-
involve cognitive categories which are independent of the
cognizer's direct relationship to the particular object,
person or event being dealt with (e.g., being able to assess
the advantages of that new model car without relating it to
the auto accident). The individual understands the exper­
ience along non-self dimensions. The greater the nu�ber of
objective categories available to the individual through
the course of development, the better he is able to assess,
predict and control his experiences without being biased by
an inappropriate self-ref�r�nce. His functioning is more
effective, more adaptive and more mature than his subjective
counterpart.
As discussed more completely in later sections and 
Parts III and IV, I believe that the symptoms of acute grief 
are understandable as regressive changes along one or more 
of these four dimensions. A summary of these criteria is 
given in Figure 3.and in Table 1. 
D. �Importance.Qi� Relationships
1. General
. Thus far, I have theorized about the overall cognitive 
matrix, its general nature and functioning, as well as some 
of its developmental background. This matrix of dimensions, 
meanings and conceptual categories that the individual uses 
to construe his environment is postulated to be a differentiated, 
Figure 3 11 Summary Cha rt for the Ass es,sment Crit:eria of 
Cognitive Deve1 ,opment and Functioning. 
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integrated and organized structure., It is upon these 
structural aspects of man's cognitive frame-of-reference 
that I will now focus attention. 
The actual impinge ment of stimuli is highly variable 
and a function of a person's circumstance and situation. 
Therefore, survival or other fonns of goal-directed behavior 
require some selectivity of comprehension, mediation and 
action choices. A completely chaotic and cognitively 
un-differentiated position vis-a-vis the complex impinging 
stimuli forecloses the possibility of selective and effec-
tive response. Therefore, adaptivity (i.e., effective 
interaction with the environment) implies and necessitates 
an underlying organization of relative coherence. 
--'Organization• itself refers to the existence, within a 
totality, of super-ordinate and sub-ordinate dimensi.ons, and 
to the inter-relationships between these dimensions. There-
fore, a person's cognitive framework is postulated as being 
hierarchically ordered, with certain dimensions having a 
greater centrality or importance than do others with regard 
to the integrity of the cognitive structure as a whole. 
Since my analysis of acute grief presumes that the 
death of a significant other is centrally traumatic to the 
cognitive matrix, it is necessary for me to establish th a t 
. these relationships are, in fact, of core importance. I 
believe that the principle criteria for deducing which dimen-
sions hold core positions in the matrix are (a) their 
relevance to adaptation and survival, (b) their primacy or 
developmental significance, and (c) their quantitative 
centrality; i.e., the number. of other structu r al di mensions 
interre l ated with the component under consideration. 
2. Survival ·and Adaptivity 
With regard to the first criterion, it is reasonable 
to assume that the cognitive dimensions relating to the 
individual's survival functioning (and hence its adaptive 
functioning) are amongst those of central importance, since 
self-maintenance is given as the basic energizing force of 
man. It follows that the viability of these . select structural 
dimensions will have a major influence on the individual's 
environmental interaction and adaptive effectiveness. In 
other words, those aspects of the cognitiv~ frame-of-reference 
which are functionally useful for the individual in self-
maintenance and in attainment of valued goals (e.g., assessing 
another's cooperation) are super-ordinate to those dimen-
sions which are less utilitarian (e.g., assessing another's 
hair color) • 
. -Although there are rare exceptions, man is basically 
a social being, interdependently involved with others for 
reasons of self-maintenance, self-satisfaction and goal 
attainment. Whi.le the degree and intensity of such involve-
ment and dependency vary widely, it is usually granted that 
our survival is largely a function of our interaction with 
other people••• a few of whom take on a greater signifi-
cance than others. The content of our adaptation, i.e., our 
interaction ·with the environment, is primarily other people. 
Typically this includes a select group of people (such as 
family and friends) with whom we interact freq uently around 
most major and many mino r 'issue s. As a result of this fonn 
of adaptation- in teraction, cur fu nctio nal relationships 
with these s i gnificant oth e rs are of corIBiderable impor• 
tance in day-to-day copi ng and self-maintenance. Therefore, 
the cognitive di mensions associated with these relationships 
become relevant to effective survival; hence, they evolve as 
central or core components of the full cognitive matrixe 
3. Primacy 
Primacy refers to the developmental history of a 
particular cognitive component. Those structural di.men• 
sions which appear early in the developmental sequence 
(e.g., self-others) are more likely to be highly differen-
tiated in the adult because of the longer temporal op~or-
tunity for delineation. For similar reasons of greater 
temporal opportunity, there is a higher probability that 
these earlier dimensions are substantially integrated into 
the matrix. Furthermore, since by definition, differentia-
tio~ involves the separation of a larger whole into component 
parts, those cognitive dimensions from which many others are 
derived {i.e., those delineated early in development) are 
likely to have a multiplicity of bonds and linkages through• 
out the matrix. For example, the dimension of 'others' may 
be separated into males and females, then further differen-
tiated into friendly and unfriendly males/females, then 
friendly males who are trust worthy or untrustworthy, etc. 
Trustworthiness may then be linked to the conc ept of 
honesty which is connected to cooperation and so on. 
Finally, during infancy and childhood early di mensions, 
being relati.vcly few in m.,"ffiber, car..ry a greater develop• 
· mental burden or proportion of the indivi.dua.l's compre-
hension of events he encounters. Though this burden is 
diffused as the structure expands with growth, the historical 
association between primacy dimensions and the early and 
adaptively rewarding reductions of impinging stimuli chaos 
are likely to make these dimensions more important to the 
individual. For example, in infancy, the interaction with 
other people may be understood only via the dimension of 
•others'. Since males and females are merged, as are 
friendly and unfriendly males, into this global 'others' 
category, there can be potentially confusing and inconsistent 
interaction with other people who sometimes are male, 
sometimes female, sometimes fri .endly, etc. As differentia-
tion occurs, the early and derived di.mensions (male/female, 
friendliness) allow some reduction of the inconsistency and 
confusion, and are therefore of early and sustained impor-
tance to the cognizer. 
Many theorists, from Freud to Rogers, have noted the 
importance of other people in the very early and emergent 
development of the infant and child. Indeed, the primacy 
of differentiation between sel f and others have been ex• 
pounded upon at length (e.g., Sullivan, 1953) as a major 
developmental indicator of growth. Because of the limited 
self-sufficiency capabilities of the infant and young child, 
human dependency on others for basic sustenance continues 
for a prolonged post-natal period. In other words, the 
individual has an early, initial need for others which occurs 
at the very beginning of one 's d';!vel opmental histor y , an d 
results in early differenti at ion of the world in t o ' me' 
and 'not-me'. The 'not•me' category is largely comprised 
of other people. This initial (primacy) distinction between 
oneself and surrounding others, forms the basis for later 
delineations of different as pects of oneself, and for future 
discriminations between diff e rent others. In other words, 
the conceptual dimensions by which we know aspects of our-
selves, and by which we know distinctions between other 
people, can be viewed as having their origins in these 
early, primacy differentiations of 'me'/'not-me'. There-
fore, an individual's relationship with significant others 
is proposed as having a long developmental history and, 
thereby, meeting the primacy criterion as a core cognitive 
dimension. 
4. Quantitative Centrality 
'Quantitative centrality' refers to the ntm1ber of other 
structural axes which are, in some direct way, related to 
the dimension under consideration. The direct connection 
is an important qualification, because the individual's 
cognitive framework is postulated as a structurally inte-
grated totality. Thus, there are interconnections of 
varying steps or degrees bet ween any two particular compon-
ents. Figuratively, it is possible to move, stepwise, from 
cne corner of the matrix to the opposite corner. However, 
the reference here is to the more direct inter-relationships 
of certain dimensions to many others••• much like t he axle 
of a spoked wheel whi.ch is d i rectly linked to many point:s on 
the cir cumference. Such quan titativ e ly central cogni..tive 
dirnens i on s can be portr r=.J.yed as conceptual categories about 
which l fues a heavily clust er:-ed constellation of other, 
related ~-0nceptual categories. Thus, these central dimen-
sions s er ve as anchoring poi nts for a multiplicity of other 
matrix components which are individually and collectively 
used by th e person in the comprehending of his world. 
Eac h of an individual's relationships with others 
(e.g., w.arital, frie~dship, occupational) are not the same 
in term s -of their numerical linkages to additional compon .. 
ents of h is cognitive matrix. Some of these relationships 
(e.g., marital, parental) are directly involved with a 
greater n umber of cognitive dimensions than are others 
(e.g., occ upational, I recreational). Those relationship 
dimensi m1s which are bound to a larger proportion of daily 
events ar e likely to have a proportionately larger influence 
on the m dividual's overall cognitive functioning, since 
they wi11 be called upon more frequently. Usually, the 
relatlo li.'lShips that rJ11 in this grouping involve intimate 
family m.embers. Their lives and one's own tend to be 
quantit ati vely more inter-related than do the lives of 
people fu rther out on the periphery of one's life-space. 
The qua nt itative centrality of a spouse, parent or child 
is view ed as greater than that of vendor, employer or even 
most f ri.:en ds. The cognitive dimensions concerning these 
more si gnif icant others are directly affiliated with many 
other s tru ctural components with which the individual con• 
strues an d relates to his world. 
S. Self Identity 
In addition to meet in g the tb r ee criteria of a core 
dimension, I be l ieve that relati onships with s ign ificant 
others are essential keystones to an individual's self-
identity. All the various cognitive dimensions that are 
concerned with the relation of oneself to others, objects 
and events in his environment are seen, in their totality, 
as forming an individual's self-identity. The answer to 
"Who am 17" cannot emerge in a vacuum, but takes re l evance 
from its context. Identity~ therefore, is viewed by me as 
arising from the composite of dimensions dealing with 
relationships between the individual and the elements in 
his context. These provide his understanding of himself 
in relation to his world, thereby grounding him, stabilizing 
him within the context of his own life circumstances. How-
ever, all such relationships are not equally significant. 
As core dimensions, I believe the relationships the person 
has with significant others, are central to all other 
identity relationships, as well. 
Based on these ideas.as summarized in Figure 4, I have 
concluded that a person's relationship with significant 
others in hia life, typically i mmediate family members, 
forms a core and basic dimension of his cognitive matrix. 
E. Sudden De2th .2.§. s Disruptor .Qf s ~ Cognitive Dimension 
1. Steady State 
Typically, the individual is in a relatively steady 
Figure 4 a Summ.si.ry Cha rt of Base s f or the Importance of 
Core Rel atio n.st1ips 
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increased differ e ntiati on, re-organizat i on and re-integration. 
The adult is assumed to pos sess a moderately efficient and 
sufficient co nstruct mat rix for. adaptively interacting 
with the environment of which he is a part. His conceptual 
categories, the tools of his comprehension, ordinarily 
suffice to give him some understanding of events, allow 
him to attribute his own meaning to his experiences and 
provide the machinery for processing the data for decision 
making and action choices. The day•to-day, moment•to•moment 
encounters which demand cognitive response are usually met 
competently and routinely by application of the battery 
of structural dimensions available to the person. In this 
way, he is able to maintain his equilibriu m and stability in 
the worlds able to predict certain consequences to his 
behaviors and able to control the variety of chaotic envir-
onmental impingements so as to understand them in some co• 
herent, organized fashion. He is thereby able to increase 
his probabilities for goal-achieving decisions. 
Whenever a moderately novel event is encountered for 
which his cognitive structure is less than proficient (such 
as how to address a man attired in woman's clothing), the 
individual can (a) di stort the experience to make it fit 
the pre-existing struct ure (e.g., address the person as he 
or she, and thereby di sregard the incongruence), (b) deny/ 
reject the experience a l together (e.g., ignore the person), 
(c) construe and respo nd to the event with the conc eptual 
tools he has available (i.e., ineffectively . respond by 
fumbling "he", "she", "it"), or (d) he can attempt to 
modify his cognitive matrix somewhat to meet the moderate 
confrontation. The latter tact might involve some further 
differentiation of an already existing dimension (e~g., 
from men globally to men who wear men's and those who wear 
women's clothing); or it might involve a new combination of 
constructs, a reorganization (e,g., associating women's 
clothing with both sexes rather than linked only to women); 
or it may involve the addition of some wholly novel dimension 
which is then incorporated and integrated into the frame-
work (e,g,, adding the concepts of transvestite or of 
bisexuality or of unisex clothing), Note, the individual's 
cognitive structure is not intended, even ideally, to be 
able to accommodate all stimuli, but rather only intended 
to be able to adaptively comprehend those events which it 
has or is likely to engage, Hence, the normal, steady-state 
of man's cognitive functioning is a mild mixture of coping 
with routine and adjusting to novelty. 
However, some events are undoubtedly more confronting 
of one's cognitive capabilities than are others. They are 
more than moderately novel experiences, Rather, they are 
highly challenging events which demand a considerable 
degree of cognitive adjustment for their competent compre-
hension, These phenomena (e-g., puberty, marriage, retire-
ment) present the individual with a major cognitive challenge. 
2. Confronting Cognitive Challenge 
A critical distinction which the reader must make is 
between the form of cognit ive cha llenge which is confronta-
~ as opposed to a challenge which is destructive • . 
The £9.J.1f..£9ntative cogni t ive challenge can be exemplified 
by a shift in the individual's cultural surroundings, i.e., 
culture shock. He finds himself faced with numerous new 
experiences for which he has no conceptual categories. His 
cognitive ~atrix has not developed an appropriate set of 
dimensions with which to ada pt to the new environs, and he 
is confronted with events that he either can't make sense 
out of (because of his lack of applicable concepts), or 
about which he makes serious errors (because of his applica-
tion of old concepts to a new and different situation). 
Adaptive functioning is reduced since his effective control 
and prediction of interactio n is now seriously limited, 
Culture shock manifests itse l f within the individual as 
massive cognitive overload which requires, after an initial 
period of confusion and disorganization, a period of rapid 
realignment and re-categorization of one's conceptual 
dimensions. The individual must, in order to effectively 
and appropriately cope with h is new cultural context, make 
some important and major cha nge s in the structural framework 
with which he understands the world. 
It is toward this type o f 'confrontative' cognitive 
challenge by sudden overload that Toffler (1970) has 
addressed himself to in Fut ure Shock, where the individual 
is described as being repeatedly challenged by the rapid 
rate of change within his own culture. The resultant con-
fusion, frustration, anxiety . depression and somatic 
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sympto m-o1.ogy decailed by Toffler see ms e. :funct ion of both 
the overl ,oad demand itself and the wea ring down effect of 
its re pet itive ::.1ess. Nonetheless, survival is dependent 
on the i ndividual~s ability to control the chaotic, novel 
and chang ing sti .muli toward a rate of input which allows 
more gradual .readjustment of his construing matrix~ If 
this end can be accomplished, then a confronting cognitive 
challe ng e can become an impetus for cognitive growth. In 
this cas e, a growth spurt occurs because the individual has, 
in a re 1atively short period of time, considerably modified 
his ove r all framework. It is this positive outcome which 
is 1usua 1 1y referred to when "crisis theorists" (e.g., Caplan, 
1964) speak of the important role played by certain life 
crises i n providing the developmental process with an 
impetus toward growth••• It is my contention that a sudden 
death crises poses a cognitive challenge of a very different 
order, 
3. Destructive Cognitive Challenge 
The confrontative/overload challenge demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the existing cognitive system when simultan-
eously f aced with a large array of novel experiences. It 
forces ra pid expansion and modification as the solution. 
However~ the sudden death of a significant other involves 
the dest ruction of a core dimension, not merely its overload 
or conf :rontation. I have described in the previous section, 
the keys tone properties of those cognitive dimensions which 
deal wi.t h significant other people, their importance in 
adapti v\e functioning, their lengthy developmental history 
and their quantitativ e cent ra li t y~ The ·loss of one of 
these core relationship axes challenges the very structural 
integrity of the survivor's conceptual matrix. It is my 
belief that sudden death represents such a loss and results 
in considerable danger to the mourner's continued functioning. 
This is significantly different from a culture shock 
experience. With culture shock, the individual's cognitive 
structure remains intact, though its effectiveness ts 
reduced because of the inadequate capabilities regarding 
the new stimuli. However, the sudden death of an importa nt 
person in one's life results not merely in an assault on 
an existing framework, but rather represents a traumatic 
destructive impact with the concomitant elimination of a 
vital component of the framework itself. 
This destruction is rapidly followed by an onrush of 
events and experiences, not necessarily novel ones, upon 
a seriously damaged cognitive matrix••• a matrix whose 
effectiveness is substantially reduced because of the sudden 
absence of a core dimension, rather than the presence of 
novel stimuli. 
Figure S represents a summary of the above notions. 
4. Suddenness 
It is -necessary to underscore the extreme nature of 
the three components that make up the particular phenomenon 
under review here, namely the (a) sudden, (b) death, (c) .of 
a significant other person. When any even t occurs unex-
pectedly there is no opportunity to prepare or pre-adapt 
to the change. The lack of anticipation forces the person 
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Figure s. Summary Chart of t:::he Effect of Sudden Death as a 
Disruptor of Cognit'ive Functioning 
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to face the event with shocki ng onset. Suddenness leaves 
trauma in its wake, for the demand to cope with major change 
had not been predicted and is, therefore, unplanned and 
disruptive. Ongoing interactions of living continue while 
the individual is still stunned by the event. This compounds 
the confusion of his construing mechanism. The cognitive 
matrix, aimed specifically at the control and prediction 
of events, is faced with its very antithesis••• an unpre-
dicted, unpredictable challenge of maximum import. 
5. Death 
Death, as the event in focus, has special features, 
irrespective of the suddenness of onset. While avoiding the 
many philosophical expositions on the phenomenon of death, 
it is reasonably assumed that it is a mysterious and awesome 
contemplation for most people. The way one conceptualizes 
death, as an abstraction, will certainly have some influence 
on the impact of having to face the loss through death 
of someone important. However, for purposes of this section, 
the significance of the death event lies in its concrete 
consequences, rather than its abstract relevance. The death 
of another person represents an irreversible termination 
of the relationship. The severance is permanent and un-
changeable, without rational hope of re-couping the loss 
or for bringing closure to unfinished aspects of the re-
lationship or for correcting prior errors. Though memories 
may sustain, death, in effect, destroys a cognitive dimension 
along with the linkages that bound other dimensions to it. 
The matrix now contains a void, the size of which is a 
4 0 ,;,, , 
function of whose ·dea th occ,.n.~red . 
6. Signif i cant Othe r 
The importance of cogni t ive structures involving sig~ 
nificant other people in one' s life has already been detailed 
and postulated as core cognit i ve dimensions. This means that 
the relationship is pervasively linked to many other elements 
in the matrix, forming a major constellation of conceptual 
categories and axes by which the individual understands 
himself, his environment and his interactions. The loss of 
such a core dimension leaves a void of sizeable parameters 
and leaves the individual without a large functional portion 
of his previous cognitive framework, though he must still 
encounter and interact with the routine events of daily li f e. 
Thus, the sudden death of a significant other (see 
Figure 6) is viewed as a traumatic and unexpected event which 
results in i.rreversible . damage to an individual's cognitive 
frame-of-reference, rendering a large and core segment of 
that matrix, along with its associated linkages, vacant and 
inoperable. 
Consequently, when a central construct is abruptly 
and irretrievably severed ( i .e., by a sudden death event) 
the individual is no longer confronting, understanding 
and dealing with his world f rom his standard position. In-
stead, he is forced into a s tate of emergency (i.e., acute 
grief), for his usual key r e sources for interaction are no 
longer available to hi m. Furthermore, his cognitive matrix 
and its internal structure f ace a massive insufficiency; 
Figure 6, S.J.r,nn.ar.y" Cb(".\rt of the Bases f or the EffH CtEt of 
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since a pivotal element a:ri-< :l:iiJi.._•·.age (i.e., . a sisnificant -
other) is destroyed. The individual is in a personal . crisis 
and finds hi.mself unsuc ce~sf ully ·:.;ncountering events which 
were previously routine~ They are now overloading. This 
experiential inadequacy state with regard to cognitive 
functioning leads to confusion, disorganization, stress and 
a host of acute grief sympto ms. 
F. ~ Influence 2I fogni~ Disruption .Q!! Svmptomology 
1. Introduction 
The acutely bereaved has suffered a dramatic rupture 
of his organized method of construing events. Therefore, 
he is likely to - and, in fact, does - deal with subsequent 
encounters in somewhat different ways than he had in the 
past. More importantly, he is likely to undergo a variety 
of experiences which are atypical for him, but which are 
relatively common sequelae for the survivor of a sudden death 
phenomenon. These experiences are, in the composite, termed 
'the acute grief process• and include changes in all major 
spheres of functioning••• cognitive, somatic, affective 
and behavioral. This chapter will offer some theoretical 
notions that attempt to bridge the cognitive-disruptive 
state previously described and the multi-sphere symptomo-
1 logy of acute grief to be detailed in Part III. 
The premise for a cognitive model of acute grief rests 
on the notions that the principle consequences of a sudden 
I death ·event upon the survivors are cognitive in nature; and 
that symptornology in non-cognitive spheres is derived from 
or secondary to the initial cognitive impact and disruption. 
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Having present ed t he fo :r.egoing cogn iti ve model for man's 
I 
functio n in g , it is now i.nc umberi t up on me to ap ply that para-
digm to the grief process i n order to determine its 
descrip t ive an ~ explan a to r y power for that phenomenon. I 
shall do this, not only wi th regard to the cognitive 
dysfun ct ions of bereavement, but for the multiple-sphere 
dysfunc t ions which constitute the whole grief process. 
The secti 6ns in Part III will describe in greater detail 
the specific s ymptoms of .mourning and relate t:hem to their 
. I 
cognitive origins. Here, the aim is to provide a more general 
connection bet~een cognitive disruption (with its resultant 
cognitive inadequacy) and the somatic, affective and behav-
ioral s pheres. In other words, this chapter's goal is to 
explai n how cognitive disruption influences physiology, 
I 
emotionality and activity, in general; while later chapters 
will focus on the effects upon specific symptoms of acute 
grief. 
2. Effect in Cognitive Spheres 
(a) Cognitive Regression 
I 
Cognitive disruption (i.e., destruction/elimination 
of a co r e cogni Five dimension, as occurs with the death of 
a sign i ficant other) yields as a necessary corollary, cog-
nitive inadequacy. As already mentioned, this inadequacy 
differs from that which is caused by the overload of large 
numbers of novel stimuli, though both situations deal with 
the persoJs reduced effectiveness in coping with the world 
and eve nts. Cognitive inadequacy resulting from a sudden 
death l eaves the individual without the cognitive categorie s 
prE!viously avOiilable for d<::aling wi th :nany of the routine, 
day-to-day encounters of livi ng ( e . g •• decisions typically 
shared by spouses concernin g parenting, employment choices, 
vacation plans 1, love-making, etc.). What was once routine 
is suddenly novel and overloading (e.g., preparing correct 
quantity of food for dinner for 3 people rather than 4), 
because of the damage to the structural components (e.g., 
I 
cognitive dimensions relating the deceased child to how 
much he eats) that were previously used for making sense 
out of prior, routine events (e.g., preparing dinner for 
four). 
Thus, cognitive inadequacy is a function of neither 
person nor environment alone, but rather dependent on the 
interaction between the individual with his particular 
cognitive matrix (in this case, a matrix that lacks a core 
dimension) and the context with its particular cognitive 
demands (e.g., preparation for dinner). When a person, 
like the acutely bereaved, lacks the refined and sophistica-
l 
ted matrix for ~eeting certain contextual demands of 
adaptive coping, he must respond in a less refined, less 
sophisticated, more crude and more disorganized manner. 
Rather than making an advanced develop inental res}i)onse 
(e.g., preparing a properly distributed meal for four family 
I 
members), he must fall back on less advanced methods of 
I 
understanding his world (e.g., a buffet, with too much or 
too · little food); methods which are not dependent on the 
damaged core dimensions or its linkagesa Such a movement 
backwards to a less refined, delineated, organized and 
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:integrated fr ~mework of c0 gnitiv e functi oning is t ermed 
'cognitive regression•. 
Regression is not pervasive throu ghout the individual's 
cognitive matrix, since his cogniti:ve inadequacy is defined 
only in relation to the contextual demands at hand, and 
these may be limited to particular areas of functioning 
(e.g., family interaction, but not work). However, it has 
been noted that a core dimension is an important keystone 
to the entire structure and has, therefore, at least some 
influence throughout most of the matrix. It can be assumed 
that cognitive regression for the acutely bereaved is most 
extreme in those areas directly relating to the deceased 
(i.e., ·daily activities and decisions usually shared), with 
decreasing effects on those peripheral zones that are more 
distant from the damaged core (e.g., the car needs a tune-
up). Since a central dimension has been involved in the 
event of a sudden death, the cognitive framework as a whole 
. I 
may be viewed as being under strain, though the outer 
ripples of the event's aftermath are less violent than those 
closer to the core. 
Thus, the death of a significant other damages and 
disrupts a core cognitive dimension with which the person 
coped with events, construed experiences and understood him-
self in relation to his world. This disruption creates a 
state of great cognitive inadequacy and insufficiency, 
(i.e., reduced cpping ability), especially when the person 
must respond to events which are related directly or 
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tangentially to the deceased; i.e., to the core di mension 
that's been disrupted. Adaptatio n and survival de mands, 
however, force the individual to attempt some form of 
effective construing of events. This, in order to obtain 
at least minim~l need gratification from the environment 
and to avoid the chaotic state of a completely disorganized 
interaction with the world. Th i s regressive, fall-back 
level of cognitive functioning to which the person retreats · 
I 
is relatively less developed than that existing prior to 
the cognitive disruption, when the cognitive frameIDrk had 
been intact and l undamaged. However, it allows at least 
some protection 1 from complete cognitive breakdown. 
The regressive reversal of cognitive functioning to 
earlier levels can be described in terms of those criteria 
which were used earlier in the analysis of the developmental 
process of cognitive growth, namelya (a) disjunction, 
(b) absorption-modification, (c) dilation-constriction, 
and (d) subjectivity-objectivity. I contend that the sur-
vivor of a sudden death experiences regression along each 
of these criterion parameters. And in addition, that he 
experiences significant effects upon the overall differen-
tiation, organization and integration of his entire 
cognitive structure. Adaptive efficiency, general ability 
to adequately understand and cope with interactions, and 
predicting/controlling capabilities are similarly affected. 
Finally, as a major by-product of reduced cognitive effect-
iveness, the bereaved experiences considerable cognitive 
overload. These consequences of sudden death upon the acute 
grief syndro rne
1 
will be d iscussed on the following pages 
(see Figure 7). 
(b) Disjunction 
Disjunction was de f ined as the separation of the 
cognitive, conative and affective modes of relating to 
objects within a particular content area (see page ). 
As part of the regressi ve process subsequent to a sudden 
death, there is a major reversal of disjunctiveness, 
especially in those areas of the cognitive matrix which 
deal with the deceased. Desire and emotionality merge with 
cogr~ition in these content areas and severely interfere 
with the ability to give rational thought to the deceasedv 
There evolves al mixture of intense feelings, strong desira-
bility and cognition of the deceased. There is, in other 
words, reduced differe nt:iation within this content area, 
such that the mourner's knowledge about the lost person is 
I 
highly contaminated by whether he wants/rejects, likes/ 
dislikes the dead person. In particular, affect and cogni-
1 
tion merge. For example, prior to his wife's death, a 
bereaved husband may be able to discuss her career goals 
in factual and informat i ve terms without becoming emotionally 
aroused. After the dea t h, he experiences such a conversation 
as distressing tiecause o f his intense desire for her presence 
mixed with profound fee l ing s of emotional turmoil. There 
is, post-death, conside r ably less disjunction between the 
cognitive, conat
1
ive an d affective modes of relating to his 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. (c) Abso~ption•Modification 
Sudden dE]ath leaves t he mourne r at a great disadvantage 
in some spheres of his cognitive matrix (e.g., decisions 
I 
about raising the children), and at lower risk in other, 
less directly involved areas (e.g., decisions at work about 
business transactions). Conceptual dimensions relating to 
the deceased afe no longer available; while other dimensions 
are made vulnerable due to the general loss of structural 
integrity atte~dant to core construct damage. The protective 
reaction whi.ch 1ensues in the vulnerable, but intact, dimen-
sions is one of increased. absorption or rigidity (e.g., job 
I 
behavior becomes stereotypic and rigidified). Since there 
is massive ch ange and modification necessary in the dis-
I 
rupted sector 9f the framework (i.e., dimensions surrounding 
I 
the deceased), Jthe other non-disrupted sectors (i.e., those 
areas of one•s \life, such as work or school, which are less 
I 
directly involv~d with the deceased) compensate by lowering 
I 
their flexibili~y to change, i.e., by greater absorption. 
The bereaved distorts and otherwise assimilates events into . I 
these more peripheral cognitive dimensions, without the 
I 
usual flexibility of compromising some structural aspect 
in order to mak~ a better fitting of event to matrix. For 
example, at wor~ the acutely bereaved becomes more dogmatic 
in his decisions and more routine or mechanical in his 
I 
behavior. In other words, a balance between event and cog• 
I 
nitive adjustment (i.e., equilibrium) does not occur because 
I 
there is such a large cognitive adjustment demand being made 
in those other dlimens i.ons relating to the death. If 
further adjustments are made in peripheral dimensions (e.g 0 , 
change of job 1at same ti me as death occurred), then the 
entire, unstable structure may possibly collapse into chaos. 
Therefore, the bereaved ten ds toward extreme rigidity in 
his non-disrupted zones; he has lost so much functioning 
effectiveness in the core areas that he stiffly holds on to 
what remains intact. 
In contrast, an acutely bereaved- individual is very 
susceptible to 1modification of his cognitive matrix, in 
response to environmental encounters, in those areas which 
are somehow associated with the death or the deceased. In 
these areas there is a void that requires filling, and the 
mourner is open to considerable influence from impinging 
events {e.g., other people's comments). To this extent -
in these disrupted core cognitive dimensions and sectors -
the person is highly modifiable, labile and suggestible. 
I 
He is very open to suggestion and makes futile efforts at 
repairing the cognitive damage with any of the varied inputs 
that present themselves. 
It is this modifiability that crisis interveners focus 
upon when they offer help to the acutely bereaved,. Certain 
I 
sectors of the individual's cogn i tive matrix are especially 
open to change during this critical period. A trained intere 
vener can provide appropriate new methods for construing 
events which wi .11 reinforce the structure and lead toward 
substitutive dimension formation, both these goals aimed 
I 
at restoring cognitive fra mework integrity. For example, 
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by suggesting 'activities th a t will lead to the formation 
of new relationships, such as joining -Parents-Without- · 
Partners. 
Thus, a sudden death results in movement by the 
individual away from cognitive equilibrium and flexibility, 
and toward extreme absorption/rigidity in the peripheral 
areas with converse extreme modification/lability in those 
sectors linked to the death and the deceased (see Figure 7). 
{d) Dilation-Constriction 
Another regressive change in cognitive functioning 
I 
involves the continuum of dilation and constriction. Acute 
grief results in rapid fluctuations between these cognitive 
activity poles, along with parallel shifting in behavioral 
activity levels. The mourner may first narrow or constrict 
I 
his focus onto environmental interactions which make only 
minimal cognitiwe demands (e.g., spending the day in deciding 
what to cook foi:' dinner). Constriction is usually aimed at 
re-grouping one's cognitive structure in order to reassert 
some measure of \ stability. Then he may shift to uncoordin-
ated expansion 6f cognitive efforts in order to find 
conceptual replacements for the disrupted components of 
his matrix (e.g,, trying to figure out the 'real' cause of 
death, such as J ow an obvious suicide can be explained as 
an accident). Dilation has as its prim~ry purpose, the 
searching for substitute concepts or ways of understanding 
events, thereby \replacing the loss and refilling the void~ 
This oscillation between a narrowing and an expanding 
cognitive framework also manifests itself in the behavioral 
\ 
activity lev e ls of the mour ner. He may limit himself to 
a relatively few, si mple behavior s and ge neral under-
activity (e.g., just sitting in the bedroom, eating), then 
engage in non-goal directed behavior which see ms to only 
serve to keep him busy (e.g., takes up a variety of new 
hobbies simultaneously). This latter act i vity, when focused 
on death, is r ~lated to the •searching' phase of the grief 
process in which the mourner seeks out events and objects 
related to the deceased in order to somehow re-capture the 
stability of the past. Both extremes of dilation and con-
striction tend to be futile and represent lowered function-
ing capabilities since they are less than adaptive modes of 
interacting wi ~h the environment (see Figure 7). 
(e) Subjectivity-Objectivity 
The acute !grief following sudden death appears to 
result in the mourner's attention being focused on himself 
as the center of events. Concern for one's own cognitive 
stability forces the person's interpretation of events to 
be based . on how they affect and relate to himo He has dif-
ficulty dealing ! with non-personally related phenomena, and 
I 
tends to distort the objective world by construing it as 
either irrelevant or subjectively overly relevant to him 
(e.g., he relates the death of a neighbor 2 s cat to his own 
I 
loss)., There is c1n over-r i din g egc-centricity which does 
not permit the more accurate perspectives of his previous 
objectivity to surface. This limits the individual's 
I 
ability to adaptively interact with environmental events .. 
Acute grief subJjectif i es t he mourner, restriccing his conce r n 
to his own dis
1
abil ity and distress, and their manifesta-
tions. There is a general i zed centering upon the world of 
self, particularly upon the part of self that has been 
damaged by the death (e.g., woman's self perception as 
widow rather than as wife)4 Thus, on this parameter as 
well, acute grief involves a regression to less functional 





Along with these changes in developmental measures, 
I 
there are general alterations of the bereaved's cognitive 
framework. He1tends to construe interactions in more global 
terms, i.e., there is reduced differentiation. Selective 
comprehension (e.g., of children as individuals) yields to 
grosser forms 9t understanding (e.g., of all children as 
being the same) 1. Cognitive dimensions (e.g., relating to 
siblings of deceased child) are collapsed and combined 
rather than being further delineated (such that they all 
begin being treated alike)~ This reduces the person's 
ability to accurately predict and control his experiences. 
I 
Therefore, his coping skills are less adequate than before 
the death. 
I Before he can restructure his cognitive constructs into 
a functional entity again after the less, there is a period 
of rapid disorganization. The traumatic rupture of a core 
dimension throws the relatively neat structure into disarray. 
Numerous segments of the matrix must now be rearranged; 
super and sub•0? 7dinate dimensions must be re-assessed in 
light of the disruptive death event; t:he organized framework 
which was formerly based~ to a substantial degree, on the 
I 
relationship with the dec eased mt.:st n,.:,w be reworked to 
accommodate for the absence. For example, when an older 
child dies, th i re is a shift in the way ·younger siblings 
are perceived ~Y parents with regard to reassignment of 
responsibilities; viewing them as needy of greater protec-
tion. 
In a similar vein, the complex integration of concep-
tual categories and constructs is disturbed by the death. 
There is a period of disintegration as cognitive linkages 
which used to be affiliated with the deceased must now be 
re-integrated into the remainder of the matrix or they must 
be abandoned. The connections between elements of the fra me• 
work are disrupted and new bonds need to be formed which 
take into account the major loss suffered by the individual. 
Until these re-integrative processes are underway, the 
I 
cognitive network lacks firm linkages between many of its 
components, with resultant confusion and instability. For 
example, the widow now lacks conceptual links between her-
self and another on such dimensions as fellow parent, lover, 
companion, friend, financial advisor, etc. She must realign 
these connections to substitutes or abandon theme 
The overall effects of sudden death in the cognitive 
I 
sphere are summarized in Figure 7. 
I 
3. Effect iri Somatic Sphere, 
I have noted earlier that I believe the so matic symptom-
ology of the acu
1
te grief reaction is secondary to the initial 
cognitive disrup ition. However, the cognitive model I have 
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proposed does f ot d irectly ·de scribe t he sympto ms in the · 
somatic sphere 1without the u.~e of th e mediating concept -
stress. My proposal regard i ng the connection between 
I 
cognitive disruption-somatic symptoms, requires a brief 
discussion of the nature of stress and its physiological 
manifestations •I The term •stress' has often been used so 
broadly as to encompass virtually any novel or unpleasant 
experience or situation. My usage, however, refers more 
specifically to the state in which the individual encou nter s 
an environmental threat to his security or survival. This 
threat may present itself e ith er directly as an assault, 
or indirectly by overloadin g the adaptive ·system to the 
point of breakdown. These t h reats typically result in 
physiological responses ass ociated under the rubric1 
General Adaptation Syndrome or G.A.S. The origins of 
G,A.S. symptoms lie in hypothalmic arousal, adreno-cortical 
stimulation and output, and stimulation of the autonomic 
nervous system, particularl y its sympathetic branch (Cannon, 
1929; Parkes, 1972; Selye, 1956). 
The cognitive inadequac y experienced by the acutely 
bereaved reduces his coping . abilities and his adaptivity to 
environmental demands. Dis ru ption has affected the refined 
cognitive structure with which he previously understood the 
complexities of daily livin g and with which he previously 
construed, controlled and pre dicted eve nts. The mourner is 
at a serious disadvant age. His usual means of dealing with 
events is severely limit ed, placing him in a vulnerable 
position; that is, a posit:i. on in which there exists a 
• 
continual threat to his s elf-maintenance a:nd survival. The 
cognitive regression which he undergoes in order to retain 
some sense ·over his interactions further reduces his effect-
iveness. Furthermore, the impingement of even routine 
stimuli upon the cognitive matrix poses an overload that 
threatens to weaken the damaged framework still more. These 
forces combine to constitute a considerable threat . to the 
individual, ·which he experiences as a prolonged period of 
psychological stress. 
Many investigators have emphasized that psychological 
threat or assault is responded to as if it ·were physical 
(Engle, 1962; Frederick, 1971; Lindemann, 1960; Parkes, 1972: 
Selye, 1956; Wolff, 1953). And Rees & Lutkins (1967) state 
that the psychological aspects of grief are invariably trans-
lated into physiological reactions. In other words, the 
state of and subsequent strain of cognitive inadequacy and 
regression following a sudden death is postulated as suffic-
ient to place the mourner in a sustained stressful condition. 
I . 
This condition of prolonged and/or intense stress has certain 
definitive somatic manifestations associated with it (Selye, 
1956). These physiological responses occur in virtually all 
the major organ systems and will be reviewed in detail in 
Part III of this dissertation. Here, I merely wish to em-
phasize the relattionship between cognitive disruption and 
bodily stress as a reaction to that disruption. 
Therefore, cognitive disruption of a core dimension 
is seen as extremely stressful to the bereaved because it 
seriously limits hts adaptive abilities, while simultaneously 
66. 
making him vulnerable to overload~ His co nceptual resources 
are undercut at: a time when he needs them most, and this is 
viewed as ser i ously threatening to his survival. Since high 
stress, of even moderate duration, leads to physiological 
symptoms, it is deduced that the stressful cognitive condi-
tion of the mourner will similarly lead to somatic responses. 
Indeed, as wi.111 be noted in later pages, the typical somatic 
sym.ptoms of the acute grief reaction are basically physiolo-
gical stress responses (see Figure 8). 
4. Effect in Affective Sphere: 
In a similar vein, it is my contention that affective 
responses of acute grief are secondary to the cognitive 
disruption. Since there are very early and very intense 
emotions arousem by a sudden death, the delineation of a 
primary cognitive and secondary emotional effect is both 
difficult and controversial. Furthermore, the traditional 
descriptions of the grief syndrome place considerable em-
phasis on the affective sequelae, both implying and directly 
stating that the emotional responses are the most important. 
I disagree. Without negating the reality of intense emotions 
during bereavement, I believe they are best explained as 
derivatives of the disarray in the cognitive matrix of the 
mourner, rather than primary reactions independent of the 
bereaved's conceptual state. The information is processed 
first, then the associated feelings are aroused (Beck, 1967). 
My notions are supported from three principle view-
points, (a) the disjuncttve regression process that follows 
I 
cognitive disruption; (b) re-definition of the key affective 
67. 
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symptoms of ·be r r avement a lo ng t he l in ~s of cognit i ve func"' 
tioning; this his been al r eady proposed by Kelly (1963) 
regarding anxiety, hosti l ity and gu ilt, and by Beck (1967) I . 
-- regarding depression; an d (c) the hypothesis that certain 
physiological a f ousal states are cognitively labeled as 
emotions: the p~ysiological states themselves having been 
I 
discussed as secondary to cognitive stress. 
(a) Disjunction 
I 
The disju j ctive pr ocess. as a separation of conation 
and affection from cognition, has been discussed at lengt h 
in previous sections. The only additional point of emphasis 
here is that events whic h are highly ambiguous (lack consen-
sual validation) 1 and complex are more difficult to disjoin I . 
than are simple physical events. Inter.personal in t eractions 
tend to be ambiguous and complex, and therefore are unlikely 
to be completely ! disjoin e d. Moreover; their complexity 
demands greater bognitive effort and sopnistication for 
I 
successful coping. Indeed, the construing of most inter• 
personal Situatio l"~, ·  tho ugh somewhat disjunctive, in the 
I 
adult, is assumed to have some mixture of like/dislike 
I 
(affect:) and desire/rejection (conation) as factors contarnina• 
ting the cognition. 
I propose that when sudden death occurs and disrupts 
I 
the interpersonal dimens i ons associated with the deceased 
(which are only partial ly disjoined to begin with), t hen the 
cognitive inaceq ~acy and regression th at follo ws stimulates 
further merging dr feeli ngs and co gnitions (e.g., previous 
discuss io ns about deceased wife's career goals were only 
I 
partially i nf l u~nced by h i s fe el i ngs -to~,;,ard her, now the y 
are highly infl ve nced by h is feelin gs). Cognitive regression 
leads t:o a redu 6tion in disj unction which, in turn, leads 
I 
I 
to an arousal of affect in the target area (i.e., the dis-
I 
rupted core dimension) of the regression. In other words, 
whatever degree 
1
of separation has previously existed betw een 
emotions and cognitions relating to the deceased, it is 
likely to be reduced as disjunction is regressively reduced. 
. If affect .\ve arousal has been stimulated in this way, 
then it probabl Yi feeds back into the originating cognitive 
confusion and inadequacy by contaminating thoughts of the 
deceased with. i.ritense desir,es and emotions (e.g., the newly 
aroused feelings of sadness make it even more difficult 
to objectively cbmprehend and discuss the dead wife's previous 
I 
plans without still further confusion). Efforts to make 
sense out of the traumatic event are interfered with by the 
strong positive f nd negative feelings being generated. It 
alsc seems probable that most of these feelings are negatively 
loaded and unpleasant (e.g., sadness, guilt, depression), 
since the grief experience is one of distressing instability, 
insecurity and threat to the framework, which generate fear, 
I 
anxiety and anger, respectively. Therefore, _in addition to 
the cognitive un€ertainty and disequilibrium of acute grief, 
there is an assumed upsurge of confounding negative emotions I -
which add to the psychological stress of the period. 
Most importantly, the unpleasant affects aroused are 
I 
centered in thos j cont e nt areas which have been disrupted 
by the death and !which are a l ready vulnerable to further 
overloa d . Eve n though internally gener ated, these emotions 
become added sti muli which the weakest zone of the matrix 
(ioe., those involving che dec eased ) , must:, nonetheless, 
cope with. The unpleasant emot ions of gri.ef, therefore, 
add to the potential overload in g of the system. 
Thus, affect arousal is postulated: (a) to be partially 
a function of the reduced disjunction associated with cogni-
tive inadequacy and regression, particularly since it occur s 
wj_thin an interpersonal content area that is only partially 
disjoined to begin with; (b) t o involve primarily unpleasant 
and distressing feelings because it is a result of the threat-
ening consequences of cogniti ve disruption, and (c) as 
constituting an 
1
additional burden, since it contaminates t:he 
construing abilities of the individual and adds to the over• 
load of an already strained cognitiv~ system (see Figure 9). 
(b) Redefinition of Terms 
Acute grief is associated with several emotions 
(e.g., guilt, anxiety, anger, depression) and a survey of 
I 
these will be presented in Part III, At this point, I wish 
to offer some alternate definitions and explanations for some 
of these affective responses in terms of the cognitive model 
of man. This re-definiticn has already been proposed for 
anxiety, guilt and hostility by Kelly (1955,1961) and for 
depression by Beck (1967). My discussion of anxiety, guilt 
I 
and hos~ility in this section and of depression in Part III, 
is drawn directly from these authors ideas and writings. 
According to Kelly (1963), anxiety is the experiential 
state of chaos that arises from the en countering of "events 
Figu.re 9. Summary Chart of the Eff ec t of Sudden . Death Upon 
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"Guilt-.J 
for which it se r ms one has ·no adequate constructsN or . 
cognitive dimensions. Lacking the equipment for understanding 
what's occurring or for predicting events, "one seems help-
lessly caught up in events, with no idea of what to do after 
they arrive" (K~lly, 1961, p. 264) (e.g., prepa~ation of 
meals without the fourth family member leaves the survivor 
I 
ar.xious as to what to do). This is an apt description of 
the condition of the acutely bereaved whose loss of a core 
I 
cognitive dimension leaves him lacking the means of coping 
with even routine events. He experiences them as unmeetable 
challenges to h +s cognitive structure and is overwhelmed by 
these environmental demands (e.g., plans for the weekend; 
child's school work; call from old friends). The individual 
is in a state of emergency and finds himself unsuccessfully 
encountering events which were previously related to con-
structs associated with the deceased••• events for which he 
now lacks an operational structural dimension. Such an 
experiential state of cognitive confusion and overload, 
bordering on chaos, is defined like Kelly, as anxiety. 
Anger and its manifestation of hostility, are also 
components of the affective sphere of acute grief. They have 
similarly been given new meaning by Kelly (1963). When a 
situation arises 1, like a sudden death, which demands a 
massive revision of one's cognitive matrix in order to 
effectively cope \ with the reality of life, there is reluc-
tance to undergo l the uncertainty and distress attendant to 
I 
a major cognitive overhaul. The choice is often the diffi-
cult one between either a major revision of the matrix 
73. 
(e,g., acceptance of the los s and the necessa r y readjustments 
attendant t o it)1 or a major di stortion of the event to 
make it force.,.fit into a str uc ture whtch is no longer viable 
(e.g., by ratio ilalizing the co ntinuance of the person's 
presence via the deceased's momentos). \t~en the individual 
chooses the latter alternati ve (force-fitting distortion), 
I . 
he may attempt to confirm or v alidate his distortion, by 
I . . 
coercing others 
1
to share in acc epting the distortion. Kelly 
(1961) terms this attempt to extort external validation of 
an invalidated ~onceptualiza ti on, as hostility. "It is not 
the desire to injure someone; any injury is incidental; 
rather, it is arl extortioner' s trick designed to preserve 
I 
the psychological status quo a nd to relieve him of the re-
sponsibility of revising his outlook" (Kelly, 1961, p. 265). 
The experience of guil t i s also redefined by Kelly 
(1963), again from the cognit i ve perspective, in terms of 
role relationsh t ps (e.g., sel f -assessment in role as wife). 
It was noted that an importa nt element of one's identity is 
concerned with the way an ind i vidual understands himself in 
relation to events, objects an d especially people in his 
environment. These relation sh ips anchor the person's sense 
of self, influencing his self - image, self-concept and self• 
expectations. They form a set of role parameters (e.g., 
I 
husband imposes criteria on th is role concerning financial 
support, protect ~on, decisio n making) by which he judges 
important aspects of his succ e ss and failure in life. These 
roles, being interpersonal, s,e riously involve someone other 
than himself and 1 usually someo ne to whom he is strongly 
committed. 
When the individu a l loses a co r e relationship through 
sudden death (e.g., his wife), he simultaneously loses his 
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role associated lwith that relationship (e .• g., as her protector). 
Since the role included self-imposed role expectations 
I 
{e.g., successful protection of spouse), these are also lost. 
Kelly defines guilt as this sense of loss of role. He notes 
I 
that when such a loss occurs, the individual must make a 
self judgement about whether or not the role loss was a 
consequence of his failure in it (i.e., his failure to meet 
the expectations of the role). For example, following an 
accidental auto mobile death, he will question whether he 
had her car checked properly. Moreover, the questions that 
he has about his success/failure in the ·role relationship 
. can no longer be appropriately tested in contact with the 
, other person. Thus, the possibility of having made a mistake 
(i.e., been a failure) in the role of parent, child or spouse 
which may have uesulted in the loss ·of the relationship upon 
which the • very role was built, leaves the mourner with a sense 
of guilt. It a ] so leaves him with unanswerable questions 
about the adequacy of his role performance prior to the death 
(i.e., was he generally and usually protective enough). 
In these ways, Kelly (1961, 1963) has re-conceptualized 
anxiety, hostil ~ty and guilt so that they are consistent with 
. the other cogniuive descri ptions of bereavement (see Figure 9). 
(c) Physiological Arousal 
The third jbasis of sup port for the contention that 
affective re s po~se t:o sudd e n de ath follows cognitive disruptio n , 
utilizes the physiological reactio n · to s-cress as an inter--
mediate explanation. I have already discussed the effects 
of cognitive di ~ruption upon somatic processes in tenns of 
stress, and I've made reference tc the 'alarm reaction' 
that is common to the stressful experience. This alarm re• 
action consists of intense physiologic arousal that includes 
stimulation of the autonomic nervous system, the adrenal 
glands and several other organ systems {e.g., respiratory, 
These somatic changes resulting from 
stress are similar to somatic responses occurring in people 
who are reporting intense emotional experiences such as fear 
and _anger {e.g.-, Schacter & Singer, 1962; Selye, 1956). 
For example, Schacter and Singer (1962) have found that the 
subjective experience of emotional excitement is a combined 
function of the physiological arousal of somatic systems 
(similar to those arousals experienced under stress) plus 
the individual subjectively and cognitively interpreting the 
arousal as emotion {e.g •• experiencing an increased heart 
rate and interpreting this as fear or anger)~ In other words, 
as the body is aroused, the person may label or identify what 
he's physically experiencing as some type of emotion. Which 
emotional label is assigned .appears dependent on contextual 
cues and previous experiences with the particular somatic 
arousal signs. 
My reasoning in support of cognitive dominance from 
this third viewpoint, is as fol lows 1 (a) The i.nf0rmation 
concerning death , is presented, which causes cognitive disrup-
tion; (b) cognitive d i srupt:ion causes stress; (c) people 
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respond physiologically t o stres s~ eve n if it's psychological 
stress; (d) the physiological arc aisal resulting from stress 
is parallel to that reported during periods of emotional 
excitation; (e) the .per so n senses the stress-based arousal 
and subjectively identif ie s (construes) it as emotional 
excitation; (f) the specific label assigned to the arousal 
(e.g •• fear or anger) is determined by context cues and 
I 
previous experience (see Figure 9). 
s. Effect i ~ Behavioral Sphere.a 
The adaptive importance and value of a stable and mature 
cognitive framework is in its utilization by the individual 
to understand and behaviora.lly interact with his environment 
in order to survive, fulfill his needs and attain his objec-
tives. The cognitive basis for behavior in general was . 
d i scussed in Part I (Introduction) and in the opening section 
of Part II It may be simply restated that man is an active I • 
organism that perceives (e.g •• sees person), construes 
(e.g •• recognizes person as friend), decides upon (e.g •• 
decides to shake hands), and then acts (e.g •• extends arm 
I 
to shake hands) with regard to events that he encounters. 
When there is damage to the structural matrix upon which 
these actions are based, such as the disruption following a 
sudden death, then the behavior of the individual is likely 
to be subsequently and similarly disrupted. Cognitive in• 
security. instab lility and confusion _are poor foundations for 
producti.ve and construct i ve acti.vity. 
The behavioral sequelae to sudden death are viewed as 
direct manifestations of the cognitive changes previously 
discussed. For example. the disruption of a core inter• 
1 . 
personal dimension is likely to send ripples of disturbance 
through the matrix to other interpersonal dimensions ~ It 
is reasonably assumed that linkages existed · between this 
core dimension and axes related to other people. Therefore, · 
many oft.he behfvioral changes would be expected to••• and 
do••• involve interpersonal interaction or its converse, 
social isolatioh (see Figure 10). 
(a) Activity Levels 
The mecha h ical behavior ·of the bereaved is seen as a 
function of the protective cognitive regression to simpler 
and . less sophisticated methods of interacting with the world. 
I 
In other words, l as the individual retreats to safer, simpler 
and less complicated methods of understanding and dealing 
with events, hi ~ behavior takes on the characteristic of 
activity which requires minimal cognitive effort. i.e., 
automatic behavior. 
I 
However, the ac~ivity levels of the bereaved can vary 
from retarded te overly active. This appears related to 
I 
cognitive constriction and dilation fluctuations. As a 
means to regain adequate coping facul _ties, the mourner may 
frantically expand his activities. His behavior will become 
aimless, erratic, without consistence or goal orientation 
(e.g., begins multiple hobbies). Or the person may attempt 
to preserve the minimal stability remaining by severely 
restricting and limiting his actions (e.g., by sitting 
around the housi ). He performs behaviorally in ways that 
parallel his cognitive activity level (see Figure 10). 
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(b) Searchin g 
. I 
Another exa rnple o:f t he cog ni:ti. ve --behav io r.al · parallels 
involves 'searching' activity. Pre-occupation with the 
deceased is a cbgnitive symptom that involves a reliving of 
past events of fh e disrupted relationship through memori es 
I 
and a heightened sensitivity to environmental cues (e.g., 
I 
furniture, music) conc e rning the deceased. The process is 
I 
important since it allows a gradual accommodation to the loss. 
It can take on mal-adaptive qualities if the pre-occupation 
develops into obsessive rumination. The behavioral der i va• 
tive of this cognitive symptom of grief is searching activity~ 
The mourner behaviorally attempts to · re-capture or replace 
some of the elements of the now defunct core relationship. 
By actively seeking out reminders (e.g., favorite pipe) or 
substitutes (e.g., other people with whom to interact), the 
bereaved can similarly lessen the trauma and slow down the 
adjustment demands to a tolerable pace. However, like its 
cognitive counterpart, searching can also become extreme and 
. I 
mal-adaptive when persistent efforts are made at reunion, 
such as through l the survivor's death by suicide. 
The thrust of behavioral symptomology is, therefore, 
one of parallel t ng the cogni ·tive changes resulting from 
the sudden death. This is expected since behavior is postu-
lated as the external outcome of prior, internal, cognitive 
decisions (see Figure 10). 
6. Concluding Note 
I 
lh this final section of Part II, I have presented my 
I 
views on the effects of cogniti ve disr.upti .on and inadequacy 
upon all major pheres of fu nction ing . These effects are ,, . ' 
most directly seen in cognitive regression and the associated 
cognitive dysfu hctions which reduce adaptive effectiveness. 
I 
These primary dysfunctions of cognitive activity place the 
mourner in an e~ergency condition of intense and pro• 
longed stress, i ith physiological stress reactions that 
I . 
give rise to somatic symptomology. In addition the affec-
tive arousal I · t d ·th · f has been discussed from as j ocia e wi . gr1e 
the viewpoint of cognitive disjunction, re-definition of 
the emotions an 1 their physiological basis. Finally the 
general behavio ~al manifestation of grief have been proposed 
as expected out ~omes of the disrupted cognitive foundation 
upon which acti n decisions rest, 
It is now appropriate to turn to the more specific 
symptoms of normal and pathological grief in order to test 
the descriptive i power of this model upon the actual data 
of the known symptomology of the acute grief syndrome. 
8lo 
III. NOR~AL AND PATHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMOLOGY OF ACITTE GRIEF 
. A. Introduct ion 
r The purpcse of includi.ng this part on symptomology is 
two-fold, Firs t it is intended to provide the reader with 
an overview of the principle manifestations and processes of 
acute grief in its normal and pathological forms. Secondly, 




for the support of the cognitive m,odel proposed in Part 
I 
In other words, does the model comprehensively describe 
symptom manl festations of the syndrome7 I contend that 
it does and believe tha t the following discussion and analysis 
of acute grief symptomology will convince the reader, as well. 
This Part ! ( III) will focus on symptom descriptions as 
I they are presen 1ed in the literature, experientially by 
the survivors, and as they may be viewed from the cognitive 
model perspective. Part IV will deal with ·several proposed 
detenninants for why some individual's experience normal 
grief. while others undergo a pathological course; and 
cognitive . model explanations for the effects of these in-
fluential factors will also be presented. 
The plan here is to highlight the major symptom groups 
associated with acute grief within the four principle spheres 
of functioning - cognitive, somatic, affective and behavioral. 
Within each sp~ l re, the symptoms will be grouped into main 
categories, with each category discussed in terms of normal 
and patholog i cal manifestations, cognitive model analyses 
of the syrnpt o·.ns, and the 1 iterature relevant to the symptom 
category. Alth
1
ough several hundred published clinical and 
I 
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theoretical r eports have been revie wed, so me are overlappi ng 
and will not be referred to unl.e !i·S they offer so me meani .ng -
ful additional information. Only a relative handful of 
these studies yteld significant empir i cal data, the majority -
1 
of reports being clinical-descriptive or theoretical-
explanatory. \~ ere empirical data has been available, I 
have tried to i nclude it. 
Before variations of any basic pattern can be reason-
ably considered, it is necessary to establish some normal 
range again s t wf ich deviations can be compared. Although 
grief reactions vary considerably between individuals, there 
are several gen ~ral finding s about: bere avement: which can 
and will be described. These normal grief responses serve 
as the baseline l for comparison with pathological mourning. 
- I 
Normalcy, in this sense and in this dissertation, essenti .ally 
refers to grief \ reactions that are statistically most common 
among white Americans and Britishers. 
There is i paucity of literature on bereavement 
patterns of Bla 6ks in the United States, although several 
I 
studies in the anthropological literature provide data on 
mourning practi bes and funeral rites of other cultures 
(Ablon, 1971; Aginsky, 1940; Carpenter, 1954; Devereaux, 
1942; Kennard, 1950; Opler, 1946; Racy, 1969; Yamamoto et 
al, 1969). Several reviews of mourning cross-culturally 
are also availa ~le (Bendann; 1930; Habenstein & Lamers, 
1961; Krupp & Kligman, 1962; Saucier, 1967). I am making 
this particular lnotation of cross-cultural differ e nces 
in order to underscore the fact that a socio-cultural effect 
probably influc ces mournin g ~ though I am not examining 
that influence in · this work. I also want to avoid any im-
plication of universality for the symptoms to be discussed. 
While some commbnalities exist between cultures, the over-
whelming majori l y of the literature reviewed here is based 
I 
on the observations and interviews with white Britishers and 
Americans. Any conclusi.on .s drawn must, therefore, be limited 
to this population. Other determinants .of the grief reactions 
which exert an r nfluence within this population are discussed 
at length in Part IV of this dissertation. 
I noted Jbove that one of the essential criteria for 
normal symptoms was its relative frequency of occurrence in 
the bereavement: 1 populatlon under study. However, in addition 
to incidence, othe~ criteria may also be used in disting-
uishing between normal and pathological grief symptoms, and 
I will be appl~ing a few of these. Specifically, symptoms 
are considered pathological if, (a) they are idiosyncratic 
or rare (e.g., exacerbation of pre-existing physical ailments 
is common but ~he development of post-grief cancer lesions 
is rare);(b) their intensity is exaggerated so that a par-
ticular symptom dominates the syndrome (e.g., guilt is a 
natural component of the grief syndrome, but self-denigration 
I 
and guilty self-destructiveness is not); (c) they persist 
for longer durations than usually experienced by the sur-
1 
vivors {e.g., early confusion is typical and predictable -
' 
as noted above - but sustained confusion for 6 months to a 
year is unusual); (d) they are an extreme example of an 
otherwise normfl symptom (e.g., palpitations are common, but 
not when they're intense enough to cause cardiac dysfunction): 





(e.g., .the persistent identification of the 
I . . . 
somatic complaints of the deceased is virtually 
I 
of an unhealthy and unresolved bereavement). 
The analysis of acute grief symptornology involves an 
arttficial separation of the cognitive, somatic, affect:ive 
and behavioral components. In reality, these factors function 
inter-dependently as interacting elements of a complex 
reaction syndro l e. Although clarity of presentation is 
enhanced by this artificial dissection, it must be remembered 
that responses from each sphere often occur together and are 
interrelated. 
For a summary of the symptom sections to .be presented 
I 
in Part III, see Figure 11. 
B. Cognitive Symptomologv 
1. Confusions 
I . 
(a) lntrod 1ction and Literature Review 
There is general concensus that the immediate reaction 
upon learning of an unanticipated death is a stunned exper-
ience of shock. Thinking is blunted, clarity of comprehension 
is blurred, con ~eptual association~ are loosened••• all this 
occurring abruptly, as if the impact of the event had shat.., 
tered coherence. This type of response has been reported to 
me as the first and most immediate reaction by mourners whom 
I have interviewed; and a.lso by coroner's deputies who them-
selves serve as daily informants of sudden death news. This 
Figure 11, 
1 
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itive bl un t ing i s a ls o described by many 
investigators who have re co rd ed t he · ini tial grief reactions 
I . 
of individuals f Engel, 1961; Kutsch e r, 1969; Li fton, 1963, 
1967; Lindemann, 1944, Parkes, 1972; Westberg, 1962), 
families (Eliot, 1932; Vollman et al, 1971) and even national 
samples reactin g to presidential deaths (Greenstein, 1965; 
Johannsen, 1946; Kliman, 1965; Orlansky, 1947; O'Toole, 1966; 
I 
Wolfenstein, 1965; Wolff, 1947). 
This immediate cognitive impact shortly evolves into 
an experience of uncertainty and confusion, regarding both 
the death itself and what to do about it. I have found that 
the acute mourner is acutely confused; he suddenly can't make 
I 
sense out of much of the information input. Nolfi (1961) 
found that afte i a child's death, mothers had an intense 
need to talk to another person because they didn't know 
what to tell their other children and felt confused. 
Grossman (1967) also notes confusion amongst parents regard• 
ing their communication t:o their children about death. 
The form of confusion experienced by the bereaved 
varies but Bowlby (1961) emphasizes that the basic psycholo-
gical process of grief i ncludes disor~anization, and this has 
been confirmed by others (Lindemann, 1960; Parkes, 1971). 
Disorganization of previous conceptual abilities generate a 
subjective sense of chaos, described to me by a young widow 
" ••• as if a picture wi ndow had been shattered in my face 
. and I stood there trying to figure out how I'll ever be able 
to put 
manner 
the piec Ts back t ogether•••" The neatly organized 
of under j tanding and coping with the world suddenly , 
abruptly becomes a litter of jagged, irreparable pieceso 
Routine i pt ellec tua l functioning may be impaired durin g 
grief as a result of the general confusion, and it may add 
I 
to the disorganizationa1 spiral. Memory problems (Lamers, 
1972), concentration difficulties (Clayton et al, 1971) and 
difficulties in resolving daily problems (Lindemann, 1960) 
have been repor f ed as symptoms of bereavement. The critical 
cognitive function of applying meaning to events is dis-
rupted as survi r ors experience a sense of injustice (Marris, 
1958 s Yamamo'to et al, 1969) and an inability to fathom the 
impact of the de&th. Their typical ability to think clearly 
and without internal distraction is altered, as the cognitive 
associations to j the deceased interfere with the routine 
construing patt ~rns. 
The sense of helplessness before the cognitive demands 
of day-to-day events (Paul, 1967; Schmale & Iker, 1966) adds 
to the mourner's uncertainty. It seems to be partially 
responsible for \ the high proportion of young, recently bereaved 
widows and widowers who are among the first-time applicants 
to psychiatric clinics (Stern & Susser, 1969). 
Following the initial shock and disruption, the mourner 
usually experiences intense cognitive disorganization and 
confusion for aj brief period. He then begins to decelerate 
this downward spiral as his defenses start to take hold and 
temporarily stabilize the system until more permanent re-
construction occurs. Chaos is avoided eventually by the 
survivor's abil
1
ity to partially regain his equilibrium at 
a lower level of functioning. He shuts down some of the 
inp u t and int e racts in a ver y c i rc u.nsc ribed way with many 
events. 
· However, soma indi.vi<luals are not able to accomplish 
this input limi hatton beca use of factors such as those 
discussed in ParL IV (i.e., mode of de ath; relationship 
to the deceased; characteristics of the survivor). Their 
inability to functionally relate to events continues unabated. 
Each new encounter adds to t he chaotic state, as the defenses 
I 
are either unused or insufficient. The extent and duration 
I 
of disorganized thinking is an important index for the 
presence of pathological grie v ing, since the degree of 
confusion may vary from odd thoughts (Maddison & Viola, 1968) 
to mass hysteria (Helvie, 1968) to schizophrenia (Blum & 
Rosenweig, 1944; Edelson & Warren, 1963), with increased dis• 
integration and pervasiveness representing greater likeli• 
hood of pathological process (Dabrowski, 1964). 
The prolonged confusion further aggravates the indiv-
idual• s instabil lity vis--a-vis the environment. There is a 
protracted perio f of failing to fully understand what is going 
on1 and his convulsive efforts to comprehend events throws 
him into further disorganization and disarray, Basic rela• 
tionships with a wide variety of events, objects and people 
become blurred in areas far removed from the deceased, Over-
load becomes a constant cognitive condition until there is 
eventual breakdo wn into chaotic or ps ychotic thinking dis-
orders. 
Thus, cognitive shock and confusion, with resultant 
disorganization~ 1uncertainty, intellectual dysfunction and a 
I 
I 
sense of lost. meaning and hel pless ness col!lbine t:o position 
the bereaved in , jeopardy of cognitive breakdown into chaos. 
The instability of his comprehending structure is considered 
I 
normal if its ii;itensity is moderate and it is wit):lin defined 
areas. However, as the confusion's intensity, disintegration 
or P,ervasivenes l spreads to include non-related content areas, 
loose and globa f association..~ (i.e., severe regression) and 
disorganized thin.~ing arise and indicates that bereavement 
has begun a pathological course. 
_(b) Cognitive Model Description for Nonnal Confusion 
I 
This sense of confusion is a direct result of the acute 
rupture of a core relationship caused by the sudden death. 
The cognitive matrix is postulated as structurally depen-
dent on these central dimer~ions 
I 
integrity. Wheh there is damage 
base - then the j entire matrix is 
for its stability and 
to the structure - at its 
vulnerable to collapse. At 
the very least, the area of damage is no longer available 
90,. 
to the individual, leaving him without adequate tools for 
coping with tho be e·vents which demand construing via these 
defunct dimensi 1ns. Since these core dimensions, by definition 
have a quantitative centrality, there are numerous affiliated 
linkages and areas that are similarly affected. Thus, many 
routine interactions are abruptly foreign and unmanageable 
confrontations \because of an acute absence of construing di-
mertSi-ons. The 
1
cognitive void created by the sudden death 
makes the day-to-day e vents overwhelming and chaotic impinge-
ments, resulti11g in cognitive overload and an experiential 
state of confusion. Furthermore, the trauma to the individual 
is as shockin g l nd stun ning to 1:he. cognitive -system as is 
the acciden t al •limb amputat ion to the somatic systems There 
I 
is initial cognitive bluntin g because the magnitude of the 
I 
even.t's information impact i s beyond the individual's ability 
I 
to immediately process. As th e blunting eases and the infor .. 
mation begins t6 be processe d , the disorganization of cogni .. 
tive functionin t sets in, for a key pillar of the cognitive 
organizational J atrix has be en shattered, like .. a picture 
window". 
91. 
(c) Cognitive Model Description for Pathological Confusion 
. I . 
Pathological confusion results from a combination of 
I 
for~es acting uBon the cognitive framework. The individual's 
core dimension, !which was damaged by the sudden death, may 
have had greater centrality than typically found. We can 
. I 
tend assume, for example, that overly dependent persons to 
I . 
base exaggerated and extensi ve cognitive functions upon the 
I 
other. When th l other dies un expectedly, then the loss of 
cognitive functioning is sim .il arly exaggerated and extensive 
. I 
because the cor ~ dimension had been carrying more than a 
normal loading iJn its support of the overall cognitive matrix. 
When suchan und J ly loaded co re dimension is destroyed, the 
framework. doesn' lt merely wobbl e, threatening to collapse ••• 
. I 
This leaves relatively few intact areas it actually cras lhes. 
of the matrix wh( ch must the n serve the survivor's routi.ne 
interactions. I 
Or the individual may hav e a weakly developed cognitive 
matrix to begin with, such t h at overall organization and 
integration is u1nstable and s ubject to disarray even with 
moderate trauma ~ When death ,:,ccurs, the loss of the core 
dimension destroys the su~portive structure of an already 
susceptible framework. 
Most prob hbly, the pathological confusion results from 
the other events in the individual's life which he is unable 
to copew with in a weakened cognitive state. These pressures 
mount and sustain, givi.ng him no respite from the overload 
situation. The constant impingement dema.nds upon a cogni• 
tively inaqequate matrix result in continual confusion as 
he tries vainly to cope with environment -al interactions • e. 
until finally, he finds even the stmplest and most routine 
cognitive endeavors unmanageable. 
See Figure 12 for a summary of this section. 
2. Cognitive Defenses, 
In an attempt to control the disruptive influence of 
the death, mourners typically resort to three principle 
defensive techniques, which I have characterized as denial, 
distortion and depersonalization. The cognitive defenses 
are not only normal, but also relatively healthy aspects of 
the bereavement process. In moderation, they give the mourner 
time to deal with the event of sudden death and to perhaps 
cope with the disruption more effectively. Eventually, the 
healthy cognitive defense mechanisms yield to the reality 
92. 
of the loss and the individual must then make cognitive adjust• 
ments to this fact. However, for some survivors, the defenses 
do not yield, but instead rigidify and diffuse. This is 
postulated to occur for some mourners because of the influence 
Figure 1.2. Summary Chart: of Cognitive Confusion 
Sudden Deafh of a Significant Other 
Cognitive Disruption 
93. 
• Damage to many linkages affiliated with cor--~ 
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Pathological Grief 
of factors descr libed in Par t IV. 
{a) Denial 
i. Introduction and Liter ature Review 
I 
Denial refers here to di s belief, a refusal to accept 
the actuality of the death by insisting that. the j_nformation 
is untrue or mi, taken • . This ma~ vary in degree from the 
simple statement upon learning of the death, "I don't believe 
it:" . to the more extreme ·denial manifested in retaining the 
belief that the ldeceased will be home for dinner the next 
evening (to the extent of setting the dinner table for him). 
Probably ~he most commonly reported normal cognitive 
defense is denial or disbelief (e.g., Deutsch, 1937; Engel, 
1961s Halpern, 1972; Hobson, 1964; Lamers, 1972; Lindemann, 
I 
1944; Lipson, 1963; McConville et al, 1970; Parkes, 1965, 1971, 
1972; Westberg, 1962; Yamamoto et al, 1969). This occurs at 
the individual (see above references), family (Eliot, 1932; 
Vollman et al, 1971) and national levels (Orlansky, 1947, 
Wolff, 1947; re Roosevelt's death - O'Toole, 1966; Wolfenstein 
& Kliman, . ·1965; res Kennedy's death). Although denial occurs 
very early in the grief process (Lindemann, 1944; Westberg, 
1962), it involves a different effect than the cognitive 
~lunting described under confusion (i.e., disbelief rather 
than a temporary stunned shock). Both effects, jointly and 
i~dependently, ~erve to protect or anesthesize the individual 
against the impact of the loss (Lamers, 1972; Westberg, 1962). 
, Sudden de f th is such an overwhelming experience for 
survivors that they cannot i mmediately incorporate the 
information. Denial is therefore both a protective, delay ing 
maneuver and a \d~mon.s tra t ion of the in comprehensible nature 
I 
of the event for the ber-ea vt~d. This particular cognitive 
defense has been referred to by psycho-analytic writers as 
I 
a primitive method (read immature) of warding off anxiety 
(Cameron, 1963; Fenichel, 1945). However, within the context 
of the cognitive model, it is considered a functional effort 
at delaying potential chaos. The survivor who denies the 
death of a significant other is not. in this way, communica-
ting simply an Lnwillingness to believe the event; he does 
not, in fact, accept the information and often pursues his 
routine as if the death had really not occurred. In the 
I 
normal range of denial, there exists a breadth of variation 
as exemplified above; but denial of intense or diffuse or 
of stubborn prolongation must be viewed as pathological. 
Prolonged denial (of a week or longer) is pathological 
since it involves the exclusion of a vitally important event 
from the person's cognitive fra mework. His interaction with 
the world and interaction in it is based on a gross fantasy 
(i.e., the fals J belief that th e deceased is still alive), 
as he continu e s to reject the actuality of death. In order 
to support this fantasy, he soon finds it necessary to deny 
a wi~e variety of phenomena which might contradict the central 
disbelief. This diffusion of denial is particularly lik e ly 
because until the damage to t he core dimension is ackno w-
ledged, all damage in related areas must be denied as well 
(i.e., quantit ative centrality is involved). The disbelief 
beco mes perva s ive and in tim e t akes on delusional qualities 
(Pretzel, 1972) as more and more of one•s realities must be 
95. 
disbelieved. 
This may take the form of a paradoxical response to 
the death of a spouse (Freidman & Zaris, 1964) in which 
activities and plans are carried out without any observable 
effect by the loss. Or it may take the form of decreased 
flexibility (because, as noted below, pathological denial 
results in framework petrification) leading to intellectual 
dysfunctioning associated with poor school adjustment after 
a death event (Kirkpatrick et al, 1965). Volkan (1970) 
interviewed a number of abnormally bereaved individuals 
and reported excessive denial with some selective amnesia 
concerning the death, occasional slips of the tongue refer-
ring _to the decersed as if he were alive, and delayed 
reactions that finally emerged on the anniversary of the 
loss or at the time of a subsequent loss. 
Several investigators have noted significant rela _tion-
ships between the intensity of the denial and the fact that 
the death involved a child. This is especially so with regard 
to the fathers of the deceased. Nolfi (1967) reported that 
surviving fathers in acute grief experienced a 'silent grief', 
were unwilling and unable to discuss their child's death••• 
as if it had not occurred. Similarly, interviews with parents 
of adolescent suicides (Herzog & Resnik, 1968) revealed ex-
treme denial and disbelief by fathers, as well as brothers 
of the deceased. Efforts to break through this protective 
shield were stro 1gly rebuffed. The parents did not want 
to validate the death, even indirectly, by admitting to its 
actuality. 
96. 
The delay I <lf grief is p_erhaps the most serious mar1ife s -
tation . of exaggerated cognitive denial, and it is usually 
viewed as an example of pathological mourning (Deutsch, 1937; 
Hi.nton, 1967; Lindemann, 19l~4, Volkan, 1970). Lindemann (1944) 
I 
states t h at t:he ,discomfort of bereavement must be experienc ed 
in order for the mourner to successfully resolve the problems 
associa~ed with ,the sudden death of a ~ignificant other. 
Denial processes which delay or prevent the acceptance of 
- I 
the loss. necessarily preclude this resolution of grief 
problems. 
ii. Cognitive Model Description of Normal Denial 
Both denial and distortion involve extremes of cognitive 
absorption in which the event is encountered, but has no sig• 
I 
nificant effect in altering the cognitive matrix. The event 
is force-fitted into the structure without major change to 
the structure itself. Denial represents a virtually total 
I 
absorptive interaction in which the sudden death phenomenon 
has no effect oJ the bereaved's understanding and interac-
tion with the _e~viror:unent. It is my contention that denial 
is not simply an ignoring of the information; rather, that 
the death -lnfoJation is cognitively processed so as to warp 
its relevance and meaning for the survivor. Since the con-
ceptual dimensions involved are core elements of the matrix, 





massive input data without it actually effect• 
Jhange. I believe this can be accomplished by 
cJ nstruing the event as untrue, and therefore, 
f the sudden death info •rmation is conceived 
as untrue, then I there is no need ft)r cogniti.ve matrix modi• 
fication. Rather, the · information i s absorbed and processed 
as irrelevant, and therefore, discardable. 
Clinically. denial is an especially difficult defensive 
· . stance to oppose, for direct confrontation further rigidifies 
the cognitive matrix, making it even more impermeable to 
environmental input:. Thus, the initial denial of loss may 
be exacerbated by well-intentioned efforts to force the 
real~ty of the loss into the bereaved's cognitive framework. 
Petrification of an unrealistic and inappropriate cognitive 
matrix - (i.e., retention of a defunct core dimenston) is 
difficult to sustain, considering the limited resources of 
a damaged matrix, and yields ~o more realistic openness in 
time. That is, if the denial isn't attacked, causing defen• 
sive . entrenchment. It is unwise to try to force-fit the 
reality of a de J th into a cognitive structure during t:he 
initial denial-absorptive period. 
iii. Cogl itive Model Description of Pathological Denial 
All the cognitive defensive maneuvers can become path• 
ological when they are prolonged. Concerning denial, an 
individual whosJ cognitive framework becomes pervasively 
rigid and closed to interactional change effects is not able 
to cope successfully. Adaptivity presupposes some degree of 
absorption and ,edification. The highly and increasingly 
absorptive cognitive functioning associated with extensive 
I 
grief denial does not allow sufficient flexibility for the 
mourner to adequately meet environmental demands. Rather, 
he construes an4 then acts upon events in a more and more 
98. 
stereotypic mannr r• Th i s further r e1 uces hi.s effective ness 
at coping adaptively, si nce che i.mpi.ng i.ng stimuli retain 
their complexity. The stereotypic, ri .gid matrix of the 
pathologically bereaved denier is predictably overloaded by 
the complex stimuli demands. This set of circumstances 
leads to overload, breakdown and chaotic disorganization as 
the end result. The force-fitting of events into the pre-
existing structure is a delusional pattern which is one 
step on the road to that end (see Figure 13). 
(b) Distortion 
i. Introduction and Literature Review 
99. 
Although denial .may be construed as a form of distortion, 
the latter term refers here to those other thinking patterns 
\ which accept (rather than disbelieve) the fact of death. 
~ but grossly modif y its meani .ng and importance in order to 
lessen the impact. The method of distorting the trauma of 
acute grief may be through extensive philosophical rational-
izations involving fate, God, patriotism, etc.; or it may 
take the form of paradoxical statements such as; "it was 
probably the best think that could have happened", "at 
least she had a good life while it lasted" (regarding a 24 
year old woman). 
The distortion occasionally focuses on the impact it-
lf h I .. i h ff f h d h b i se wen mourners minim ze tee ect o t e eat y stat ng 
that they had a premonition which offered some preparation 
time (Parkes, 19f 2); or by accepting the fact of death sc 
completely and easily, on the surface, that the observer may 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These are examp l!es of norrn;;.\l distorti.tm, · since they a:re · 
both common and moderate in degree . Reac tions of this type 
I 
may even he con j tdered - on a short term basis - healthy, 
since they prov de the bereaved with an opportunity to more 




Thus, distortions associated with mourning are attempts 
at avoid ing the jfull impact of the death, once the death 
itself has been accepted. Though most investigators have 
not trie d to distinguish between denial and distortion, as 
I've done here, some particular references to defensive 
distorti ng have been noted. For example, Loveland (1968) 
and Ston e (1971 ~ describe changes in religious attitudes 
that prov.ide cushioning rationalizations for the death, 
and justificati J ns for its disruptive .cognitive aftermath. 
Distorti on and i ntellectualization are reported by Light (1972) 
regarding psych Jatrists' attempts to divert attention from 
the fact of dea Jh and toward hypotheses of why the suicide 
occurred. Nolf { (1967) studied a group of bereaved fathers 
who made consci J us efforts to avoid word reminders and other 
. . ~ 
expressi ons that referred to their dead child, and Yamamoto 
et al (196~ note j this attitude in the bereaved of avoiding 
reminders. 
Pathologi ,al distortion develops (as with denial) 
when it becc ,mes sustatned and pervasive. The death is 
acknowle dg ed, btnt its acceptance is so qualified and its 
impact so dilut l d that the mourner is unable to really make 
appropr1 ate cog l itive adjustments, For him, as with the 
denter, t here {c;, no need to make -the se ad justments becau s e 
the core dimension loss, although assimilated ashaving 
occurre d, has not yet been genuinely experienced . with regard 
to its implications~ 
For many athological distorters, their attention is 
dive~ed to somr secondary aspect of the death, so as to 
avoid confrontifg the primary cognitive disruption of core 
damage. I have counseled individuals two or more years after 
the death who are still focus~ng their attention on 'how did 
it happen? 0 
won't fully 
U, til that question is answered for them, they 
dea!l with the fact that death did happen, irres-
pective of how. 
P'atholog cal distortions can be considered present 
whenever there is exaggerated or prolonged efforts at mini-
mizing the full impact cf the death, ·to the point of pre-
venting reparative efforts. It may involve extreme avoidance 
f •· d I h . f th f o remin ers sue as staying away r.om e cemetery or 
years aft:er th J death (Volkan, 1970) ~ It may manifest it-
self in gross, illogical rationalizations about the benefits 
accrued by the death (Kutscher, 1969), thereby not dealing 
with the death's disruptive consequences. 
Most often, abnormal distortion concerns the acceptance 
of the fact of death, but stubborn distortion of some major . 
aspect o ·f the eath • • • such as how it occurred. This is 
102e 
frequent: among survivors of a suicidal death (Herzog & Resnik, 
1968; Pr etzel, 1972) in which the mode of death is cognitively 
altered by the bereaved. Their attention is focused, not on 
the major impa t of the loss itself, but on the secondary 
factor of the mode of death$ Pretzel (1972) provides exa mpl es 
of family members who at tri bute a suicidal death to either 
accidental causes or to some mysterious intruder who perper-
trated murder. JThe efforts of these mourners to validate 
their false belief ta ke on severe pathological qualities as 
they try to rationalize a hanging suicide, accompanied by 
a suicide note as an accident, Or their belief system be-
comes delusional as they insist that police, physicians and 
other investi gaf ors are conspiring to label the death as a 
suicide, rather than capture the real murderer. They become 
so engrossed in finding the fantasized burglar/murderer that 
they never begin to mourn and readjust. 
103. 
Those sur.vivors who thus deny or distort the sudden 
death experienc je have converted the delaying cognitive defense 
methods into avoidance mechanisms. This forces them to func-
tion inappropriately and ineffectively, with a cognitive 
matrix that contains a vital, but unrecognized, flaw. In 
their attempt to prevent cognitive collapse and ensuing 
chaos, they build their understanding of events upon a 
structural foundation that is flawed and vulnerable; one 
which may, in fact, hasten rather than delay the very break• 
down they're trying to shun. 
ii, Cognitive Model Description of Normal Distortion 
Defensiv J distortion of th~ impact of death is also an 
extremely absorptive function, although it differs from denial, 
When defensive distortion occurs, the death is accepted, but 
its full adjust ment consequences upon the individual are 
not comprehended or dealt with. The fact of death is pro-
j 
ceased as true, but as rel ativ e l y inconsequential. Cognitive 
activity and at ~ention is diverted from the damaged zone of 
the .core relationship loss (particularly its implications 
for the survivor), to a less threatening aspect of the event, 
such as the rea ~on for or mechanics of the death. 
In additton to providing some time .before having . to 
cope with the i ~stability and vacuum created by the core 
dimensional loss, such a distortion has negative potential 
as well. It can, for example, force the mourner to distort 
other events iJ order to maintain his diversion of attention. 
Therefore, cognitive distortion, as with denial, is poten• 
tially dangerous~ in terms of their rigidifying effects on 
the cognitive m1atrix and in the resulting need to expand 
or diffuse the distortion to otherwise unaffected areas. 
iii. Cognitive Model Description of Pathological 
Distortion 
Pathologi lcal distortion follows much the same sequence. 
In addition, considerable cognitive effort is required to 
maintain the pr jolonged diversion which distortion serves. 
The individual ,becomes increasingly attendant to his cogni• 
tive search for the reasons for the death. He must simul• 
taneously expand his distortion perimeters while avoiding 
the damaged core. He fails to cope well with routine events 
because he has had to rigidify his peripheral and extraneous 
dimensions, lest they require modifications that might add 
to the strain already upon the cognitive system. Thus, he 
builds a new and distorted framework on a fantasized founda-
tion which disallows adaptive interaction, since its 
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conceptualizations are not tr ue re pr esen t ations of events. 
Instead, they a re warped facs i mile which have been absorped 
into the rigid, stereotypic s tructure (see Figure 13). 
(c) Depersdnalization 
i. Introduction and Literature Review 
, Depersonalization is related to the numbness that is 
frequently repo 1ted by those who are _ in the grief process 
(Hobson, 1965; Lamers, 1972; Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1972; 
Westberg, 1962).
1 
It, too, is a protective device which, in 
a sense, freezes the individual's cognizance of his traumatic 
loss and gives him some cognitive and emotional distance 
from the event. · The depersonalization occurs at various 
stages of bereavements at the initial point of learning 
about the death 
1
when shock and numbness are precipitated by 
the news, later . on, when the individual behaves in rather 
automatic, mechanical ways; and whenever he is able to take 
a somewhat distant, uninvolved view of what has happened to 
him. 
Depersona~ization is not an absorptive te _ndency, but 
rather is postulated as a cognitive breakdown in dimensions 
concerning the understanding of oneself in relation to the 
world. Identity - knowing oneself - is based on these re-
lationships and lis severely traumatized when one of these 
supportive relationships is disrupted. The sudden death 
event places the mourner's knowledge of who he is in doubt, 
if not in jeopalidy. Until the other self-identifying cog-
nit'ive parameters are stre ngthened and expanded to partial l y 
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correct for the new absenc e of a key identity component, 
the bereaved experiences depersonalization. This includes a 
sense of disharmony wi.th himself, a sense of distance and 
uncertainty, a 1state of limbo while he re-establishes the 
remaining identity-anchoring relationships. 
The relevance of grief to the problem of identity 
and depersonalization is noted by Becker (1962) who discusses 
theoretical n~tions regarding mourning as part of a class 
of depressions which present problems to the individual in 
his forming of a coherent identity. Hinton (1967) and 
Lindemann (1944) also refer to the precess of depersonaliza-
tion as a sense of loss of self, and they relate it to the 
mourner's pre-occupation with the deceased. 
I 
The gaining of a new identity is an important part of 
the grief syndrome which Parkes (1972) discusses in terms 
of changed role obligations and role relationships. He 
takes particular note of the "loss of self which is often 
referred to as a 'gap' - 'it's a great emptiness', 'an 
unhappy void' "• Parkes suggests that significant identi-
fication with their deceased husbands occurred in many of 
his interviewed widows as an attempt to fill that gap. In 
order to substit
1
ute for the absence, many widows detach 
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from their pre-existing roles and identities and try to fill 
the wage-earner or family-leader slots, in ways that duplicate 
that of their fo 1rmer spouses. They have difficulty in seeing 
themselves as wido tvs and many "still seemed to regard them-
selves as married to their dead husbands" (Parkes, 1972), 
which may partially account for Marris' (1958) figures showing 
a low re••marri a.ge rateJ I believe t hese women are not 
rejecting wid owhood status, so much as displaying uncertainty 
about who and what chey ar e as a result: of a sudden death 
experience. T~is is not uncommon for mourners (Kutscher, 
1969). In healthy gr i ef syndro mes, the survivors new 
identity is typically defined over time by gradual .adjust-
ment to new life . situations which emerge and by new relation• 
ships that they form which provide alternate identity 
anchors (Lindemann, 1944). 
I 
The inability to re-define oneself as widow, orphan or 
other survivor may be a prognosticator of poor bereavement 
recovery. This type of mourning dysfunction results in an 
increasing loss
1
of self-identity and loss of contact . with 
actual role res ~onsibili .ties and role relations. The patho-
logically bereaved individual does not have a firm cognitive 
grounding in his relations with the world. Thus, he experi-
ences critical breaks in his ability to adequately interact 
with the environment's reality. This may account for the 
higher incidence of psychotic conditions reported for those 
I . 
who have experienced deaths of oth e r people (e.g., mothers) 
upon whom their identities were largely dependent (Arthur & 
Kemme, 1964; Barry, 1939; Blum & Rosenweig, 1944; Edelson & 
Warren, 1963; Hrlgard & Newman, 1961, 1963). 
ii. Cognitive Model Description of Normal Depersonal-
ization 
Cognitive depersonalization, thou gh it also permits 
some delay~ has as its primary function the providing of 
some respite from the onslaught of overloading stimulus 
107. 
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demands. By cUstancin g onesel f f:rcm one•s self, overload 
is temporarily avoided and efforts at cognitive repair can 
take a less under-pressu re pace. The danger of too prolon ged 
a respite is th At the depersonalization becomes routine and 
the mourner loses self-conceptualization/self-identity anchors 
which he later can't regaino Recall that self-identity 
is a function of the relationship of the individual to 
events, objects and most importantly, others in the environ-
ment. When a s i\gnificant other is lost, along with the 
other cognitive damage, thera is a corresponding disruption 
of the survivor's self-identity because one of its principle 
anchor-relationships is gone. Until this central dimension 
is replaced by other, substitutive relationships and link• 
ages, the person experiences uncertainty regarding his self• 
identity. 
iii. Cognitive Model Description of Pathological 
Depersonalization 
Loss of self-identity anchors increase the likelihood 
of pathological depersonalization because the individual's 
' . 
security is already weakened by the sudden death. In other 
words, the mourner is already less th _an assured of 'who he 
is', and if he firmly and continually avoids functioning as 
himself via depersonalization, then he may lose his self-
conceptualization beyond recapture. This appears to be a 
partial explanation for the symptom of over-identification 
with the deceased that has been mentioned as pathognomonic 
for atypical grief (Lindemann, 1944). The bereaved exces-
sively models the deceased, in part, because he has been 
- 1 
able to excessively- distance himself from his own experiences 
and his own cognitive structure. 
The numbness that evolves into pathological depersonal-
ization may have one of three precipitants. It may' result 
from the overwhelming threat of loss to the mourner of 
his self .. identit :y anchors. Or it may be caused by the lack 
of alternate cognitive dimensions for the individual to 
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relate himself to the world. Or the initial set of parameters 
I 
by which he knew himself may have been weak. 
Long-term loss of substantive identity is particularly 
tragic because it is ·one of the most susceptible symptoms 
for correction by appropriate external intervention. The 
acutely bereaved has lost the balance between who he is I . 
vis-a-vis the environment. He tends to distance himself from 
this unstable position by attempting to reassociate himself 
with the deceased through the modeling of some aspect of 
the deceased. However, this activity paradoxically pushes 
him still further from the reality of his situation and re-
duces the likelihood that he'll attempt to correct his actual 
cognitive matrix damage. On the contrary, to correct it 
first requires recognition and acceptance of the loss/damage 
ash!.§. loss and damage. Yet it is this very phenomenon that 
he is distancing himself from. An individual cannot re-
establish an identity stability on the basis of a defunct 
I 
relationship. Yet in order to re-establish~ identity, 
that's exactly what he attempts to do. This pathological 
course can, nonetheless, be corrected if other dimenstons 
can be provided r or the mourner which permit him to 
cognitively a r-,chor '!.ntc t he r e al world. Then he can form a 
re.vised; but aut pentic, -set of relationships as a basis for 
knowing who he i 1s ( see Fi gum 13). 
3. Pre-occupation with the Deceased 
{a). Introd J ccion and Literature Review 
The symptc:!ll of pre-occupation with the deceased usually 
occurs later in lthe grief process than other cognitive mani-
festations. Beyond the mechanical focusing upon the death 
required by the ( une ·ral and other mourning rituals, the 
individual who ttas suffered a sudden death experience tends 
to spend consid~rable time thinking about the significant 
other person whom he has lost. This pre-occupation takes 
many fo:cms i.n i J s imagery, such as dreams, wakeful fantasies 
and memories. 
The neces J ity for the bereaved to cognitively attend 
to his loss i.n order to repair the damage to his framework 
and bring the gl ief process to a healthy resolve is specified 
by grief counselors (e.g., Lindemann, 1944; Paul, 1966). Work-
ers in the field of crisis intervention (see Pa.rad, 1965, 1969) 
who often deal with the bereaved also emphasize the import-
ance of focusing upon the lost relationship, in order to 
bring closur e to various aspects of it and to re-construct 
the disrupted matrix. Avoi dance of this distressin g process 
forces the indiv i dual to pa tholo gically and excessively 
use defenses pr i v i ously descr ib ed to sustain this evasion. 
Throu gh this revi.ew proc ess, the significant ether is 
kept co gnitively viable as a memory with relevance to the 
I 
mourner's past history and present circu ms t ances. It is a 
procedure whtch allow s a mo:.e gra d11al s ep aration than the 
actual death itself permitted. Although many helpers have 
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a desire to divert the mourner's pre-occupation to less 
distressing are ~s, this diversion may not be in the bereaved's 
best interests. 'Werking through one's grief' (Freud, 1917; 
Lindemann, 1944 )
1 
means • attending to it', and moderate pre-
occupation following the initial shock is a common method 
for such a proc J dure. It is a painful process - as is grief 
in general - but a functional one that should not be 
inadvertently stifled. 
However, most individual's experiencing grief do tend 
I 
to give considerable thought to the deceased without solici-
1 
tation or coercing (Hinton, 1967; Lester & Kam, 1971; Lamers, 
1972; Lindemann, 1944; Mcconville et al, 1970; Parkes, 1972; 
- - I 
Paul, 1966; Pretzel, 1972; Rees, 1970). This may take the 
form of memories (Parkes & Brown, 1972) which are described 
as being very clear and very intense, similar to an actual 
t . · j 1· i f h O th ti percep ion or re- iv ng o t e event. r e pre-occupa on 
can be experienced as an actual sense of the deceased bein g 
present (Hobson ~ 1964; Marris, 1958; Parkes, 1965, 1971; 
Rees, 1970; Yamamoto et al, 1969). 
Bowlby (1961) points out that the basic psychological 
phases of grief I, as he views it, are divided into three 
sequences with the initial phase being the urge to recover 
the loss - defined by him as 'yearning' (Bowlby, 1961; Parkes 
(1971, 1972). The yearning is a restorative effort to re place 
the missing dimension. It is manifested in dreams (Mcconville 
. et al, 1970; Rees, 1970) in whic h th e decea sed i s alive 
(Pollac k , 1961) 1and whi ch i nvolve vi.vi d i magery of the de-
ceased, but wit h the shadow of death falling over the con-
j 
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tents (Waller, 1951). Volkan (1970) also refers to these 
repetit i ve dre J s about the deceased being alive but in danger. 
He feel s that t f ey are pathological indicators .when they 
include symbolic references to reincarnation. Volkan also I . . 
suggest s that verbal slips of the tongue referring to the 
decease d may be signs of unconscious pre-occupation. 
There is some overlapping here between the mental pre-
occupat io n and t he searching activity discussed under 
I behavio r al symptomology. Cognitive searching appears to occur 
as the mourner reviews the multitude of associations related I . 
to the l oss. The cognitive (and the behavioral derivative) 
searchi n g serve J a valuable and vital purpose for the be-
reaved i n his atrtempt at coping with his grief. In moderation, 
· this co-gnitive activity permits the individual to deal direct-
ly with the dis bi ption rather than avoid it. He has oppor-
tunitie s to review positive and 
I 
relatio nship, i i order to bring 
closure ·to bonds that have been 
negative components of the 
some degree of effective 
abruptly severed. 
Pa rkes (1972) has described a process of selective . I 
percept io n in widows, whereby perceptions not related to the 
decease d are sc Jeened out, wi th a concomitant focusing on 
percept io ns that: bear upon the loss. There is, Parkes be-
lieves~ Che develop ment of a perceptual set concerning ambig-
uous imp ression J which fits them into the mourner's effort to 
- I 
focus o,n the death. This may result in visual or auditory 
illusions. Bcth ,Parkes (1972) and Rees ( 1970) characterize 
this pre-occupational illustnn. p:t1e nomen on as a component of 
normal grief. They report that these iilusions are helpful 
experiences for hhe mourners, particularly if the grief 
counselor explains it as . a common reaction. Thus, most 
investigators view the various forms ·of pre-occupation as 
nonnal and as helpful for the bereaved in re-constructing 
a revised perspective on life which includes the reality 
f . h d. I . o t e recent ~sruption. 
In referring to moderate pre-occupation with images 
and memories of f he deceased, I have been careful to abstain 
fro~ characterizing this normal symptom as obsessive. When 
the tendency to give thought to the deceased is pervasive 
and constant and non-distractable, then pre-occupation has 
magnified into an obsession. The obsession, by its degree 
of exaggeration !of the normal symptom, is considered patho-
logical. There is room for no other comprehensions and 
there is distortion of non-related contents so as to make 
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them refer to the deceased. The individual finds himself 
literally flooded with memories and images which he cannot 
control or term·nate, His dreams are manifestly death related, 
his ideation is !limited to the loss and its ramifications, 
his fantasies are those of union. The pathological obsession 
need not be triggered by some event or object or recall, for 
the bereaved himself is predisposed to affiliate events with 
the death. 
Patholo gical obsessin g about the death can. prevent 
the mourner fro ' coping with the multiple and complex events 
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of daily living. Halpern (1 972) note s that obsessive rumina-
tion may focus on the circumstances c1f the death; and reference 
has already been
1
made here to those who have become obsessi-
vely , pre-occupied with proving that a suicidal death is really 
an accident or homocide {Herzog & Resnik, 1968; Pretzel. 
1972). Certain types of cognitiva pre-occupation have been 
identified as relatively specific to pathological mourning. 
These include pr l longed concern with the deceased for years 
after the death {Bowlby 1961; Volkan, 1970), er focusing on 
tangential aspects of the death, such as the weight of the 
gravestone (Volkan, 1970). Another exaggeration of normal 
I 
pre-occupation involves the magnification of sensory illusions 
I 
(i.e., misinterpretations of ambiguous stimuli) into visual 
I 
and auditory haliucinations of the deceased for which there 
are no sensory basis (Hinton, 1967; Matchett, 1972; Rees, 
1970). 
This obses i ion is typically bonded to behavioral symptoms 
in which compulsivity to repeat shared experiences, from the 
. I 
trivial to the extravagant, is dominant. The cognitive search-
ing of the normal mourning process takes an unhealthy turn, 
because in obsessive pre-occupation, the search has ended. 
There's been a cognitive •re-capturing' of the dece ased, in 
which the cognit lions have a common thread of similarity 
where the world is one of death, death reminders, death sti muli. · 
(b) Cognitive Model Description of Normal Pre-Occupation 
with the Deceased 
When there is a disruption resulting from sudden death, 
there is a damag.; to the survi vor's co gnitive framework. 
This is acco mpanied by a te nde ncy co repai r the linkages 
which were formerly bound to th e core dime nsiono 1bose 
I 
'spokes of the wheel', metap horically described in an earlier 
chapter, remain un•anchored to a central construct. The 
I objects, events and people conceptually related to the de-
ceased are unstable at one end. Therefore, they require 
attention in order that they may perhaps be reassociated with 
some other or new dimension. Normal pre-occupation is less 
a narrow focusing than a reparative effort at cognitive 
re-stabilization. 
There is moderate constriction as the mourner re-
channels his cognitive attention into the damaged area of 
his matrix (i,e., the deceased); and moderate dilation as he 
cognitively searches for new poles to anchor these adrift 
linkages of the l1d core constellation (i.e., memories of 
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the deceased). The bereaved is confronted with routine inter-
actions that previously were coped with via routine .cognitive 
categories. These categories are no longer firm.· Therefore, 
when environmental demands r eq uire their adequate functioning, 
the matrix i.s st ~essed. This can occur whenever an event 
happens • to evoke a cognitive r esponse fro m. the damaged area; 
for example, when the survivor sees the deceased's favorit e 
chair or a film that they once shared. The symptom of pre-
occupation is the manif e stat i on of the perip heral ripples of 
cognitive damage l to affiliate d conceptual axes. It i s stre s s-
ful, but also functional. 
The increa r ~d atten -i:io n to the disrupted parts of t he 
matrix is partia l y a function of th e i ncrea sed subjectivit y 
resulting from the genera l co gniti ve r eg ression of acute 
grief. The mour1er becomes more ego~centric in order to 
protect his vulnerable framework from further, avoidable, 
overload; and si i ultaneously to concentrate his efforts on 
I repair and repla f ement. - The foundation by which the bereaved 
comprehends his experie nces has been wounded. His increased 
. I 
subjectivity enables him to nurse his wound and the radia-
ting pain around it. 
(c) Cognitive Model Description of Pathological 
Pre-occupation with the Deceased 
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While normal pre-occupation permits the mourner to 
productively attend to the re-anchoring needs of core 
dimension linkag l s, obsessional pre-occupation with the 
deceased results in a rigidified cognitive matrix. As the 
individual becomes increasingly absorbed with the instability 
and threat of fl bating linka ges, the other areas of his cog• 
nitive framework l are ignored. His daily activities• unrelated 
to the death - are no lon ger sufficiently attended tot hence, 
overall adaptivi t y declines because his cognitive efforts 
are being over-e 1tended in the damaged area (i.e., the death 
event), to the e f clusion of other zones {i.e., work). There-
fore, the obsessional pre-occupation leav es otherwise non-
affected cogniti r ~ 
and breakdown. 
Constricti bn 
dimensions more susceptible to overload 
and dilation oscillate rapidly, as the 
individual focuses down very narro wly onto the dimensions of 
I t he deceased and tho se associated with t he m. TI1en he errat-
ically expands in an attempt to grossly re-capture the loss 
by filling the void with other related. but i.nappropriate1 
cognitive eleme J ts. For example, a particular event they'd 
shared or song Je liked or holiday remembered will be used as 
a replacement anchor for the defunct core dimension. It does 
not serve as an effective replacement, of course; but the 
search for such a substitute goes on through the dilation 
process. 
The degree of cognitive regression is greater in path~ 
ological obsession than it is in normal pre-occupation. 
Consequently, subjectivity is more intense. Events that are 
actually not related to the sudden death event or to the 
mourner's condition nonetheless, take on relevance as they I , 
are distorted to fit the exaggerated subjectivity of the 
bereaved. A neighbor's cat dies; an automobile accident is 
passed on the road; a movie about children••• all trigger 
associations to the acute grief that is being experienced. 
The subjective ~ramework of the pathological mourner will 
tend to stress the tangential reference of these and similar 
I 
events to his bereaved situation. While an objective stance 
will allow these encounters to be understood within their 
I I 
own context, th 7 obsessively pre-occupied mourner is sub-
jectively pre-disposed to construe these phenomena from his 
I 
narrowly defined mourning context (see Figure l'•). 
c. Somatic S·ymptomology 
1. Introduc j ion 
In Part II, I have pointed out that the cognitive 
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Figure 14, Sur.Jmary Cha rt of Cogniti ve Pre-occupation with 
the Deceased . 
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disruption of a core di mension s ubsequent to a sudden death . 
acts as a major dtressor upon t:he i ndividual si.nce it seriously 
threatens his co J tinued coherent survival. It: is generally 
accepted that ps J chological stress is responded to by the 
I 
body as if it were a physical assault (Engel, 1962; Frederick, 
I 
1971; Lindemann, ]1960; Parkes, 1972; Selye, 19561 Rees & 
Lutkins, 1967; Wolff, 1953). 
I 
I contend that mourning is psychologically {hence, 
. . 
physiologically) Jstressful to the mourner, and that · the 
somatic symptomology of acute grief is, therefore, related 
to those bodily responses associated with stress. These stress 
I reactions are normal, protective, defensive, physiological 
activities that have been studied and detailed at length 
(see Selye, 1956 for a complete re\•iew). Selye describes the 
body~s response to stress as being a relatively consiste nt 
pattern of somntic changes in various organ systems. The 
response patter ~ has been characterized as the General 
Adaptation Synd1ome or G.A.S. 
The General Adaptation Syndrome is a tri-phasic se-
quence of events beginning with an 'Alarm Reaction' consisting 
of two stages; (1) a shock stage in which there is lowered 
resistance with 1adrenal cortex enlargement, some degenerative 
changes in the J hymus gland and early gastro-intestinal 
ulceration due to hyper-secretion. This is followed closely 
by (2) a counte f shock stage of te mporary recovecy f~om these 
symptoms. Overall, these changes tend to be degenerative 
and result from Ja complex glandul a r interaction involving the 
pituitary and adrenal glands., If either of these glands are 
surgically removed, t hen res earch ani mals do not display 
the 'Alarm Reaction'. 
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If the stress is more prolonged, a 'Stage of Resistance' 
evolves in which most of the 1 Alarm Reaction' symptoms 
subside. For example, t he adrenals reduce to normal size, 
as does the thymus gland, and blood glucose levels (often 
depleted in the alarm phase) return to normal. Although 
biological adjustment ap pears optimal in this 'Stage of 
_Resistance', the individual is subtly in a highly vulnerable 
state • . This is because the ad justment appears to be limited 
to the particular stress tha t the person was originally 
exposed to. Any new or additional stressors will lead 
dramatically to further and more serious degeneration. In 
effect, it appears that phys i ological defenses to stress 
are limited and can be overl oaded even during this optimally 
responsive phase. 
Even if the overload of a new stressor does not occur, 
there exists a temporal limitation to the amount of stress 
that can be endured wit h sat i sfactory somatic adaptation. If 
the stress continues, the in d ividual eventually weakens and 
the 'State of Exhaustio n ' be g ins. This can lead to ominous 
physical changes involv i ng ma ny of the body's organ systems. 
While the overall General Adaptation Syndrome's effects 
comprise a series of ch a nges occurring over fairly extended 
periods of time, stress also evokes more immediate responses 
that act as preparatory chan ges for some type of behavioral 
protection (e.g., fight or f l i ght) against the perceived 
survival threat. These more rapid changes parallel the 
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•Alam Rea~tton' of the G.A.S. Thev refiect the activation 
fth . . 1 "'"h. . 0 e auto nomic ! nervous system. J. e autonomi.c nervous system 
acts directly up r n certain somati.c systems and indirectly 
upon others through its influence upon hormonal glands. 
The autonomic nervous system is an efferent system 
I . 
whose fibers innervate the smooth muscles and glands which 
control many of th e involuntary functions of the body. It 
is composed of t Lo divisions which act antagonisticallys 
the sympathetic ~ranch and the para-sympathetic branch. 
Activity of the !sympathetic branch prepares the individual 
for an emergenc l by mobilizing the body•s resources. For 
example, by incrieasing blood sugar levels, heart and resp-
iratory rate, w, ile simultaneously inhibiting the less 
critical digest ~ve processes. Conve.rsely, the activation of 
the parasympathetic branch calms the individual's physiology, I . 
for example, by jreducing heart rate and enhancing digestion. 
Symptoms of sympathetic arousal will vary as a function of 
the overall threat and the individual's particular reaction 
to it. Short-t J rm sympathetic stimulation manifested as 
dryness in the mouth (i.e., salivary inhibition) may evolve 
into long-term symptomology such as peptic ulcers. More 
serious symptoms appear as the prolonged emergency footing 
I 
of the body under stress begins to fatigue over time. As 
I . 
explained with regard to the G.A.S., a 'state of exhaustion' 
eventually 
and stress 
sets ' in and normal bodily responses to 
brea r- down. 
I 
emergency 
Most of the somatic symptoms of acute grief can be 
traced back to lthe effects of autonomic nervous system arousal 
at different phases of the General Adapta ti on Syndrome. Suen 
effects are quite broad and to uch upon mos t major organ 
systems. Both short and long term manifestation s of auto-
nomic activation are demonstrated by individuals who are 
under the stress of bereaveme nt. 
I believe that the chain of effects connecting a sudden 
death event to somatic sympt oms are as follows a The sudden 
death of a significant other person disrupts the coherent 
cognitive abilities of the survivor. This is due to the fact 
that a basic-core dimension by which he knows and interacts 
with his environment is no lo nger functionally available to 
him. This condition leaves t he mourner in a state of vulner-
ability because he can't adapt to stimuli impingement as 
adequately as he did before. He now experiences even . routine 
events as overloading. This reduced adaptive effectiveness 
and simultaneous overload demand are serious threats to 
continued psychological func t ioning and survival. The body 
l22e 
of the individual responds to the psychological threat of 
cognitive breakdown as if it were as stressful as physical 
assault. The bereaved, phys i ologically, prepares for emer-
gency by activation of the s ympathetic branch of the autonomic 
nervous system. This activa t ion results in a wide variety of 
physiological changes, as obs erved in aspects of the common 
General Adaptation Syndrome. These autonomic nervous system 
changes, both functional on.e s and de generative ones, are 
manifested as so matic sympto ms in the acutely bereaved. In 
essence, vir t ually all the pr inciple bodily sympto ms of 
mourning have their etiology in these autonomic chan ges 
associated with stress., Stress an d it s physiological con ... 
. th I d . . f " . b . i d . com1.t:ants are j me 1.a t1.ng . :a ctors etween cogn1.t ve 1.s-
ruption and ·so mayic symptomolo gy. 
The following sect i om will review the individual's 
major organ systems with regard to the changes occurring in 
them during bereavement. Such a review is intended to demon-
strate both the somatic symptom effects of grief and their 
derivation from ~tress-induced autonomic activation. 
2. Respiratory Sympt oms 
The gasp of shock upon learning about the sudden death 
of a significant / other (JackSon, 19571 Kutscher, 1969) may be 
the prototype f i r the sustained sighing and irregular 
breathing which joccurs t h roughout bereavement. Lindemann 
(1944) has noted that sighing seems to be pathognomonic 
I 
for the grief priocess. Others (Lamers, 1972; Volkan, 1970) 
have similarly noted that gasping and sighing are common 
I 
respiratory signs of grief. Associated with this response 
is a general absence of regular breathing rhyth ms and 
I 
apparent difficulty in obtaining _sufficient inhalation. 
Respiratory ~atJ increases ·(Parkes. 1972) with obvious 
shortness of breath (Maddi son & Viola. 1968) or breathless-
ness (Lindemann l 1944) as sociated with a choking sensation. 
I 
While crying isl not in itself a respiratory effect, the dry 
sobbing that often acco mpanies weeping (Clayton et al, 1968, 
1971, 19721 Volkan, 1970) may be construed as further efforts 
to obtain more air thro ugh spasmod i c respiratory action. 
I 
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Several l vestiga t ors have not ed a significantly hi gher 
I 
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incidence of acute asth matic at ta cks during bere avement 
(Cobb & Lindemanm, 19431 Hi nt on, 1967; Lindemann, 1944; 
Marris, 1958; McDermott & Cobb, 1939 : Schmale & Iker, 1966). 
Since asthma is understood to be an inflammatory allergic 
reaction of the bronchial tubes which may be precipitated 
by allergies (Guyton, 1969) or psychological stress (Buss, 
1966; Selye, 1956),it is considered a normal stress response; 
that is, when it · involves the acute exacerbation of a pre-
existing asthi~atic condition. However, the development of 
bronchitis (Mar1is, 1958) or chronic bronchial asthma 
(Hinton, 1967; Lindemann, 1944; ·Maddison & Viola, 1968) 
subsequent to a /sudden death is an unusual and extreme 
respiratory symptom which must be viewed as pathological • 
. 3. Circulatory Symptoms 
An immediate pallor (Kutscher, 1969; Marris, 1958) 
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marks the initial observable effect on the circulatory system. 
This results from peripheral vasoconstriction (Guyton, 1969; 
Selye, 1956; Woodburne, 1969) which serves to direct blood 
from non-essential organs (e.g., skin and abdome~) to the 
heart and musculature where blood vessels are dilating. It 
is this circulatory reduction to which Marris (1958) attri• 
butes the report of leg ulcers in widows he interviewed. 
Centrally, tachycardia (Marris, 1958) or heart palpitation 
(Maddison & Viola, 1968) are frequently reported by the 
bereaved, as overall card i ac activity increases, along with 
a rise in blood pres sure (Bruh n et al, 1970, Marris, 1958; 
Parkes, 1972) and pulse r ate (Marris, 1958). Chest pains are 
a normal complai r t (Maddison & Viel .a, 1968; Marris, 1958) 
·which .appear to be related to the stress of sudden and 
sustained rise i t coronary demand an d output, !leadaches 
of the migraine type are also pat't of the grief syndrome 
(Maddison & Viol l , 1968; Marris, 1958; Parkes, 1972) and 
may be caused by spasm and dilation of the blood vessels 
supplying the intra-cranial tissues (Guyton, 1969). 
I 
While the foregoing circulatory changes are typical of 
I . 
the acute grief syndrome and while overall exacerbations of 
pre-existing con f itions are common in bereavement (Parkes, 
1964, 1972), such aggravations are particularly dangerous 
in this area. 1hcreased morbidity and mortality in the be-
1. 
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reaved will be discussed separately, but it is important to 
note here that t he principle factor in these higher mortality 
rates, especiall i for widowers over 50 years old, was the 
degenerative cor ~Ilary diseases, Young et al (1963) studied 
almost 5000 wido r ers and found a mortality rate 40% higher 
than that normally expected. Of these, three-quarters of the 
increase .was due to death from coronary thrombosis, arterio• 
sclerosis and other cardiac ailments. These findings have 
been supported b ~ other investigators (Cox & Ford, 1964; Parkes 
· et al, 1969) and for widows as well as widowers (Symposium 
Report, 1967). All have emphasized that the stress of grief 
is an exacerbati [ g, though not causative, influence upon 
coronary disease leading to death during the 6 months after 
the loss. It ap ears that the addition of circulato r y re-
actions of berea r ement upon an already weak heart jeopardizes 
the heart's fra gile maintenance of bodily demandso Sustained 
l 
demand f or high itar.diac nut r.mt l"i t h concurrent elevation of I .  . . 
blood pressure mly lead t o cor ona r y i mpai rment in even an 
otherwise no:-mal y functioni ng ind i vidual, or to chronic 
hypertension and its rnany sequelae ( Guyton, 1969). 
4. Digestive. and Gastro-Intest i nal Symptoms 
Nausea and/or vomiting and stomach contractions often 
occur during the first few hours of grief (Kutscher, 1969; 
Parkes, 1972), a part of the cognitive shock/physiological 
alarm reaction ml diated by the autonomic nervous sustem ·. As 
stress-precipita t ed diversion of blood from the digestive 
organs to the he 1rt and musculature progresses, there is 
general digestiv l discomfort and indigestion ,reported by 
the -bereaved (La kers, 1972; Lindemann, i944; Maddison & 
Viola, 1968; Mart is, 1958). Gastric tone decreases precipi-
1 
tously and largely accounts for the . overall experience of 
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digestive upset. I It also influences the anorexia and sig• 
I 
nificant weight loss that is typical during mourning (Clayton 
. . I 
et al, 1971; Lruners, 1972; Lindemann, 1944; Maddison & Viola, 
. I 
1968; Marris, 1958; Parkes & Brown, 1972: Stern & Larviere, 
1957). · Reduced i alivation with subsequent drying of the mouth 
1 Id l - . ·t . may a so occur aI pay a ro1e 1n appeti e suppression 
(Kutscher, 1969; Schoenberg et al, 1970). 
Prolonged ·tress is a known etiological factor in the 
. . I 
develop ment of gastric and duodenal ulcers (Buss, 1966) and 
Marris (1958) found that ulcer incidence was higher than 
expected in the ~ecently widowed that he studied. It must 
be mentioned tha b a pre-existing ulcer, as with asthma and 
coronary dise ase. may be exacerb at ed by the str ai n of a 
sudden death event. Thus , e ithe r S<";;ri ous aggr avation of a 
pre-existing ulcer or development of an ulcer are considered 
1 · 
extreme and, hence, patholo g ical responses. 
~onetheless, duodenal and gastric ulcers appear to 
be less frequent pathological concomitants of grief than 
ulcerative colitis (Hinton, 1967; Lindemann, 1944; Schmale & 
Iker, 1966). The latter disease is often precipitated by 
prolonged and severe diarrhea which allows the rapid flow of 
I 
digestive enzymes from the small intestine into the lower 
bowel. These enzymes are extremely irritating, especially 
upon the colon's walls. Usually, the lining of the large 
intestine is coated with mucous secretions for protection 
and lubrication. However, stress-induced sympathetic 
stimulation inhibits the protective secretions and increases 
sphincter tone. The net result is severe diarrhea and high 
enzyme irritation to (and holes in) the walls of the colon, 
a condition known as ulcerative colitis (Guyton, 1969). Cobb 
& Lindemann (1943) made early note of a relationship between 
acute grief and h1cerative colitis during their investigation 
of the survivors of the Boston Coconut Grove fir.e. Lindemann 
(1945, 1950) more specifically stated that acute grief acted 
as a stressful psychogenic precipitant to ulcerative colitis, 
a potentially li ~e-threatening disease. An experimental study 
by Almy of the irritable colon (1951) further supported 
these relationships by showing that healthy subjects .demon-
strated colon disturbances induced by experimental stress 
which were similar to t hat seen in psychologically distressed 
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• . I 
persons and 1.n perso .ns facin g · life crises such a.s bereavement. 
Thus, while diar l hea rnc1,.y be f requently exhibited as a I ~ . 
physiological s ., .. ptom i .n grief, prolongation of t:his condi-
tion is abnormal and a precipitant for the more serious 
complications of ulcerative colitis. 
I s. Musculo-S l eletal Symptoms 
Tension aceompanies the grief syndrome (Lindemann, 1944) 
and ·manifests it Jelf in muscular readiness throughout the 
body. Although ~his adaptive response to stress is useful 
against direct pf ysical assault, its appropriateness and 
functional usefullness during bereavement is minimal. The 
I 
prolongation of tension in the muscles usually results in 
fatigue (Lindema bn, 1944; Maddison & Viola, 1968; Stern & 
Lariviere, 1957) jand overall aching (Maddison & Viola, 1958). 
A tense muscular state cannot be maintained for prolonged 
periods without ~uch consequences. Furthermore, spasms may 
be associated wi lh muscular tension, and in fact are reported 
in the -bereaved. These spasms appear to be localized in the 
neck and throat, with resultant sensations of choking and 
throat tightness (Linde mann, 1944) or difficulty in swallow-
ing (Maddison & I iola, 1968). 
As with ot er conditions, grief has been identified 
as a psychogenic aggravator, rather than cause, of pre-
existing joint diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis (Cobb 
I 
et al, 1939; Cob! & Lindemann, 191-¼3; Marris, · 1958; Parkes, 
1964) and fibroc"tis (Marris, 1958). Parkes (1964) suggests 
that the reporte aggravation of arthritis may simply serve as 
an excuse for the widows to ta l k to their physicians about 
their grief. Nonetheless, he concedes that the probability 
of authentic joint inflammation for many mourners remains 
high. I 
6. Neurological Symptoms 
Many of the neurological symptoms reported during 
bereavement are associated with underlying autonomic nervous 
I 
system arousal (Parkes, 1971, 1972, Parkes & Brown, 1972), 
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such as insomnia (Clayton et al, 1968, 1971, 1972; Hobson, 
1964; Lamers, 1972; Maddison & Viola, 1968; Parkes, 1971; 
Parkes & Brown, 1972; Stern & Lariviet~, 1957; Yamamoto et al, 
1969). Other frequent somatic grief complaints also appear 
to be based on au l onomic arousal. These include restlessness, 
I 
trembling and nervousness (Maddison & Viola, 1968; Marris, 
1958; Parkes & Brown, 1972). 
In addition to these symptoms which seem to be concerned 
with neural over-activation, the mourner may experience 
I 
neurodermatological changes such as skin rashes (Maddison & 
Viola, 1968; Marris, 1958); dizziness or fainting (Maddison 
& Viola, 1968); and sensory distortions (Lindemann, 1944). 
The latter can escalate into hallucinatory proportions in 
those suffering from pathological giief (Matchett, 1972; 
Rees, 1970). 
7. Other Somatic Symptoms 
In addition to the forementioned effects on certain 
organ systems, grief-related stress reactions may be 
manifested in ot he r ge ne r a l bo~i l y r espon s es, as wellu . I 
Frederick (1971) 'e mphasi.zes t ha t _pve1:-a daptation by man• s 
highly developed and integra t ed nervous system can be a con• 
sequence of such non-specific stressors as grief. He note5 
that inflammation, a walling-off pr ocess, is important to 
the body's immun~ response because it prevents the spread 
I 
of disease to other areas by encapsulating it. Corticoster ... 
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oids are anti-in l lammatory agents; i.e., they su ppress this 
immune response, usually in a short-term sense. An over-
adaptation is exemplified by the ACTH-corticosteroid response, 
which under a continuous stress, does not turn off. Hence, 
an individual who is stressed by grief, with the resulting 
physiologic pi.cture of increased and continuous corticoster-
oid levels, might ! nQ! be in an immunological state of readi• 
ness. In other words, the high steroid output reduces 
i.mmunity and increases susceptibility. One result is that 
I . 
a person may contract the malignant rather than benign form 
of a disease caused by the same virus. Frederick (1971) 
suggests that such an ever-adaptation with corticosteroid• 
induced complications may well result in greater susceptibility 
of the bereaved to a variety of serious disease states. These 
include glaucoma (Boyd & McLeod, 1964), insulin-resistant 
diabetes (Frawley, 1955), fun gal infections (Louria, 1962), 
tuberculosis (McLean, 1962), viral · infections (Hallett et 
al, 1951; Ormsby et al, 1951) and possibly mali gnancies 
(Taliaferro, 1957). 
The relationship bet we~n recent life losses and the 
development of malign an t dis ea ses is particular l y interestin g . 
Schmale & Iker (1 966) studied ' 51 ~omen at Strong Memorial 
Hospital in Roche
1
ster, who were hospitalized · for suspicion 
of cervical cancer following atypical PAP smears. The aim 
I 
of their investi ga tion was co test their theoretical notion 
that the feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, which 
often accompanied ! a loss, may be responsible for physical 
illnesses. Each If the women were intervie wed by a psychia- . 
trist prior to the biopsy and inquiries were made regarding 
I 
recent losses. ·If the patient had experienced such a loss 
and also experien bed feelings of hopelessness and helpless-
ness, a prediction was made that the biopsy would confirm 
cervical cancer. \ If these predictor criteria were not met, 
then the absence of cancer was predicted. In 36 of the 51 
I 
women (71%), the diagnosis was accurately made prior to 
the exploratory surgery, Le., on the basis of recent loss, 
hopeless and helpless feelings. Schmale and Iker conclude 
that their study may be indicative of the physiologically 
I 
stressful state of the bereaved which make them more vulner-
1 "2 .a.J • 
1 
able (because of lowered immunological readiness) to malignant 
diseases • I 
. Schmale & Iker (1966) and Green (1966) also make note 
of a high incidence of recent losses among a group of pat-
ients suffering from leukemia and lymphoma. And these 
relationships between loss and cancer have also been supported 
by findings that significant separation experiences were 
common in patient ~ with malignant breast tumors, but not 
in patients whose \breast lesions were benign (Muslin et al. 
1966). 
Finally, many acthor s (e~g., Li.ndemann~ 1944; Maddison 
&. Viola, 1968: Parkes, 1972) ha\:e made reference to the 
frequency of symptom identificat .ion with the deceased by 
those individuals who are on the pathological bereavement 
course. Typically, such identification is related to the 
last illness of ti:1e deceased, if one existed. For example, 
a widow may develop chest pains following her young husband's 
recent death from acute cardiac arrest. Since these mani-
festations may vary according to the actual death inducing 
illness or according to the mourner's symbolic representation 
of it, this class of symptom is referred to this general 
category. The appearance of identificatory symptoms is an 
important index of the degree of abnormality in the grief 
process. 
8. General Morbidity and Mortality of the Bereaved 
While the previous sections have dealt with specific 
symptomo _logy, some . studies have taken overviews of the 
bereaved population in order to assess the general morbidity 
and mortality incidence of this group. The findings have 
consistently demonstrated that ill health and premature 
death are higher in mourners than in the general population. 
In addition to the greater frequency of particular symptoms 
and diseases already noted, Hobson (1958), Maddison & Viola 
(1968) and Marris (1958) found that widows gave self-reports 
of overall poorer health after the death of their spouses 
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than before the death. Parkes (1971, 1.972) and Parkes & Brown 
(1972) point out that any pre-existing physical dysfunction 
is likel y to be a targ et of s tre ss, with consequential 
aggravat i on of t he target dys functio n du r in g the grief 
period. Certain Jtypes of families also displa y higher 
morbidit y in the ' surviving family members following a sudden 
death (Vollman et al, 1971). And grief has been desaribed 
as a haz a rdous condition for those contemplating oral surgery 
(Kutsche r et al, 1970) or elective surgery in general 
(Schoenb e rg, 1969) because of the higher susceptibility of 
the bere av ed to complications. Postponement of these pro-
cedures i s recommended by these authors. 
The six-mo
1
nth period i mmediately following the death 
of a sig n ificant person in one's life is a critical interim, 
during which the risk of the survivor's own death is great. 
The variety of causes for this higher mortality rate among 
recently bereaved has been suggested earlier in this chapter. 
The fact that grief-related diseases actually lead to fatal 
outcomes -is indicated by several studies with different 
populati ons. Kraus & Lilienfield (1959) found an outstanding 
excess of deaths among the young widowed (under age 35) and 
Young et al (1963) re ported similar findings of higher mor-
tality amongst older (over 55 years) widowers during the 
first 6 months of bereavement••• an increase of over 40%. 
134. 
The latt e r study is based on a five-year follow-up of almost 
4500 widowers and has been s upported by other investigators 
(Cox & Ford, 19~4; Par ke s, 1964). Family members ot her than 
spouses . are simil a rly higher r i sks for fatal illnesses shor tl y 
after t h eir loss (Rees & Lutkins, 1967; Vollman et a l, 1971), 
especia 1l y if She dea t h is sudden. Recs and Lutkin s (19 67) 
found the mort a lit y rate fo r r e la ti ves · of the deceased to 
be seven times ch at . of a comparable gr oup in a similar area 
of semi-rural \vales who had net experienced a recent death. 
Several author's have suggested explanatio~ for this 
higher mortality incidence in the bereaved, such as psycho-
logical dysfunction leading to self-neglect (Hinton, 1967), 
additional environmental pressures of widowhood (Kraus & 
Lilienfield, 19519) and physiological vulnerability res _ulting 
from stress (Frederick, 1971; Parkes, 1964, 1971, 1972). 
Though each of these factors appear to be influential, it 
has been my contention that stress-related physiological 
effects are the mosc critical. 
D. Affectiv!L_Symptomology 
1. General Explanation for Cognitive Basis of Affective 
Symptoms 
135. 
The rationale for the cognitive influence over affective 
symptomology has already been detailed in Part II. However, 
as a means of rekindling those reasons prior to a descrip-
tion of the symptoms themselves, the following summarization 
is offered. 
Three perspectives converged to support the model of 
cognitive prima J y regarding the emotional aspects of the 
acute grief syndrome. The regressive process which acco m-
panies the disruption of the core cognitive dimension 
includes a loss of disjunctiveness between the cognitive, 
conative and affecti ve modes of i.nter a.ct i ng with even t so 
I 
Interpersonal phenomena, which are ambiguous and, therefore, 
I 
poorly disjc t ned ' to beg i n with, are esp e cially vulnerable 
to affective arousa.l when cognitive r eg ress i on occurs. This 
effect of high affect arousal and involvement, subsequent 
I to interpersonal loss, partially accounts for the strong 
emotional symptomology of bereavement. The regression 
of cognitive functioning has as a corollary - emotional 
stimulationo 
In addition, Kelly's (1963) re-definitions of certain 
relevant affects into cognitive terminology and explanation 
gave support to the idea of emotions related to grief being 
understood as cognitively derived. Thus, anxiety was de·fined 
as the experience of encountering events for which the 
individual lacked an adequate cognitive dimension ·for com-
prehension or coping. Anger and hostility were described 
as feelings of (a) having to choose between restructuring 
one's matrix or force-fitting events into the old innappro-
priate structure; and feelings of (b) actually attempting 
the force-fitting, while extorting validation for the dis-
torted perspective. Guilt was explained as the sense of 
loss of interpersonal role responsibilities and expectations, 
with attendant questions about the degree of one's failure 
in the prior, now lost, role. 
Finally, t he physiological state that signifies stress 
(which is activated by the psychological stress subsequent 
136, 
to disruption and inadequacy) places the mourner in a somatic 
arousal condition that is subject to cognitive interpretation. 
The bodily responses of stress are similar to those of hi gh 
emotional tension. Therefore, it is possible that the mourner 
137. 
identifies his e ixperience as certain feelin gs su ch as anger 
or fear, on the basis of physical ser~ at ions that are actually 
cognitively-ind J ced reactions to stress. 
The reade j may also refer to Figure 9, pa~e 62 • 
. The plan of this section will be to present a litera-
ture review of l he emotion under consideration, followed by 
a cognitive model explanation of the respective affective 
symptom. The a j fects discussed include (a) fear and anxiety, 
{b) anger and hqstility and .(c) guilt. These descriptions 
will be followed by an expanded section on (d) depression, 
based on Beck's (1967) previously published cognitive 
explanation for that syndrome. 
2. Fear and ,Anxiety 
(a) Introduction and Literature Review 
The frequ~ncy of anxiety and fear in the bereaved is 
high (Bruhn et al, 1970; Krupp, 1965; Lamers, 1972; Lindemann, 
1944; Maddison j Viola, 1968; Parkes, 1964,1965,1971,1972; 
Yamamoto .et al, 1969). However, its intensity and duration 
can vary. Most anxiety reactions occur early in the be-
reavement process with occasional exacerb ations later8 
Persistent and extre me fears may indicate pathological 
grief. These can include recurring n ig htmares (Maddison & 
Viola, 1968), pl nic attacks after the first month of be-
reavement (Maddison & Viola, 1968; Parkes, 1971, 1972) or 
. I 
terror fears (Paul, 1967). It should al s o be noted that 
sustained anx iety/fear has as its corollary a sustained 
somatic arousal condition which is potentially dysfunctional 
I 
to normal physio�ogy (Selye. 1956). In other words, the body 
begins to wear d�wn after a prolonged period of fearful 
I tension ••• the neral Adaptation Syndrome's ''Exhaustion 
Stage". 
Other investigators have described anxiety based 
symptoms of griek, including school phobias (Jakab & Howard, 
1969), phobias of being alone or of death�related stimuli 
(Hinton, 1967), ears about: maintaining their sanity 
(Lindemann, 1944; Maddison & Viola, 1968) and realistic 
fears about all,gations of child neglect .
or child abuse fol­
lowing an infan ,•s unexpected demise (Halpern, 1972) as 
occurs in the 'Sudden Infant Death Syndrome'. 
{b) Cognit:·ve Model Explanation 
The sudden death of a significant person in one's 
life is a very frightening experience. Among its immediate 
effects are a s  nse of vulnerability and inadequacy in the 
race of previouJly routine stimuli that now become over­
whelming. The Jorld is confusing and impi.nging, since the 
normal resourceJ for dealing with events is disrupted. The 
potential for cJaotic disorganization is great. The individ­
ual responds tojthis psychological assault as if it were a 
physical assaulf (Wolff, 1953) because the threat to security 
and survival are similar. 
Fear reacfions are generated because of the acute
abaence of another person upon whom the bereaved may have 
depended in soml important ways. This loss of, for example, 
genuine protect I. on gives rise to authentic potential for 







Inte rn ally, anxiety reactions a re genera ted because the 
individual is votded of - a core d imension with which he had 
understood and cop ed wi ch a multitude of events. Psycholo• 
I 
gically, the bereaved finds his func ·tional survival unexpec- . 
tedly threatened and hi~ matrix foundation de-stabilized. 
There really is possibility for collapse, especially as the 
overload increases, and the mourner 0 s anxiety and fear must 
be viewed with that reality in mind. 
139~ 
Comprehension ·of the threat results in somatic arousal, 
as well, The mourner is under stress and experiences a physio-
logical alarm reaction involving increased reticular stimu-
lation and autonomic arousal. These changes yield somatic 
I 
cues that are identified by the mourner as fear or anxiety. 
Such fears are a normal component of the acute grief syndro me 
sinc ,e they are realistic responses to the genuinely hazardous 
sequelae .to a sudden death experience. 
· That the anxiety may be dependent on survival threat 
is suggested by Bowlby (1961) in his analysis of 'separation 
anxiety'. He notes that attachment to a mother figure is a 
functional necessity to the infant and that the severing of 
this attachment is literally life-threatening. He and Krupp 
(1962) have also noted - though from different theoretical 
bases - that there are similarities between adult grief 
anxiety and inf Ant ~eparation anxiety (Bowlby, 1960). Whereas 
Bowlby and Krupp con ceptu alize grief as either a recapitula-
tion or a special case of infant s epara tion anxiety, my 
content to n is that each is a realistic survi val th rea t in 
its own right. Westberg (1962) lends some support for t hi s 
notion of survival threa.t in his reporting that the bereaved 
indicate an experience of panicky feelings due to fear for 
their continued survival . and their inability to cope or 
function as adeq Lately as they had been able to previously 
(see Figure 1.6) •1 
3. Anger and Hostility 
{a) Introduction and Literature Review 
Indeed, anlger is a common affective symptom reported 
by the bereaved (Lamers, 1972; Paul, 1966; Siggins, 1967). 
Whether it takes the form of irritability and loss of inter-
personal warmth (Lindemann, 1944; Westberg, 1962), rage 
{Halpern, 1972: Paul, 1967) or aggression (McConville et al, 
1970; Volkan, 1970). The resentment is experienced by in-
dividual survivors (see the foregoing: Hinton, 1967) and 




The targets of . grief hostility are often persons who 
tangentiall l associated with the death. Thus, in Herzog 
Resnick's st judy (1968) of parents of adolescent suicides, 
anger was directed at police, coroner's deputies and 
the researchers themselves. The displaced hostility in 
Nolfi's (1967) sample of survivors of children's deaths, was 
targeted at a diagnosing physicians, the treatment doctors 
and nurses, the !hospital at large and, here too, at the inter-
viewers. Parents of victims of 'Sudden Infant Death Syndrome' 
often express their anger, resentment and blame toward older 
siblings of the deceased child (Halpern, 1972). This suggests 
considerable projection as well as displacement because these 
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child's death~ 
I 
fn many instances, the deceased is the object 
of rage (Hinton,
1
1967; Pretzel, 1972; Westberg, 1962). 
Bowlby (1960, 1961) and Westberg (1962) suggest that this 
I 
displaced anger at the deceased is generated by rage over 
a sense of abandonment. Others who have observed suicide 
survivors (Cain, 1972; Pretzel, 1972) view the grief hostil• 
ity toward the d~ceased as arising from the sense of having 
been attacked t~rough the suicidal act. While intense 
hostility can be directed toward specific persons, some in~ 
vestigators bel i eve that a generaliz _ed anger is also a 
frequent mourning symptom (Hobson, 1964; Parkes, 1965, 1971, 
1972; Yamamoto et al, 1969). 
Expressions of hostility can be quite distressing to 
I 
the targeted individuals. Nevertheless, they are basically 
I 
normal components of the grief syndromeo However, when the 
anger has a shotgun effect: that is, spread indescriminately 
toward everyone and everything at peak intensities, then 
it is no longer typical, but exaggerated and pathological 
(Sigging, 1967) '• Volkart and Michael ( 1957) measure the 
I 
pathology of anger in bereavement on the basis of intensity. 
They found that hostility was normal at relatively low 
strengths with 
1
concomitant low vulnerability to mental 
142. 
health problems. Highly intense rage, however, was correlated 
with a much greater risk of overall psychological dysfunctiori,. 
I 
And Becker (1933) makes the connection between angry feelings 
and behavior, by stating that one type of bereavement response 
I 
involves the free ventilation of violent and aggressive 
behavior: and that this must be considered abnormal because 
143~ 
I 
of its r arity and its 'pot enti..ally dangerous consequence R. 
(b) Cogni t ive Model .Expl anatio n 
· ·Man has been conce ptualized he re as a· being who atte mpts 
I to make sense out of events. Yet sudden death is often a 
phenomenon that ts senseless. As . such, it is an event which 
challenges the v!ry basis of the individual's functioning, 
thereby confu s in g him and by its assaultive nature, enraging 
him. The bereaved has been injured, damaged and insulted by 
the meaninglessn 1ss of the inopportune loss of a signific ant 
component of his , world. And part of his response is to get 
angry: However, individuals apparently have difficulty 
maintaining rage against an abstraction, i.e., death••• a 
target is requir kd, though rarely does an appropriate target 
exist. -Therefore, the m()urner tends to express his anger 
toward environmental objects that are opportunistic rather 
than appropriate :. For this reason, most anger displayed 
during bereavement is displaced upon what ever targets are 
readily availabl j • I have ,consistently been impressed with 
the rhetorical question so often shouted by mournerss "Why 
did this have to happen to me?" And I have noted .that the 
question appears ! to have more of the quality of indignation 
and outrage, than of wailing bereavement. · 
Anger and hostility is generated from two other bases, 
as well, As suggested earlier, the individual must either 
re-structure h i s cognitive matrix to acco mmodate for the loss, 
or he must exer ~ effort at mak in g events which really don't 
fit, slide into his co gniti ve fr amework. The latter invol ves 
an extortion or illegitimate confirmation from reality in order 
to validate a de f tmct fr amework , Kel l y (1963) has ·called 
this extortion , J os tili ty '. Also, the state of alarm 
triggered by the stress of cognitive disruption is known, 
appropriately, a, a 'fi gh t or fli ght' reaction. Therefore, 
the bereaved's physiolog i cal state is in readiness for con-
frontation. If Jhe somat ic experience is identified by 
the individual a1 fear , t hen he'll react on the 'flight'si de 
of the choice; i.f identi f ied as anger, then he'll reach from 
a hostile 'fight' stance ( see Figure 16). 
3, Guilt 
(a) Introdu ,tion an d Literature Review 
It is not l urpris in g that acutely bereaved people, who 
are already in a state o f cognitive inadequacy, would be more 
susceptible to ni gative s elf-judgements regarding their 
adequacy of role fulfill ment. And many mourners do, in fact, 
experience inten e guilt feelings that focus on a sense of 
failure, self-bl b e, an d inadequacy (Clayton et al, 1971; 
I 
Hinton, 1967; Kalish, 196 3; Lamers, 1972; Lindemann 1 1944; 
Mosley, 1969; Pa l kes, 1965, 1972; Si ggins, 1967; Westber g , 
I 
1962). The feeling may be expressed as self-reproach or 
lf · · · I f f 1 . f . d . . se -recr1m1nat1on or ac ts o rea or antas1ze omission or 
commission. 
A child's death appears to be especially provocative 
for intense guil k feeli ng s (Cain & Cain, 1964) because t he 
parent role is hkavily wei ghted with expectations and re-
. I . 
sponsibilit i es w ich th e surv i vin g pa r ent judges himself as 
having failed to meet. Nolfi (1967) found pare ntal guilt 
144., 
to be centered o a) the etio1og y ·of de ath and their own 
contribution to i t; b) ths pos s i bility of having delayed 
recognition of t J e symptoms t hat . led to -the death, and; 
I 
c) the failure to provide the best possible care and treat-
/ 
ment because of lack of sufficient funds. Suicidal death 
I 
of a child is pe l haps the most difficult experience of 
loss for parents Ito bear. In these cases, self-blame and 
guilt are the most dominant affects (Cain, 1972; Herzog & 
Resnick, 1968; Pretzel, 1972; Whitis, 1968) and are fueled . 
I 
by the public shame and stigma attendant to suicide. There 
is also the subtle interpersonal message of self-destructive 
deaths which ten ~ to, in the act itself, point a finger of 
blame at the sur ~ivors. This is discussed more completely 
in Part IV unde ) 'differing modes of death'. In other than 
suicidal deaths, , such as those associated with 
Inf ant Death Synldrome, gui 1 t in the parents is 




who may become olverwhelmed by guilt and self-doubt regarding 
their maternal adequacy. 
I 
Spouses (Clayton et al, 1971) and siblings (Cain et al, 
1964; Holland et al, 1971) are not immune to these feelin gs 
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of failure, and 1often experience guilt over min~r omissions, 
or search their ,pre-death behavior for faults and negligence 
(Lindemann, 194i )• Thus, regardless of the particular role, 
the loss of tha T role creates self-doubts about the survivor's 
adequacy of filling it, and this leads to the emotion Qf guilt~ 
Pathologi l a1 intensity of guilt occurs (Siggins, 1967; 
I 
Volkart & Michael, 1957) most often - in those bereaved who 
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are subject to a high sen.ae of failure,. This can be due to 
the f~ct that thr~ did a~tually fail in their role, rather 
than it simply br ing a distorted self-assessment; or because 
the nature of the death (e.g., suicide or Sudden Infant Death) 
carries implicit accusations regarding their role competency. 
The danger of pr j longed and intense guilt feelings is the 
potential for self-abuse or suicide, TI1e acutely bereaved, 
especially those who are themselves survivors to a suicidal 
death, are a high -suicide-risk group (Cain, 1972). And the 
higher mortaiity rates in the recently bereaved, which were 
discussed earlie~, may represent a tendency toward the 
passive self-de + ruction of guilty mourners of simply neglect-
ing to routinel care for their health and well-being (Hinton~ 
1967). 
to a 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation 
The affect live experience of guilt is intimately linked 
sense off lilure. The mourner typically understands the 
death of a significant other as a demonstration of his own 
inadequacy in s 1ccessfully meeting his responsibilities 
regarding the r t ationship, He had assumed certain obliga-
tions in hi .s rol je as parent, spouse, child or sibling, and 
tends to attribute the death to his failure to fulfill the 
expectations of that role. This explanation differs somewhat 
from other defi J itions that are based on moral transgression, 
actual culpabil j ty or ambivalence surrounding anger at the 
deceased. Instead, my belief is that an individual in 
relation with arlother defines for himself certain explicit 
and major expec lations which he intends to meet. When the 
role is irretr t e
1
-.,ably l os t upon t he oth e r person' s death, 
t:he survivor ju dges himse lf with re gar d to his s ense of 
success or failur ai n realizin g t hose ex pect a t i ons , and 
judges whether dis role fulfillment (or lack of it) affected 
the death event. When he judges himself as having failed 
to meet his role responsibilities (even though they're self• 
defined), then he experiences the role loss with a sense of 
guilt. At leas 1 partially, in this way, he blames himself 
for the death. / 
Figure 16 is provided as a summary for these affective 
notions. 
S. Depression 
(a) Introdu J tion and Literature Review 
I 
Bowlby (1966) points out that all forms of grief have 
a sequence of s1ages that must . include despair, and Paul 
(1967) terms these feelings as universal and consisting of 
profound sadness and despondence. The literature of grief 
reactions virtually always includes some reference to the 
depression which accompanies bereavement (e.g., Clayton et 
al, 1968, 1971, , 1972; Crisp & Priest, 1972; Hinton, 1967; 
Lamers, 1972; Lester & Kam, 1971; Lindemann, 1944; Maddison 
& Viola, 19681 Marris, 1958; Parkes. 1965, 1971, 1972; 
Parkes & Brown, / 1972; Yamamoto et al, 1969). 
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Several investigators have found in their retrospective 
studies of adult depression which have no known situatio nal 
precipitant, that these dep r essive reactions are manifes t a-
tions of prolon ge d grief processes originating with some• 
I -
childhoo d loss of a si gnif ic ant oth er per son (Beck et al, 
1963; Birt:chnell, 1953, 19 701 Capl an & Doug las, 1963; Hilgard 
& Newman, 1961; IHi 11, 1967, 1970). 
Pathological depression in bereavement is indicated 
by Parkes (1964) in the large proportion of hospitalizations 
for acute depressive episode within the first 6 months after 
the death of a spouse. The form of the atypical depressive 
reaction may be one of agitated depression (Lindemann, 1944) 
or simply the undue prolongation of depressive affect which 
develops into a chronic condition (Herzog & Resnick, 1968). 
(b) Beck's Cognitive Explanation of Depression 
i. Introduction 
S . d . I . b h d i f"f . ·· _ 1.nce epress1.on appears to e t e om nant a ect1.ve 
symptom of the grief syndrome, it seems worthwhile to provide 
a more detailed analysis of this mood disorder in order to 
support the contention that depressive affect is a function 
of cognitive disruption. Such an analysis has already been 
put forth by AaJ on Beck in his book Depressions Causes and 
Treatment (1967), which has become a standard reference work 
in its field. The presentation that follows is derived from 
Beck• s work. I. 
Although w~i.ters have traditionally and formally (see 
DSM II, 1968) cl aracterized depression as essentially a mood 
disorder, Beck construes the syndrome as "primarily a .thought 
disorder with resultant disturbances of affect and behavior 
consona nt with cogni •tive distortion s " (Beck, 1967). He 
proposes that t e "way an individual structures an experie nce 
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determines his a (ffective respo rise to it 11 (Beck, 1967) and 
I 
that the "typical depressive affects are evoked by erroneous 
conceptualizations" (Beck, 1967). The specific thematic 
content of these l erroneous cognitions and the types of 
cognitive distortions being applied to them have been categor-
ized. 
ii Cognitive Content Areas in Depression - • I 
Accordingly, six major areas of content are delineated 
I 
with regard to depressive distortionss 1) Low self-regard 
and low self-ev~luation .is a prominent component of depres-
sive iqeation and usually consists of devaluating themselves 
in areas of particular importance to them. This may apply to 
personal attributes (e.g., ability or health),to acquisi-
tions of tangib i es and intangibles (e.g., friendship) or 
past performance in one's role (e.g., parent). The latter 
was discussed in the last section in particular with reference 
I 
to guilt feelings. A common feature of these negative self-
I 
evaluations is the magnification of failure and inferiority, 
with minimizati l n of favorable traits••• especially in com-
parison with others. 
2) Ideas of deprivation and destitution are allied to 
these low self-appriasals ,and are manifested in thoughts of 
I 
loneliness and lack of material goods, contrary to reality 
I 
evidence of both friendship and goods. 3) Self-criticism and 
self-blame, unl ~ke the comparative low self-regard, simply 
refers to perceived shortcomings irrespective of their pre-
1 
sence in ot he ·,::-s
1
• 4) Overwhelming duties and problems are 
described alt hough they repr es Emt magnifications of respo n -
sibilities considered ins ignif ic ant when not depressed. 
1 SO~ 
5) Self-coercive cognitions involving self-commands and 
injunctions ('shoulds' and imusts') form a substantial portion 
of the thoughts of the depressive. They usually consist of 
self-proddings to do things which are impractical. undesir-
able or impossib l e to implement. They typically apply to 
a broad range of activities, many of which are mutually 
exclusive. 6) The final theme of depressive cognitions in-
volve escapist and suicidal wishes, in an effort to evade 
the problems of life. Perceiving the problems as unsolvable, 
yet formidable, the depressive tends to withdraw. When the 
situation is construed as untenable or hopeless, then 
suicidal ideation develops as the only possible solution. 
iii. Thinking Errors in Depression 
.Each of these cognitive areas represent varying degrees 
df reality distortion in that t hey demonstrate a systematic 
bias against the cognizer. A manner. in which these typical 
depressive cognitions can be cate gorized is in their mode 
of deviation from logical thi nkingo Beck (1967) has su ggested 
the followin g thinking errors as explanations for .these 
distortions (Also see Table 2 ) • 
'Arbitrary inference' (a form of paralo gical error) is 
defined as the process of dr awin g a conclusion from a situa-
tion, event or experie nce, when t he re's no supportive evi-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cont:rad i.ct s the co nc lu siono Such d~duc t'ive errors are 
especial ly likely to occur when the informational cues are 
ambiguou s ; and this type of thinking t yp i cally involves a 
lack of regard for alternative explanations that are more 
probable and more plausi.ble. For example. assuming that 
an obvio us ly suicidal death was actually a hcmocide. 
'S e lective abstraction' (another paralogical error) 
refers to the process of focusing on some detail of an event 
without co nsideration for the rest of the context or for more 
importan t details, and then conceptualizing the whole event 
on the bas is of this sin~ular element; for exampie, deciding 
that an op en window (on a warm night) is evidence of an 
intruder / rourderer, despite the suicide note. 
'Overgeneralization' (also a paralogical error) refers 
to -the •cog nitive pattern of deducing general conclusions 
about ab il ities, performance and worth on the basis of a 
solitary occurrence; for example, viewing a minor argument 
as a demonstration of a wholly hostile relationship. 
' Magnification' and 'minimization' (stylistic errors) 
refer t o evaluative errors of gross over or under estimation 
(e.g., of poor performance or inflated problems). 
'I nexact labeling' (a semantic error) occurs when the 
affecti ve reaction is proportional to the descriptive label-
ing of t b e event, rather than the actual intensity of the 
trauma (e.g., labelin g an event as panic producing and 
experie nci ng panic, though event is only so mewhat anxiety 
arousin g) . 
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iv. Formal Characte ris Lics of Depressive Cognitions 
The foregoing sections have attempted to describe the 
cognitive characteristics of depressive symptoms in terms 
of their typical content and the cognitive processes in-
volved in the depressive's conceptual errors and distor-
tions which allow these content biases. 
Formal characteristics of depressive cognitions have 
also been observed and described by Beck (1967). They 
includes 1) the automatic nature of the depressive thoughts, 
without any apparent preceding reflection or consideration 
and 2) their involuntary quality even when the depressed 
person has resolved not to have them. The cognitions are 
also 3) very plausible to the depressive and tend to be 
accepted without critical assessrnento 
With regard to plausibility, Beck (1967) has provided 
some support for my own earlier notions about disjunction. 
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He finds that the more plausible the distorted cognition, the 
stronger the affective reaction; and conversely, when the 
affective reaction to a thou ght is particularly strong, its 
plausibility (despite its erroneousness) is enhanced and the 
individual finds it more difficult to assess its true valid-
ity. Furthermore, once the stron g affect is aroused in re-
sponse to a distorted cognition, any subsequent distortions 
seem to have an increased plausibility. This occurs regardless 
of whether the affect aroused is sadness, anger, anxiety or 
euphoria. In other words, affect arousal interferes with 
accurate co gnition, which I postulated earlier as a function 
of reduced disjunction. 
The final chara c t er istic of depressive cognition is its 
.stubborn 4) perseveration, i n which there is a stereotyp i c 
interpretation of highly compl ex and heterogenous stiuation. 
v. Cognition as the Detenninant of Depressed Mood 
On the basis of this analysis of the thematic content 
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the logical errors and the formal characteristics of the 
depressive's cognitions, Beck (1967) proposes that the distorted 
conceptualizations (e.g., of inadequacy, being deserted, 
or being sinful) are respons i ble for the corresponding affects 
(e.g., of sadness, loneliness, or guilt). "The affective 
state can be regarded as a consequence of the way the indiv-
idual views himself or his environment" (Beck, 1967). "The 
way an individual structures his experiences determines his 
mood. Since the depressed person consistently makes negative 
conceptualizations, he is prone to have a consistently neg-
ative mood" (Beck, 1967). Beck refers to clinical studies in 
which changes in the person's cognitions evoked congruent 
changes in the depressed feelin gs (Loeb et al, 1964). He 
finds that there is a defin i te temporal contiguity of thought 
and affect, as well as a lo gical consistence between them; 
i.e., the specific affect (e.g., humiliation) is con gruent 
with specific thought conte nt (e. g ., of being inferior). 
The linka ge whic h Beck postulates between co gnition 
and affect is one of 'conce pt ual schema', parallel to my 
ideas about 'cognitive dime nsions'. • The co gnitive structuring 
or conceptualization of an ev ent, accordin g to Beck, is de-
pendent on the schema e lic ite d to understand it; and th e 
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specific schema ha s a di.rect ir1fluen c e on the affective 
response to the event~ In the ea r lier discussion of the thema 
and logical fallacies of the depressives, it was noted that 
there is a tendency to utilize depression eliciting schema 
in the construing of certain events; and to cognitively 
distort interpr.etations in order to make the interpretation 
· fit the schema involved. 
For example, if the schema is concerned with self-
depreciation, a feeling of sadness will be associated with 
it; if its concerned with self-blame, then gutlt feelings are 
evoked. The particular types of depressive affects are re-
lated to the specific types of thought patterns (schema) used 
to construe the event. Therefore, patterns (or dimensions) 
that have a content relevant to being deserted, thwarted, 
undesirable or a failure in one's role will yield, respectiv-
ely, feelings of loneliness, frustration, humiliation and 
guilt. 
As these types of cognitive schema (e.g., being 
deserted) are employed to understand some phenomenon, their 
respective affective components (e.g., loneliness) become 
activated, thereby providing the overall subjective feeling 
aspect of depression. Furthermore, it is proposed by Beck 
(1967) that once affect is generated, a circular feedback 
process occurs that partially explains the downward spiral 
of depression. In other words, the evoked affect interacts 
with the initial cognition to escalate the nega.t:ive thinking 
••• then, the more negative he thinks, the more depressed 
he gets and feels; the more depressed he feels, the more 
negative he thinks. 
However, it must be emphasized that not all negative 
thoughts (with their resultin g negative feelings) are auto- · 
matically distortions. I have gone to considerable length 
1560 
in support of the fact that the sudden death of a significant 
other is realistically construed as a traumatic, negative 
experience of major importance and threat potential. The 
depressed feelings associated with the realistic concept-
ualization of the loss are still determined by the cognitions, 
though, in this case, they don't have to be distorted to be 
negative. The pervasiveness and severity of the trauma can, 
however, create an exaggerated cognitive response which is 
partially realistic and partially distorted. One of the 
principle tasks of the grief counselor would seem to be the 
sorting out of realistic conceptualizations about the 
death with their affiliated depressive affect from the dis-
torted negative cognitions and their associated affect. 
vi. The Primary Triad of Depression 
It is useful to discuss Beck's (1967) 'Primary Triad of 
Depression' in order to relate the views thus far presented 
to a general descriptive paradigm of depressive feelings and 
to note the applicability of the paradigm to the depression 
associated with grief. 
Depressive dysfunction may be viewed in terms of the 
activation of a set of three principle cognitive patterns. 
These patterns predispose, or force, the individual to construe 
himself, his world and his future in negative ways, such that 
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associa t ed affects are ar otlSed whi ch ch arac t e rize the de pres-
sive state. It is my conte ncion that a su dden death reasonably 
and logically activates t h i s t riadic cog nitive pattern; and 
that acute grief symptomology embodies .both the negative 
thoughts and the affiliated affects of the triad. 
The first triadic component described by Beck (1967) 
is the pattern of construing experiences in a negative way 
by consistently interpreting intera~tions with the environ-
ment as representing defeat, deprivation or disparagemente 
Life is perceived as being comprised of a sequence of burdens, 
obstacles or traumatic situations which significantly detract 
from the cognizer. 
Such interpretations and perceptions by the acutely 
bereaved of their environmental interactions are often quite 
accurate. Their reduced coping abilities, due to disrup-
tion cf a core dimension, increase their vulnerability to 
defeat and make previously routine events overwhelmingly 
difficult and burdensome. Their experience is one of con-
tinual overload which leads to a realistic assessment of 
being able to meet many environmental demands. The sense 
of deprivation is similarly based on the genuine irretriev-
able loss of an external resource. These cognitions are no 
less depressing because the y are realistic, nor are the 
affiliated feelings less intense. Acute grief includes a 
normal, depressive affect element based on this pattern of 
construing these realistic interactional consequences of 
the death. 
The pathological depression of grief arises from the 
exa.gge ra.tions ~.nri distorti on3 of th ese nor mal and realistic 
conceptualizations. In these instances of pathological 
depression, the individual selectively an d inappropriately 
interprets his experiences by automatically making negative 
assumptions about his situation even tho~gh more obvious 
and plausible expianations exist. His typical cognitions 
show deviations from logical thinking, including arbitrary 
inferences, selective abstractions and overgeneralizations. 
While some obstacles are really not surmountable for the be-
beaved, even those whi.ch are manageable are viewed as 
i.mpossible; and the understandable difficulty in dealing 
with problems is misinterpreted as total failure. The real 
loss they have encountered sensitizes the pathologicaliy 
depressed mourner to exaggerate relatively trivial events as 
constituting additional substantial deprivations. And their 
sense of vulnerability and damage predisposes them to think 
that their defect is exposed to others and subject to frequent 
disparagement and derogation (see Figure 17). 
The second component in the triad of depression is the 
cognitive pattern of viewing oneself in a negative way. 
The individual regards himself as deficient, inadequate or 
unworthy and tends to attribute his unpleasant experiences 
to some defect in himself. Furthermore, he may regard himself 
as undesirable and worthless because of his defect, and may 
then reject himself because of it (Beck, 1967). 
Sudden death is both disruptive and destructive to 
the survivor's cogniti.ve matrix. He experiences a condition 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































central/core dimension of hi ~ ~ogni.t ive structure. There 
is real deficiency durin g acute gri~f and the attribution of 
a negative cognition and a ff ect to this experience is an 
appropriate connection - to make, Even the element of self-
rejection can be understood as normal on the basis of some 
loss of identity anchors that were previously associated 
with the relationship to the deceased. These are common and 
reality-based reactions to the trauma of a sudden death and 
the depressive feelings are expected derivatives of the 
mourner's accurate self assessment of his situation. 
However, when the deficiency becomes so magnified that 
it occupies the individual's total self-concept or he seems 
incapable of viewing himself in any other terms, then a 
pathological depression is involved. Here, the bereaved 
tends to generalize from a particular inadequacy to an over-
all character trait and to regard himself as a generally 
inferior person (ioe., selective abstraction). Not only does 
he have an intensified sense of identity loss, but addi-
tionally rejects and reproaches himself for. being so defec-
tive and inefficient (see Figure 17). 
The final component of the depressive triad consists 
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of viewing the future in a negative way. The person antici-
pates that his current difficulties or suffering will continue 
indefinitely. His hopefulness is meager as he perceives life 
as constituting relentless hardship, frustration and depri• 
vation (Beck, 1967). 
Again, these concep Lualizations, though arousing strong 
depressive feelings are, nonetheless, based on the realities 
of the loss. The trauma of c?, st"dden death leaves the world 
uncertain and unpredictable8 The cognitive tools for pre-
dicting and controllin g future encounters are severely 
weakened, making reliable anticipation difficult••• except 
in the expectation that the current situation will continue 
or degenerate, since cognitive regression . . is progressing 
and adequacy is failing over time. Thus, the prospects for 
the future~ negative and the normal mourner is, indeed, 
likely to feel hopeless. 
Pathological grief is manifested by the obsessive pre-
occupation with a doomed future. The ruminations and fan-
tasies are so ominous that suicidal ideation appears to be 
the only escape from burdensome tomorrows. Moss and Hamilton 
(1956) reported bereavement as a precipitant in a very large 
proportion of suicide attempts. The sense of endless misery 
.is related to an absence of temporal grounding, which the 
suddenness of the death has traumatized by its unpredict-
ability. The mourner's prophecies begin to distort reality 
improvements in his situation, such that the expectation be-
comes self-fulfilling (see Figure 17). 
In this summary of Beck's cognitive paradigm of depres-
sion, followed by my application of it to the normal and 
pathological depression of bereavement, the intent was to 
support the contention of cognitive influence over the 
major affective symptom of grief, namely depression. By 
describing the thinkin g content, distorting processes and 
triadic construing patterns of depresston, I believe such 
161~ 
support was of f ered. 
E. Behavior-al Symptomology 
1. General Explanation for Cognitive Basis of Behavioral 
Symptoms 
The behavioral chan ges t hat accompany bereavement a r e 
postulated as direct manifestations of the cognitive alter-
ations. Action i.s the observable outcome of cognitive func-
tioning. Therefore, when the latter is disrupted by the 
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trauma of a s·uctden death, behavioral outcomes will consequentl y 
be affected. The individual is conceptualized as using his 
construing abilities in order to make decisions about what 
actions to take upon his environrnent4 These actions will be 
aimed at increasin g his probabilities of success in maintain-
ing his survival, obtaining his objectives and accurately 
predicting events. A major purpose of cognitive functioning 
is in the control of behavior toward those ends. As grief 
affects the underlying cognitive functions, behavioral 
symptoms will appear. These are described on the following 
pages. 
This section is concerned with three cate gories of be-
havioral response t o sudden death: (a) interpersonal chan ges, 
(b) changes in typical activity levels and, (c) searchin g 
behavior. A brief explanatio n of the co gnitive origins is 
provided prior to a review of t he literature dealin g with 
these behaviors during bereave ment. 
2¥ Interpersona.1 Change s 
(a) Introduction an d Literature Review 
The constriction of interpersonal behavior has been 
reported by Berardo (19 70) as social isolation in aged 
widowers; by Hobson (196a), Hinton (1967), Marris (1958), 
and Parkes (1965,1971,1972) as general social withdrawal; 
by Lamers (1972) as social in.11ibition a nd l oss of socializing 
desires; by Lindemann (1944) as overall changes in relations 
with others, including isolation (which he considers patho-
logical) and loss of social inter.action patterns. Moreno 
(1947) also notes loss of interaction patterns during be-
reavement. Family cohesion often appears after a sudden death, 
with an increase in solidarity and overall inter-member 
interaction, usually to the exclusion of non-family members 
(Eliot, 1932; Jensen & Wallace, 1967; Vollman et al, 1971). 
However, the stress of having to re-shape family roles after 
the death of a key member may take its toll on the family unity 
and cause transcient disturbances (Eliot, 1932; Vollman et 
al, 1971). 
Apparently, some specific types of death have idiosyncra-
tic consequences for the survivors. Several studies (Cain, 
1972; Herzog & Resnik, 1968; Pretzel, 1972) found that the 
stigma associated with suicidal death results in peripheral 
relatives and friends withdrawing from the mourners, rather 
than offering social support. This is also true of those 
who might otherwise be supportive to survivors of children's 
deaths (Nolfi, 1967) but who, bec ause of their own feelin gs 
of inadequacy in coping with the event, tend to withdraw 
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and thereby force the be r eaved t.o und t~r go further isola tion . 
Another interperso na l behavior t hat occurs in the be-
reaved has be e n referr ed to in the descrip t ion of affective 
anger and hostility sy mptoms. Many sur vivora experience angry 
feelings for which there is no appropriate target. These 
feelings are frequently dischar ged upon others who are simply 
opportunistic targets, such as Halpern's (1972) description 
of mothers angrily blaming older siblings f or the loss of 
a child to Sudden Infant Death Syndromeo It is this displace-
ment of hostility which elicited the comment by Lindemann 
(1944) that in acute grief there is often a loss of inter-
personal warmth. 
As with other symptomology, atypical grief manifests 
itself behaviorally through exa ggeration. In this case, 
constriction of interpersonal relations to the point of iso-
lation is considered representative of a pathological grief 
syndrome (Hinton, 1967; Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1965). Such 
behavior prevents needed social support, precludes the re-
establishment of alternate interpersonal linkages, and often 
is associated with pathological under-activity described in 
the next section. 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation 
The primary disruption of cognitive functioning occurs 
in the interpersonal sphere with the core dim e nsio n - t h e 
relationship with a si gnificant other - being the focus of 
matrix damage. The constellation of linka ge s around this 
core di mension involves many conceptual cate gories. Howeve r, 
those most directly associated with it involve other peo ple 
either by affiliation (e. g ., sib l i ngs of the deceased) or 
by comparison (e. g ., fa t her - i n-la ;! when f a·ther dies) or by 
a social sharing history (e .. g ., married friends when a spouse 
dies). These linkages are without a central anchorage af ·ter . 
a sudden death because their prior stability was intimately 
related to the deceased. The mourner ., the ref ore, does not 
have the cognitive means for dealing with other people as 
adequately as he was able .to in the past • . His fra.~e-of-
reference for interpersonal interaction has been damaged 
and he must first re-establish stable and appropriate cogni-
tive dimensions for dealing with others. 
Furthermore, there exists a particular vulnerability 
and sensitivity in the interpersonal area of the cognitive 
matrix because it is the center of disruptiono The bereaved 
becomes especially protective lest the wound be further in-
jured. He attempts to seal off the structural damage by 
constrictin g his interperson a.l cognitive functioning, hence 
his social behavior changes. His modes of interpersonal be• 
havior change~ as well, since cognitive regression reduces 
his sophist i cation and imposes a simpler and more global 
style. This ail serves to permit reparative efforts to pro-
cede on the core dimension, without the complications of 
complex and ambiguous interactions with oth e rs.· 
Pathological outcomes can eventuate if benignly inten-
tioned others force complica t ed interactions upon the 
vulnerable mourner. This will create a condition of overload 
that is focused on the core of structural instability, wh ich 
can easily result in brea kdown. While soc i al support is a 
necessary aid during bereave ment, it must be offered at 
the level and intensity -which the mourner is able to tolerate 
(see Figure 18). 
3. Activity Levels 
{a) Introduction and Literature Review 
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The behavioral rigidity of normal bereavement may be 
characterized as psychomotor retardation, automatic behavior, 
zombie-like motions (Lamers, 1972) or as simply mechanical 
activity (Lindemann, 1944). Westberg describes it as a general 
loss of regular behavior patterns (1962). Normal grief also 
includes behavioral dilation seen as restlessness (Lindemann, 
1944; Parkes, 1972) or verbally as a pressure of speech 
(Lindemann, 1944). The increases amongst the bereaved in 
physician, psychiatirc and clergyman visits (Parkes, 1964; 
Parkes & Brown, 1972) and in their usage of tranquilizers, 
tobacco and alcohol (Parkes & Brown, 1972) may also be con-
strued as behavioral overactivity symptoms. The converse of 
constricted behavior is normally seen in apathy (Hobson, 1964; 
Parkes, 1965, 1971; Yamamoto et al, 1969), inertia (Lindemann, 
1944) or reduction in occupational comrn:ittnB'lts (Maddison & 
Viola, 1968). 
Pathological symptomology is present when there is 
failure to recover the equilibrium between either absorption/ 
modification or the moderate wavering bet ween dilation and 
constriction. When the behaviors themselves become stylistic 
of the mourner or excessive, he is considered to be exper-
iencing an~ypical grief reaction. Inability to recapture 
the vitality of behavior (e.g., remaining mechanical) is 
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exempli f1.ed in t he extreme by ca ta t oni.c sch i zophre nia whtc h is 
describ e d by Edelson an d Warren (1963) as one form of mourning. 
Mou rning which invol ves excessive behavioral dilation 
is desc ri bed as frenzied activity (Becker, 1.933) and over-
activit y without a genuine sense of loss (Lindemann, 1944). 
Shoor and Speed (1963) describe bereaved adolescents who 
experie nc e pachological diversion of normal mourning and 
show be ha vioral symptoms of delinquency, burglary, running 
away and promiscuity. And manic reactions in bereavement, 
certain ly a form of pathological and dilatory over-activity, 
have been reported (Abely & Leconte, 1938; Klein, 1940; 
Scott, 1.964). 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation 
Variations of behavioral activity level occur during 
grief as a corollary to activity in the cognitive matrix 
after a s udden death. These changes in behavior are dependent 
upon th e cognitive regression process, including the degree 
of bala nce between cognitive absorption and modification, 
and the rate of fluctuation between constriction and dilation. 
I c will be recalled that the disruption of a core cog-
nitive rli mension results in a loss of interactional equili-
brium vis -a-vis the environment. The mourner becomes hi ghly 
modifia bl e in those areas related to the deceased, the zones 
of the matrix most damaged by the death. Conversely, in other 
non-dir e ctly affected zones, he becomes rigid and unchange-
able i n order to protect his remaining structural integrity 
and st ab ility. There are behavioral changes paralleling 
these cng nitive alterations. 
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Activity involvin g the deceas e d or death event increases 
dramatically in both speech and motor behavior. He talks 
about the other, returns frequently to the other• -s room, sits 
in his chair, visits the scene of death. These behaviors, 
derived from the cognitive openness in the disrupted area 
are significant enough that they are discussed separately 
later in this section under 'Searching'. They are relevent 
for notation here since they represent an over-activity 
within the behavioral sphere that is congruent with an over-
all openness in the same general area of the cognitive sphere, 
i.e., the death event. 
The behavioral derivative of cognitive rigidity is the 
motor retardation and automatism that occurs during bereave-
ment. The individual finds himself unable and protectively 
unwilling to cope with the many complex interactions of life; 
and because of his weakened structural state, unable to risk 
even the minimal cognitive modifications of routine demands. 
Therefore, he reduces the complexity of his life by behavior• 
ally withdrawing from most activities. Those which are engaged 
in are typically performed at low levels of sophistication 
••• a manifestation of the regressive loss of ·certain be-
havioral refinements. By applying stereotypic behaviors to 
events, the mourner is able to solidify the intact cognitive 
dimensions and avoid some risk of their collapse and overload 
during the period of general instability. 
Under normal circumstances, an individual wa.vers between 
moderate expansion and moderate contraction of his cognitive 
framework. During bereavement, this moderate .wavering can 
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escalate to rapid oscillati6n betw ee n extre mes of dilation 
and constriction as the mourner tries to alternately find 
reparative elements in the enviro nmental universe••• then 
protectively consolidates the matrix into ci diJlimtted enclave 
by reducing the interaction. These cognitive shifts have 
concordant behavioral symptom consequences. The dilation 
yields a restlessness and aimlessness that is not goal-direc-
ted. and is not part of the searching phenomenon because the 
areas of attention are diffuse and not related to the deceased. 
Rather, there ts simply an abundance of activity without any 
apparent connectedness or objective. 
The constriction derivative in the behavioral symptom• 
ology is evidence by behavioral apathy and deliberately 
rest~icted functioning, such as quitting one's job. The 
consolidation of behavior is probably most noticeable in the 
interpersonal area, which has already been discussed regarding 
social withdrawal (see Figure 18). 
4. Searching 
(a) Introduction and Literature Review 
Searching behavior is normal to the grief process 
(Bowlby, 1961; Lamers, 1972; Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1970) 
and is usually directed at an attempt to somehow recover 
the loss which Bowlby (1961) considers to be 'the first of 
three basic psychological phases of mourning. The restoration/ 
replacement effort is exemplified by parents who are mourning 
a child's death and state their intent to conceive another 
child as a substi.tute (Noln., 1967). However, Cain & Cain 
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(1964) found that pare ncs who actu~lly act upon this intent 
and do conceive a child after the death of another, may induce 
pathological problems in the replacement child because of 
their complicated attitudes toward him as if he were the 
other. 
Pathological searching has as its primary feature the 
persistent seeking of reunion with a permanent lost object 
(Bowlby, 1961.). It may take the form of compulsive wandering 
(Stengel, 1943) or the chronic wandering of individuals who 
seek their lost parents of childhood, well into their adult 
years (Parkes, 1972; Stengel, 1939)0 Hinton (1967), Lindemann 
(1944) and Parkes (1972) consider the over-identification 
or modeling of the deceased's behavior, attitudes, person-
ality, interests or somatic complaints to be pathognomonic 
of atypical grief. It is a magical form of seeking reunion 
that can potentially escalate into reunion behavior involving 
suicidal attempts (Moss & Hamilton, 1956) in an effort to 
join the lost other in death. 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation 
There is a selective overactivity relating to the 
deceased which, in the previous section, was referred to 
as a derivative of extreme cognitive modification. Because 
of the disruption in the core dimension, the bereaved is in 
serious need of reparative resources and is especially open 
to suggestion and replaceme nt -in this area. This is in con• 
trast to the rigidity and closing off of other matrix spheres 
that are less directly involved with the deceased. 
In addition, a primary cognitive symptom of bereave ment 
is a pre•cccu pat i on wit h t he dec eas ed and wit h events/ 
objects associated wit h hi m .. One of th e purposes of pre-
occupation is to gradualize th e loss (i.e .. , slow down the 
readjustm e nt by mitigating the impact) until the cognitive 
structure restabilizes and until alternate dimensions and 
linkages are developed in lieu of the core disru ption. This 
pre-occupation involves revie win g memories of the deceased, 
the circumstances of the death, as well as a heightened 
sensitivity to environmental stimuli associated with the 
loss or the lost person. 
Cognitive openness (modification) and pre-occupation 
together manifest behavioral symptoms in the form of search-
ing activity, Like its cognitive counterpart, searching is 
aimed at obtaining reparative and substitutive resources for 
the damaged structure, as well as being a method for grad-
ualizing the loss' impact. Just as normal pre-occupation 
171.. 
can evolve into patholo gical obsession, so normal search in g 
for reminders and repl acements concerning the broken rela t ion-
ship can develop into pathological seeking of magical reunion. 
This may occur v i a over-identification with the deceased or 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV, DETERMINANTS OF TH.E COURSE OF BEREA'VEMENr 
A - Introduction 
I have repeatedly referr. ·ed to the fact that grief ca :n 
take either a normal/healthy or atypical/pathological course, 
the particular direction being signified by the nature of 
the symptomology displayed. The purpose of this section is 
to present a summary of those factors which appear to have 
a determining influence on the course of normal versus path-
ological bereavement. There is no single variable which ex~ 
plains, nor by itself, governs the process. However, there 
are factors which have been investigated that appear to have 
a significant effect, as well as others which, though not 
specifically studied at length, should hypothetically have 
a determinant influence. A survey of these variables will 
be presented on the following pages. 
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The particular groupi.ng of these variables is arbitrary. 
I have chosen categorization which seems to incorporate 
most of the major influences on the bereavement process, 
These groupings are, (1) the cause or circtnnstances or mode 
of death, incorporating sections on a) anticipatory dyingi 
b) sudden death, c) suicidal death, d) accidental death 
e) Sudden Infant Death Syndro me and f) notes on other modes, 
(2) the relationship of the survivor to the deceased, 
incorporating sections on a) ·spouse survivors, b)parent 
survivors and c) notes on other relationshipsi~luding child, 
sibling and general family survivors; (3) the characteristics 
of the survivor such as a) age, b) sex and c) general traits. 
. -
' 
It is my belief tha t t he 3e variabl es exert their prin-
ciple in f luence upon either or both of the two fundamental 
cognitive processes associated with bereavement; namely, 
(a) the degree of cognitive disruption and (b) t he meaning 
attributed by the survivor to the death event (i.e., how 
he construes the death). 
Cognitive disruption has been postulated as the process 
underly in g grief symptomology, from the general symptom of 
cognitive inade,quacy to the specific symptoms in the four 
major sph eres of functioning. Therefore, in order to support 
my contentions that grief is basically a cognitive syndrome, 
and that certain determinants have an important effect on 
grief, I must build an explar1atory linkage between these 
influenc i ng factors (e.g •. , mode of death) and their primary 
impact ( i,.e.,cognitive disruption). I must describe how the 
particu la r variable plays a significant role in the basic 
disruption from which all other symptoms derive. Once this 
connect i on is established, then those variables which are 
shown to maximize cognitive disruption (e.g., suddenness of 
the dea th event) can be ind:tcted also as exacerbators of the 
symptoms derived from this increased disruption. This latter 
effect, s ymptom exaggeration, has been consistently associ-
ated with pathologica.l mourning. Therefore, the theoretical 
couplin g to .be proposed involves the determinantsa relevance 
and inf 1u ence upon cognitive disruption. If the effect is one 
of esca 1a ting the disruption ; then concomitant escalation 
of deri va tive symptoms will occur. Since such symptom ex;,;. 
aggeration is considered pa tb ol or,;i ea l, th e determinant will 
have been shown - through these s t 0ps - to hcj,ve a major 
bearing on th~ course of normal versus atypical grief. 
The other cognitive effect of these influential fact.ors 
.. 
is upon the manner in which the survivor conceptualizes the 
death. A basic premise of the entire cognitive model is that 
man understands phenomena according to the varied cognitive 
resources avail~ble to himf thereby actively attributing 
personal meanings to those events which he encounters. Since 
the individual is fundamentally motivated toward survival, 
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he tends to apply meanings and understandings which will 
increase his adaptiveness, or relatedly, increase the stability 
and/or development of his cognitive matrix. All events are 
given meaning or construed in some way. The virtually uni-
versal reaction of initial denial by the bereaved is an 
example of this self-preservative meaning attribution which 
may be applied to an event; ioe. "It is not true!", and there-
fore it is not disruptive. Since the most adaptive meaning 
attribution is one which accurately construes the event , rather 
than distorting it, then eventually protective meanings,like 
denial above, give way to authentic construction of the ex-
perience. Nonetheless, what ever meaning the bereaved does 
apply to the death of another, whether accurate or not, has 
an effect upon the understanding, bodily, ·· emotional reactions, 
and behavior which follows it, Certain modes of construing 
or giving meaning to the death of a significant other, if not 
corrected. can lead to atypical extremes of grief sympto mology. 
For example, the attrib ution of reversibility to death, 
thereby making re;..union a pos sibility for that indi.vidual, 
can lead to self-destructive idea tion and behavior. It is 
my contention that some of the foregoing determinant factors 
do enhance or encourage the misconstruing and misinterpreting 
of the losst and through this step, influence the course of 
bereave ment in a pathological direction. The misconception• 
enhanci ng effect appears due to either a) the innate ambi• 
guity of the death (e.g. ,Sudden Infant Death Syndrome), 
giving the survivor too much latitude for interpretations 
orb) because the death event imposes its own intolerable 
meaning upon the individual (e.g., suicidal death), giving 
him too little latitude for interpretation. In this case, 
the aut he ntic construction is even more disrupti.ve than a 
false meaning attribution, so the survivor applies his 
own gro s sly distorted interpretation which permits at least 
some se mblanceof cognitive stability. 
Figure 19 summarizes these notions. 
B • Mode of Death 
1. Anticipated Death 
(a) Introduct i on and Review of Literature 
Many deaths are expected and unsurprising when they occure 
This results from the temporal span between the early signs 
of geriatric illnesses and final death. perhaps years later, 
or bet ween the diagnosis of a terminal illness and the death 
event itself. These for ms of anticipatory dying have been 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































who is dying ( Brim et al,1970; Kastenbaum & Aisenberg,1972r 
Hinton,1967r Kubler-Ross,1969). 
Anticipated death has also been studied in terms of its 
impact upon the survivors who experience a phenomenon that 
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is characterized as 'anticipatory grief' (Fulton,1971; Fulton 
& Fulton,1971:S Lindemann, 1944) or'pre~mortem grief' (Buxbaum, 
1966) or 'pre-mourning' (Rosner,1970), This occurs when 
family members are concerned with their adjustment in the 
face of potential loss. They slowly experience all the phases 
of normal grief during the period that they are coping with 
the illness or enduring the necessitated separation {e,g., 
for hospitalization) prior to the death, 
They expect the death, and in order to cushion against 
the shock when it airrives, they dissipate their grief during 
the waiting interim, For example, anticipatory bereavement 
includes heightened pre-occupation with the patient, mental 
rehearsal of the death and associated mourning behavior, 
depression, occassional symptom identification with the pat-
ient and overt efforts at preparing for the re-adjustment 
that will be nece s sary. When death tloes occur, minimal 
symptomology is displayed because the survivors have already 
experienced much of the grief process, have essentially dis-
engaged from the deceased and have made initial efforts at 
the re-organization of their lives, 
This process has been described by several authors who 
were involved in research studies of mothers of fatally ill 
children (Ablin et al,1971; Bozeman et al,1955; Hamovitch, 
1964,1965;Orbach et al,1955). Natterson and Knudson (1960) 
1.79. 
reported on 33 mothers, most of whom reacted initially 
with early symptoms of grief when told of their child's 
disease. They experienced tension, anxiety, social withdrawal, 
depression and denial of both the diagnosis and prognosis, 
However, after a period of four months, when the children 
of many of the women had already died, the event was re-
ceived with a calm acceptance. They had experienced a reason• 
able length of time to re-adapt,re-adjust and re-align some 
of their expectations and responsibilities. They would often 
indicate their resolution of their pre-mortem grief by reduc-
ing their pre~occupation with the ill child and speaking about 
,_ 
their obligations to other family members. 
Binger et al (1969) confirmed these anticipatory grief 
reactions in a retrospective study of 20 families who lost 
children to leukemia. An important mitigating effect upon 
the trauma of child loss (and which has been repeatedly 
suggested by researchers in this field) is the opportunity 
for the fullest possible participation by the family in t~e 
care of the child. The hospitals offering such an opportinity 
thereby provide a context for reasonably healthy grief 
resolution. 
It is noteworthy that if death does not occur as anti-
cipated (for example, in the unexpected return of soldiers 
whose relatives didn't think they'd survive their military 
assignments), then serious problems can arise in the re-estab-
lishment of the prior intimate relationship (Eliott,1946i 
Lindemann,1944, Rosenbaum,1944)e Emancipation from the 
potential deceased creai:es ce rtain re,..adjustment problem s" 
Nonetheless, the usual effect of anticipatory grief is gener-
ally positive for the sur.vi.vors . because . it .  al.1.o~is . graduali-
zation of the loss over an extended period of time. 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation for Effects of 
~nticipated Death 
The expectation that a significant other will die 
has some si milarity to the effect on cognitive functioning 
as does death itself ••• but extended over a longer period 
of time. This extension is important since it allows the 
cognitive dis-integration and ~e-organization to proceed 
at a more gradual and manageable pace. Although initial 
confusion and denial are followed by the common sympto ms of 
bereavement, there is opportunity for respite, The antici• 
pation of loss, prior to the actual death, is a hypothetical 
event, with the possibility of reve:-sibility (1,e,, hope for 
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a cure) available for the pre-mourner, At the time that death 
finally occurs, the bereaved has had a chance to partially 
re-order his cognitive matrix without this core dimension. 
He has been able to dis-engage linkages to the centr~l ' 
cognitive axis, piece-meal, rather than having them abruptly 
shattered. Ir~tead of a sud:ienvoid in the cognitive fra me-
work, there has occurred a gradual vacating and dismantling 
process with parallel re-construction. 
The integrity of the structure is notundermined because 
there's been opportunity to shore-up the damaged area with 
some temporary and some pe rmane nt scaffolding of substitute 
relationships and a.lter n.Ete expecta tions of how to deal 
with events. T.ne prior coping depen<l1?nc2 on the core dimen• 
sion can be taken over by oth er cognitive components, sotlat 
environmental demands are not suddenly overloading, but can 
be sequenced and controlled. 
A basic premise of the cognitive model is that the 
individual is better able to cope with and adapt to con-
fronting events~ as a function of his predictive skills in 
regard to the events. The more accurate his prediction, the 
more effective is the adaptation. Anticipatory grief is, 
therefore, effective adaptation since it is based on a 
realistic prediction. Wnen death occurs the cognitive disrup-
tion is minimal because the cognitive matrix has already 
been re~delineated for acceptance of the loss. Its stability 
has been grounded in alternate fo~ndations. It is for these 
reasons that bereavement after a relatively lengthy illness 
181. 
is not commonly associated with major, pathological or intense 
grief symptomology (see Figure 20). 
2. Sudden Death 
(a) Int~oduction and Review of Literature 
Sudden death is actually a generic term referring to a 
variety of modes of dying which are traumatic and unexpected. 
These include deaths by suicide, homocide,accident or some 
r41tural causes that strike fatally without early warning 
(eeg., Sudden Infant Death Syndrome). Although formally 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be considered to have i diosy ncrati.c effects {ecg.,heroic 
wartime deathst mass disasters and spontaneous abortions/ 
miscarriages). Each of these modes impose their own unique 
influence upon the survivors, and some of these modes will 
be reviewed shortly to consider their effects. However, all 
these modes share a common element, namely., their suddenness 
and the abrupit manner in which they confront the survivors 
with an acute grief experience. 
Although the researchers discussed in the following 
sections are dealing with a particular mode of death, their 
is virtual una.nimity that the very suddenness of death 
(irrespective of the mode involved) and its concomitant 
lack of preparation for the mourners, is a significant 
determinant of the grief process. 
In addition, some authors have specifically looked 
at the abruptness variable as a relevant and important 
influence on grief course and outcome. Vollman et al (1971) 
investigated the success of crisis intervention approaches 
in helping thcJse family members acutely bereaved by differ;. 
ent types of sudden and unexpected death. It was their pre-
mise that higher incidence of morbidity and mortality in 
surviving family members(e.g.,Rees & Lutkins, 1967; also 
see PartIII) was partly a function of the higher risk of 
grief complications with ac ute bereavement after a sudden 
death. Hinton (1967) and Lehrman(l956) report that there is 
greater initial shock and a higher incidence of later mental 
disturbance after an unexpected death, They attribute this 
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directly to the lack of opportunity for anticipatory mourni ng , 
And Volkan found that of t he 23 individuals he interviewed 
and determined to be suffering from p~hological grief, 
all 23 were survivors to a sudden death event (Volkan, 1970)0 
In a study of young Boston widows and widowers (Parkes 
& Brown,1972), the bereaved were group,ed accordi.ng to the 
length of their preparation-for-dea t h time. Under three days 
was considered 'short preparation' (or suddmceath/acute grtef) 
and over 3 days classed as ~anger preparation' (or anticipa• 
tory grief). The acutely ber eaved group, during the first 
mmthof bereavement, demonstrated a significantly higher 
incidence of immediate denial, anxiety,guilt and depression, 
along with expressions of apathy concerning their own death 
or statements of a desire to die. A year later (Parkes,1972), 
the sudden death survivors continued to be more hopeless 
toward the future, more tearful, anxious and depressed than 
were those with longer preparatory time. 
Another group, of London widows, were investigated (Parkes, 
1971) and classed according to the suddenness of the death 
of their husbands. Those who suffered the mpst abrupt grief 
showed significantly greater pre-occupation with the deceased · 
with a stronger sense of pre sence and a tendency to retain 
possessions and reminders of the deceas ed. 
It appears, therefore, that the suddenness of death alone 
is a major f actor influe nc i ng process, symptoms and outco me 
of bereavement. It is also i mport ant to emphasize that an-
ticipatory gr i ef is not an auto matic consequence of the 
prepmratory opportunity pr ovided by a long-tenn illness. 
Some people do not take advantage of this opportunity for 
anticipatory grieving. Their rejection of the fatal prog-
nosis persists until the actual death confronts them. For 
these indiviuals, the phenomenon of grief is as acute and 
disruptive as a sudden and unexpected death, since they 
are equally unprepared and traumatized (Volkan,1970). 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation for Effects of 
Sudden ·Death 
Although I believe that different modes of sudden 
death have their
0
own idiosyncratic effects upon cognitive 
functioninsr I propose that they do share some common fea~ 
tures with regard to cognitive disrupiion, Unpredictable en-
counters imposed on the indivi.dual reduces his adaptive ef~ 
ficiency because he lacks the conceptual resources for 
immediately dealing with these events; He must first develop 
these resources ••• either through some further differentia-
tion of a pre-existing dimension or by a structural re-
organization of some form. Most non-routine encounters of this 
nature are not critical or major determinants of functioning. 
However, if an unpredictable event occurs relevant to a core 
dimension, itseffect is more crucial and functioning may be 
interfered with. Core dimensions are particularly vulnerable 
to unpredictable impingements because so many other cognitive 
functions are associated with these central axes. Minor 
surprises can be tolerated with relative ease; core di-
mension surprises send ripples of uncertainty throughnut 
the cognitive system. 
The surprise _event has, . thus far, been discussed in 
tems of an unexpected a.nd significant change demand made 
upon the individual's frarnework. · This essentially involves 
a major modification of the matrix and even a major modi-
fication can have serious ramiflcationso However, when tpe 
surprise event involves the elimination, not simply the 
modification, of a core dimension, then the consequences are 
rnany times more disruptive. Unlike an antipipated event, 
the individual has no time to plan, prepare, build substi-
tutive elements, schedule the linkage realignment or other-
wise reduce the impact. Instead the frame-of-reference by 
which the individual ordinarily understands events is 
severely damaged••• traumatically. 
Sudden death, therefore, is a highly disruptive influ-
ence upon cognitive functioning in two prime waysa (a) death 
of a signi.ficant other is an irreversible el;mination of a 
core dimension of cognitive functioning, that requires 
considerable time and effort for its repair, yet (b) its 
immediacy is both antithetical to the predictive nature of 
the individual, and it precludes adequate preparation for 
the type of event that could use preparation mosts All 
cognitive re~adjustment (and major adjustment is necessary) 
must follow the event, at a time when there is structural 
instability because of the damage to the framework's core. 
My conclusion is that specific modes of sudden death, 
while lending their own effect to the bereavement reaction, 
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are additive to the basie ti: ·auma. or sudden eiimination. That, 
in itoel½ can have a significantly disruptive influence upon 
cognitive functioning and the eventual course of mourning 
(See Figure 20). 
3. Suicidal Death 
• 
(a) Introduction and Review of Literature 
' Given the disruptive effects of a traumatically sudden 
death, irrespective of etiology, most survivors still have 
concerned others to whom they can turn for environmental 
support in this time of crisis (Gain & Fast, 1966ar Kalish, 
1963,1967; Jackson,1957,1964). This interpersonal support 
has some mitigating effect on bereavement by partially pro-
tecting the mourner from external demands, especially during 
the initial stagss of bereavement (Lamers,1972)s There is 
one group of survivors,however, who are faced with the same 
disruptive dilemma and its symptomatic consequences, yet who 
are often abandoned and criticized, rather than helped during 
this crucial time. These are the surviving family members 
of individuals who have ta.~en their own lives by suicide 
(Cain & Cain,1972; Cain & Fast,1966,1966a, Pretzel,1972s 
\bil .man et al~ 1971). Although progress has been made by public 
educational efforts, suicide remains a stigmatizing event 
in a family's history (Cain,1972; Ginsberg,1971). As such, 
the survivor's must oft:en deal with their loss i,n the face 
of withdra wal and bla me by friends and relatives, rather tha n 
the support which .\ ght otherwise be forthcoming (Cain & Fast, 
1966ar Pr etz el,19 72) . 
Furthe rmor e, su ici de is often viewed a G a communicati ve 
act directed toward significant others in the perpertrator's 
life space (Farber-ow & Shneidman, 1961.J Lester & Lester,19711 
Resnik,1968; Shneidman,1968,1970). Suicide notes or family 
conflicts, arguments and threats prior to the death frequently 
make it clear that the suicide is intended as a final inter-
personal communication {Jacobs,1971r Shneidman & Farberow, 
1957: Shneidman et al, 1970), The content of the suicidal 
message conveys a psychic intentionality on tthe part of the 
deceased and imposes on the survivor a morbid, rejecting, 
accusatory meaning (Cain, 1972; Hinton,1967r Pretzel,1972r 
Shneidnan & Farberow,1957). 
It appears, therefore, that three aspects of a suicidal 
death account for a large part of its impact upon the sur• 
vivors1 (1) its suddenness, similar to the disruptive effect 
of other forms of sudden deathr (2) the unique reversal from 
social support to social accusation which is associated with 
the stigmatizing nature of suicide,and; (3) the overwhelmingly 
negative meanings communicated to and imposed on the survi-
vorsby a significant other's intentional self-destructive 
act. I believe that the social stigna/aucusation aspect 
( -2~ above) actually serves as an exacerbating influence 
upon the other two aspects mentioned, that of disruption 
and negative meanings. Social withdrawal/condemnation 
• 
aggravates the disruption by removing a USlal interpersonal 
supportive sheild, ma.king the bereaved more susceptible to 
stimulus overload, and ite.elfacts as an overloading event. 
Social withdrawal/conde mnation worsens the negative meaning 
aspect by validating t he rurv i.vors ~e1f-blame interpretations 
rather than aiding his efforts to lessen these meaning 
cogni .tions. 
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The effect of suicidal de .a th is virtually always path ... 
ological beyond the impact of other forms of death . (Cain,1972; 
Cain & Fast,1966a) and Xhe grief process is more intensified 
and more difficult at every stage (Cain,1972; Pretzel,1972). 
These conclusions are supported by investigators, regardless 
of survivor differences in age, sex, or familial relationship 
with the deceased (Augenbaum & Neuringer,1972a Berken..~emp, 
19611 Bunch,1972; Cain,1972; Cain & Fast, 1966,1966a, Goldberg 
& Mudd,1968; Henslin,1970,1972; Herzog & Resnik,1968a Linde-
mann & Greer, 1953: Pretzel,1972; Resnik,1968,1972; Silverman 
19721 Stone,1971; Swanson, 1960; Vollman et al,1971). A 
review cf some of these studies will demonstrate the pathoT 
logical impact of suicidal death. 
A suicide's effect on the surviving spouse has been 
described by Pretzel (1972). He notes that society prescribes 
certain normal and natural grief reactions; except for sui-
cidal deaths when the bereaved is left without · any socially 
anchored structures regarding what reactions to have and hew 
to express them. There is loss of the usual social support 
that is typically provided mourners. This is partly due to 
their own intense guilt and shame which causes them to 
withdraw from others, and due to the stigma of suicide 
which causes embaras sment and a sense of inadequacy in poten-
tial helpers ••• so they also withdraw. This leaves the sur• 
vivor feeling even more abandoned and tends to confirm 
the bereaved's sense of responsibility for the death. 
Pretzel goes en to note that all symptomology is 
intensified, particularly guilt and depression, which makes 
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the mourner himself a high risk for potential suicide. Con-
siderable anger and hostility is generated with the suicide 
viewed as an attack on the survivors, as an effective'last 
word' leaving the mourner frustrated and unable to discharge 
the frustration. Guilt and anger tend to interact, making it 
difficult to diffuse either. Pretzel finds the primary 
charact:eristic of a suicide survivor's reaction to be an in-
ability to accept the reality of the suicidal nature of the 
death. There is persistent and irrational insistence at 
denying that sutcide was the cause of death. The survivors 
develop bizarre alternative explanations which have a 
paranoid quality, such as the "myth of the mysterious prowler" 
who 'really 1 killed the spouse. 
Cain & Fast(1966a) found similarly distorted suspicions 
about the cause of death in a separate group of spouse sur-
vivors of a suicidal death who felt that the police, coroner's 
office, insurance companies and unsympathetic ministers 
were involved in a conspiracy to attribute the death to 
suicide rather than hornocide. Cain & Fast, in this same 
study, also noted the replacement of social support with 
social condemnation as a major factor in the pathological 
outcome, with a resulting avoidance of those "who know". 
They similarly reported intense guilt a nd shame feelings 
whtch caused a massive denial of the suicide as mode, and · 
prevent ,ed any communication about the death. This denial, 
concealment and refusal or inability to talk about the death 
froze the mourning process and yielded a "conspiracy of 
silence • regarding the suicide. TI1is prevented dealing 
with t be realities of the event and its consequences, such 
that distict pathological patterns evolved, which Cain & 
Fast ( l.'966a) have grouped as followsa Pa.ttern (1) involving 
reparation by re~marriage to a grossly physically or 
psycho 1ogically handicapped person •• The choice of a new 
spouse seemed to be dominated by a defensive effort to give, 
nurture. repair or undo and thereby define themselves as 
good and loving, but primarily .nQ! destructive. Pattern (2) 
was als ,o reparative in the sense of world rescue fantasies 
(e.g.; grand economic schemes, cancer cures etc,) which 
were extensively rationalized and legitimized, although 
totally unrealistic. These schemes expanded to total pre-
occupations bordering on fanaticism, as the rest of the 
survivo~s ·life structure deteriorated. Pattern (3) was mania 
fested by direct and openly self-destructive ideation and 
behavior, which was either consciously self-punitive or 
distort e dly vengeful and retaliatory. Pattern (4) involved 
the eA'"te rnalizing of the bereaved's self-accusations by 
select ir.g and using the new spouse to play out the complaints, 
grievances and accusations of his previous partner against 
him. 11ie final pattern(S) was the survivor's attraction to 
and in vo lvement wi.th other suicidal people either as an effort 
to re~live the traumatic event or to vica~iously act out his 
own suicidal fantasies. 
A study of parental survi.vors of adolescent suicides 
was detailed by Herzog and Resnik (1968). They described 
_these parents in the most fragile terms I u As we entered 
the lives of these parents, we upset their tenuous equil .. 
ibrium, They became anxious and angry at us". Indeed, the 
researchers found that the immediate parental response to 
the sudden loss of their adolescent by suicide was "overwhel-
ming hostility and denial followed by guilt and depression 11 • 
-All parents expressed some form of denial toward the cause 
of death, though they were much more accepting of the ill! 
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of death, They maintained that death was caused by a homocide 
or an accident, and expressed their denial through anger at 
those tangentially involved with the death event (e.g.,police 
hospital personnel, the authors). Herzog and Resnik warn of 
the real danger of breaking down these necessary, but 
fragile, defenses, behind which lies a tremendous sense of 
guilt, depression and failure which persist indefinitely. 
These bereaved parents were emphatically opposed to having 
another child, for fear of failing with that one too. Their 
atypical grief responses were long lasting, and seen in other 
symptoms, as well, such as social isolation,insomnia, sadness, 
exaggerated hypochondrtasis. The death of a child by suicide 
appears to generate the moet severe and extended pathological 
grief responses in the surviving parents (Pretzel,19721 
Whitis,1968). 
Similarly distressing conse quen ces of suicidal death 
are found i.n studies of children survivors of parental 
suicide (Berkenkamp,1961; Cain & Fast,1965,1966) and 
sibling survivors (Swanson, 1960) • There is virtually no 
e.-idence in the literature which indicates that a healthy, 
nomal bereavement follows a suicidal death. The combined 
effects of acute disruption, social condemnation and over-
whelmingly negative meaning implications apparently preclude 
a normal grief process, 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation for Effects of 
Suicidal Death 
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While it is not necessary to repeat the previous expla-
nation concerning the negative effects of suddenness of death 
upon the cognitive disruption, it is worth underscoring that 
the resulting disruptive state is one in which the individual 
is in a position of high vulnerability to overload. His 
cognitive matrix is inadequate to meet even routine cognitive 
demands. Ordinarily, mourners are ·. aided by family and friends 
during the earlyperiod of bereavement. This aid buffers some 
of the environmental input to reduce the likelihood of a 
cognitive overload and possible breakdown. However, suicide 
survivors lack this buffer because potential helpers with-
draw. In addition, the bereaved are li.kely to be the objects 
of condemnation and blame for the death by many of those in 
the environment(Cain & Fast,1966a). Thus, rather than cogni-
tive disruption being partially tempered by others-as-helpers ••• 
following a suicidal dea t h, the cognitive disruption is fueled 
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by others.And the nature of the overload (i.e.,, condemna t ion), 
also fuels the second major eff e ct of a suicidal death, the 
attribution by the mourner of overwhelir.ingly negative meanings 
to the death, 
A suicidal even.t, like any other event, forces the 
individual to attribute meaning to his experience. The manner 
of understanding a significant oth~r•s suicidal death is 
restricted, however, by certain aspects and implication 
of the act itself. In other words, suicide imposes meanings 
for the death upon the survivor. These meanings and implica-
tions, though recognized by the bereaved, are, nonetheless, 
of such an inte _nse ly negative quality. that they are into ler-
ab le. They must be, therefore, denied, distorted or otherwise 
misinterpreted, A suicide is an intentional, deliberate, 
volitional act of overt rejection of the world and those 
immediate others, including in p~rticular the survivor. 
Suicide is a form of behavioral statement that overtly 
implies that the survivor could not or would not help the 
deceased toward happiness, or at least out of despair (Cain, 
19721 Cain & Fast,1966a; Shneidman & Farberow,1957). These 
are some of the meanings imposed by ·the death as a suicidal 
demise. 
Suicide is also experie nced as an attack and as an 
index of failure and inad equacy on the bereaved's part. 
Though these latter meaning s of failure are often given 
to other forms of sudden de ath by the mourner, in cases of 
suicide the implications of blame toward the survivors a re 
euhanced by the dec eased ~s choice of voluntary death over 
continuation with the survivor. 
Suicide is unique i.n that meanings for the death are 
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not open to broad construction by the survivor, but are 
largely a function of the mode of death itself. It will be 
recalled that the affective experience of bereavement guilt 
is associated with a sense of failure in meeting the role 
expectations of the relationship. The surviver typically 
construes the role loss through death as partially a function 
of his inadequate fulfillment of the self-defined responsi-
bilities in that roleJ hence he partially blames himself 
for the death, This is the reason that guilt is experienced 
even in the healthiest of bereavement processes. The dom-
inant emotion of guilt in the symptom picture of survivors 
of a suicidal death can, thus, be traced back to its cog~ 
nitive origins. However, with suicidal death the guilt is 
exaggerated. This occurs because the sense of failure is 
reinforced by both the accusatory message from the deceased 
(via his self-intentioned death) and from the social condem-
nation by others. The combined effects of this •failure/blame 
meaning ·bei ng attributed to the death by the deceased and by 
others is intolerable for the survivor. The acceptance of 
such an overwhelming set of interpretations is usually 
beyond the limits of the individual's conceptual framework. 
Most su i cide survivors do not construe themselves to be 
murderers, even indirectly or remotely; it is beyond their 
comprehension. Yet to accept a death as suicide, along with 
' : 
its comptinent statements and implicat i..ons about the survivor, 
is to accept cor~iderable responsibility for the deathe 
They must ask themselves, 'What about me made him do i.t?• 
And this appears to be outside most suvivor's cognitive 
facility; it is intolerable to ask, lest an answer eme~ges. 
Therefore, the meanings and implications must be rejected. 
This is done either by denying that suicide was, in fact, 
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the cause of death (which is the most frequent and persistent 
way of handling~ rather,not handling• suicidal deaths); or 
by grossly distorting the implied accusation toward the sur-
vivor (e.g., asserting that the deceased was crazy, though 
it is established by research that most suicides are not at 
all crazy; or e.g., by scapegoating, such as blaming the 
children as the true provocateurs), This seems to explain 
why most suicide survivors are able to readily accept the 
fact of death, but not the cause of death. Their focus is 
upon the more tratm\atic .aspect for them , •••• the meanings, 
rather than the loss and damage itself. 
Such denial or distortion, however, is a false constuction 
of the event which is very weak, unstable, and vulnerable to 
realityconfrontation.Hence, the exacerbating effect of social 
condemnation which tends to confinn and enhance the very 
meanings which the bereaved is trying to avoid. That is the 
reason for the mourner's own social withdrawal and his 
anger at those peripheral reminders of the fact of suicide. 
They are genuine threats to the fragile, false cognitive 
understanding of the death which he seeks desperately to 
maintaino 
It is these combtned effects of suicidal death on cog-
nitive disruption and cognitive attribution of meaning which 
make this particular mode potentially pathological for most 
mourner's grief. 
4 - - Accidental Death 
(~) Introduction and Review of Literature 
One initial definitional problem arises concerning 
accidental death. For example, it may be broadly defined as 
any untimely demise, regardless of cause, or it may be 
narrowly restricted to specific causations, such a$ auto 
accidents or f~res. I believe Shneidman's (1961) taxonomy 
of death provides a framework consistent with my views as 
presented in this dissertation. The criteria applied in >': 1?, 
Shneidman's taxonomy is one of intentionality. Any sudden 
death which is neither self-intentioned (suicide)nor other-
intentioned (hornocide)is considered accidental. This holds 
whether the causative agent is intra-somatic (such as a 
cardiac arrest which is usually and legally classed as 
'natural') or extra-somatic (such as an automobile accident). 
This leaves the catabolic processes of aging and diseares of 
· pre-mature death (e.g., leukemia) as examples of natural 
deatha i.e., those involving anticipatory dying as discussed 
earlier .. This definition of accidental death incorp orates 
most unintentioned sudden death events. As such, accidental 
death is the most common mode associated with acute grief.It 
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is known to generate both th r~ normal and pathological 
bereavement proces(;es. If ot he r determinants {i.e., re-
lationship factors and survt vor characteristic factors) are 
of minimal influence, then accidental death generally results 
in the normal or prototypic grief symptomology already 
reviewed in Part III. 
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Although many researchers have broadly discussed acute 
grief symptomology in both its normal form (e.g,, Barnacle, 
1949; Bowlby,196lr Clayton et al, 1961; Kutscher,1969; Lamers, 
1972, Mcconville et al. J.970; P_arkes, 1972 r Shoenberg et alw 
1970) and pathological form .(e,g., Anderson,1949; Bowlby, 
1963r; Kutscher, 1969; Parkes,1972; Schoenberg,et al, 1970; 
Volkan, 1970),the study by Lindemann (1944) which reported 
on the survivors of the Boston Coconut Grove fire remains 
the classic study of acute grief following accidental death. 
Lindemann (1944) describes normal grief symptomology 
after an accidental death as including many of the sequelae 
that have been detailed on earlier pages1 cognitive dysfunc-
tions of confusion, denial and pre-occupation with the deceas-
ed; somatic distress in different organ systems; guilt, 
hostility and depression; te mporary loss of typical patterns 
of behavior and some identifi.catory symptoms related to the 
deceased. He notes that st grief work", which is necessary for 
healthy resolution of the loss, involves experiencing and 
coping with the subjective distress of these symptoms, rather 
than avoiding them. Only by accepting these consequences to 
the loss and dealing witlj th em as they arise can the bereaved 
resolve his grief eff ect ively,. This r.esolu t ionr acco r di ng 
to Lindemann includes re:..adj us tment to the environment 
without the deceased, the formation of new relationships 
and disengagement from the bonds to the deceased. This is 
Lindemann's profile of normal acute grief after an accidental 
death. 
He also describes the nature of a pathological response 
to sudden and unintentioned death as originating from 
either a delayed (i.e., denied)r eaction or from a distortion 
(i.e., exaggeration) of the normal processes. These include 
exaggerations of activity levels, of guilt, hostility or 
depression, of withdrawal from others and persistent changes 
in behaviore Lindemann attributes a pathological progression 
of mourning, as I do, to the presence of de t erminant factors 
supplementary to the accidental death itself. He suggests 
both the relationship to the deceased (e.g., mothers of 
young children) and characteristics of the survivor (e,g., 
a predisposition to depression or obsessiveness) as potential 
influencing factors. 
In sum, accidental death (i.e., unexpected and unin-
tentioned) results in a syn dro me of acute grief whose symp-
tomology is variable and subjectively distressing, but 
typical for this experience. When other contaminating factors 
are promin ent, such as certain relatio nships and certai.n 
survivor characterist i cs , t:hen the syndrome may be diverted 
toward an atypical a nd pa 'tholo g ica l outco me, 
(b) Cognitive Modal Explanation for Effects of 
Accidental Death 
Despite the typical 'normality' of bereavement following 
un-contaminated accidental death, it is still necessary to 
show cognitive impact from which even these normal symptoms 
derive. The sudden disruption of a core cognitive dimension 
may be sufficient'to cause mourning symptomology and the 
explanation for that effect has been given at great length 
in Part II. However, I believe that some notions about 
meaning are useful additions to the model's explanation of 
bereavement following an accidental death. 
I have postulated that one cf man's basic functions is 
to understand events and thus give meaning to experiences 
which he encounters. This serves adaptive/survival ends,as 
well as advancing . the individual toward his valued goal 
objectives. Occasionally, an individual encounters an event 
which is beyond his cognitive capacity _r:o comprehend. He has 
a sense of inadequacy until he is able, through changes in 
his framework,to conceptualize the experience and somehow 
incorporate the knowledge into his matrix. This is ordinar~ 
ily a routine process of development associated with cog-
nitive growth and advancement. 
However, there occurs, rarely, an event in an indivi-
dual's life for which meaning and explanation is virtually 
absent, an event for which rational comprehension is not 
possible because it does not exist in a manner consistent 
with the person's ordinary understanding of phenomena. Such 
an event is meaningle ss ,. pt.n:·poseless and wtthout rationale. 
I believe that accidental death is- such an event and poses 
the dilemma of meaninglessness to the survivors. Not only 
is the loss untimely and therefore disruptive, it is also 
incomprehensible. 
In addition to the damage to the cognitive matrix, there 
is the difficulty of conceptual incorporation with acciden-
tal death. There isn't any non-distorting way to make sense 
out of it. Intentionality is an important concept here, be-
cause it is a principle criteria bywhich we attribute and 
provi.de ourselves with understanding. In the case of suicidal 
death, intentionality is one of the main meaning criteria 
that generates so much negative consequences. Yet, by defin-
ition. i.ntentionality of victim, survivor or other is lacking 
when death is accidental. And witbout intentionality ~to 
an event:, we can not readily assign meaning, purpose or re-
sponsibility. The questions 'Why did this happen ••• to the 
deceaserl ••• to the survivor?' is unanswerable and must 
basically remain unanswerable. The result _is an experience 
of sus .tained shock and prolonged confusion; but particularly 
a reac t. ton of lasting bewilderment and disillusionment. 
As grief proceeds, the mourner restructures his cogni-
tive f r amework, but without: the certainty of predictability 
that previously existed. Now he has encountered ev.ents 
which were net only un~predictable, but unjustified and 
inexp1 i.cable. Accidental de~h is not an error of the person's 
predi ct ive practice; it is an error of assuming that all 
events• whether poten t i a l ly predic tab l e or not - somehow 
will manifest a rationale and justifiableness. When this 
assumption is disproved by the meaninglessness of an acciden-
tal death, with its senseless subsequent suffering, then 
disillusionment emerges and may pervade the cognitive matrix 
such that uncertainty regarding the future acts to undermine 
the cognitive stability of the mourner. It has been my expere 
ience that survivors of uncontaminated accidental deaths are 
likely to procee-d through a relatively normal acute grief 
syndrome and arrive at a healthy outco me. However, years 
later, they typically are still sensitive to unpredictability 
and injustice of events. TI1eir cognitive reconstruction may 
be solid, but they remain wary, for they do not truly trust 
the future. They had been fooled by an expectation of 
meaningfullness to events (even painful ones) which the 
accidental death had proven illusionary. 
5--• Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
(a) Introduction and Review of Literature 
The Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (hereafter referred 
to as SIDS) or crib death in volves the demise of a child 
whose health appears normal, and whose death occurs during 
sleep, without warning and without known etiology. The pat-
tern is typically one in which the parents awaken in the 
morning and shockingly discover their. infant dead in its crib. 
Though respiratory shut-down appears to be the physiologic 
dysfunction l eading to the death, medical research into 
SIDS has not yet pinpoi nt ed the cau sa tive agentp if any, 
for the shutdown. While SIDS falls within the general cate-
gory of ( intrasomatic) accidenta .l death, there are unique , 
qualities tc this mode of death which make it worthwhile to 
.consider separately. One of these qualities is the nature 
of the relationship {i.e., parental loss of a child) which 
is an important determinant of the grief response and wil~ 
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be discussed as a general factor in the next chapter • . Another 
quality relates more specifically to the mode of the death 
itself; namely, the realistic ambiguity of how death occurred. 
This ambiguity, which is absent in, for example, a child's 
deaith by auto accident, results in some idiosyncratt .c ~ief 
symptoms and a particular cognitive effect. 
Several authors have written about the psychological 
effects of SIDS on the family members and even upon the 
physicians involved (Adelson & Kinney,1956; Bergman et al;l969; 
Halpern,1972; Salk et al,1971) Their views are generally 
consistent with Halpern (1972) who describes the immediate 
parental reaction to the discovery of the dead child as 
acute grief-' including disbelief, a surge of rage and guilt, 
and intense fea~ andzesentment over potential and actual 
allegations regarding the probability of child neglect or 
child abuse. This fear seems to account for the verbal and 
behavioral projection of blame onto older siblings of the 
deceased. Often an older sibling shares the discovery, yet 
may be immediately and persistently scapegoated for the 
mother's own sense of confusion,guilt and anxiety, There is 
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prolonged obsessi\e rumination about the circumstances of the 
death, esp ecially by the be:cea~~ d mothers, The mothers also 
develop an exaggerated patt ern of over 0 protection toward the 
other children in the family, despite the paradoxical pro" 
jection of blamee Mothers become highly concerned a.bout their 
maternal adequacyi while the f athers seem less self-doubtful. 
Some of these grief symptoms are common to parental survivors 
of child loss, as will be noted in the next chapter.However, 
the intensity and duration of the syndrome, along with the 
unusual rtnnination and proje c tion of blame onto siblings, 
gives the SIDS a rather dist i nct effect on bereavement that 
is different from other accidental deaths, even those in-
volving children. 
(b) Cognitive Model Exp lanation for Effects of 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
The cognitive bereaveme nt effects following the death 
of a child from SIDS are sim i lar to those of other abrupt 
modes, and also share the "role failure" and "planning 
discontinuance" effects associated with child deaths in gen• 
eral. These are discussed in the next chapter. Here, I wish 
to address the issue of ambiguity which ourrounds SIDS, and 
to suggest how this ambiguit y affects meaning attibution to 
the ·., death event by the mourni ng parents. 
Recall that the distressing cognitive impact of suicidal 
death lay pr:t marily in the imposed meanings of bl ame and 
accusation to the bereaved by the deceased through his self-
destructive act. The survivors are virtually forced to under-
stand or give meaning to t hi~ suicidal de ath .in terms of 
there own partial responsibility for it .. The narrow meani.ngs 
attributable to a suicidal death result in an overwhelming 
and intolerable sense of role failure and, consequently, intense 
guilt. On the other :hand, accidental deaths generally lack 
meaningfulness and cause the mourner to experience disruption 
and suffering without rationale explanation. This leaves 
thE11.Jjawildered and disillusioned. Cognitively, the SIDS 
combines the negative elements of both extremes of this 
continuum between too much meaning (as occurs in suicide) 
and too little meaning (as occurs in accidents). 
The ambiguity surrounding the circumstances of death 
are genuine, since no clear explanation for SIDS has been 
forthcoming. It is a meaningless event because it doesn't 
make any sense that a seemingly healthy infant should simply 
and inexplicably die during the night. The bereaved parents 
are realistically unable to give themselves explanation for 
their loss, over and above its injustice. The disillusionment 
is intensified because the parents are not only unable to 
answer the self-posed question of Why7, but are also unable 
to provide a meaningful response to How7 Their experience 
of loss is exacerbated by the combination of the abstract 
meaninglessnes that they share with other accident survivors 
plus the concrete meaninglessness of an unknown causation 
that is idiosyncratic to SIDS. 
Yet the ambiguity involves a simultaneous and paradox-
ical pressure toward the other end of the meaning continuum, 
toward the possibility of parental responsibility for the 
death, The allegations of child neglect and abuse are not 
just externally generated; they derive also from the mourner's 
o~n sense of uncertainty regarding his role or role failure 
in causing the death, Lack of concrete explanation for the 
infant's demise provides a vacuum which the mourner may fill 
with his own explanations, biased by self-doubt and self-blame. 
Unable to give abstract meaning to the loss, he attempts 
to at least provide himself with some concrete understanding 
of the trauma, The meani~imposed by such an organically 
inexplicable event tends to be one of parental inadequacy 
or irresponsibility. The parent so construing himself as the 
cause, however unintentional, of his infant's death is faced 
with such an alien cognition that he must deny, distort or 
project blame elsewhere, Hence, some of the sibling scape• 
goatingreported by Halpern (1972). 
6 ~ Notes on Other Modes of Death 
The foregoing review a.nd analysis of anticipatory dyingj 
sudden death, suicide, accident and Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome provided some demonstration · of the explanatory power , 
of the cognitive model concerning the influence of the 
determinant, mode of death, upon bereavement. Some support 
for the importance of this general class of factors was si-
mutaneously presented by not in g how different modes of death 
affect aspects of grief in different ways. 
l believe that other circu mstances of sudden death may 
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have si milarly idiosyncrati.c effects on the bereavement 
process~ While it is beyond the scope of this treatise to 
explore the hypothetical ra 'llifi cations of these additional 
circums ta nces, I offer them to the reader for his own 
pondering and speculation regarding the survivor's reactions: 
a) homocidal death (both the bereaved family and the perper-
trator~ b)multiple death (e,g,, mother survives, rest of fam• 
ily per i shes in auto accident)a c) mass diaster, with many 
unrelated survivors who share the similarity of the loss 
(see Ja n is,1954; Leighton,1951; Lifton,1963,19671 Lindemann, 
1944, Ty,hurst, 1950), d) sudden death occurring with versus 
w:f.thout paint e) heroic deaths either in war'cime (Eliot, 1946; 
Lindema nn,1944),or during non-war reiated rescue efforts; 
!)abort i on versus spontaneous miscarriage f (Cain et al, 1964 r 
Kaij et al,1969), g) death from potentially lethal behaviors 
such as chronic self-abuse (e.g., alcohol related deaths) or 
high-ri. sk occupations (construction workers); h) death from 
a hered i tary disease which the survivors may be carrying 
(e.g., d iabetes), 
C • Rel a tion.ship of Survivor to the Deceased 
1. Introduction 
There are numerous relationships which the deceased had 
with t hos e in his interpersonal environment. And their are 
many vari ations within each relationship category. However, 
there doe s appear to be some commonaliti e s of grief response 
accord ing to the particular relation etiip class that the sur-
vivor had vis-a-vis th e dece ase d. In this section,the 
spouse and parent survivors will be reviewed and analyzed, 
followed by some brief notes on other relatio~~hips, 
The influence of the relationship factor upon acute 
grief seems to be its impact upon cognitive disruption, In 
addition to the suddenness of the event causing a baseline 
disruption on the cognitive matrix, it appears that the 
particular relationship class of survivor to deceased will 
detennine the extent or intensity of the disruption beyond 
the baseline. The degree of disturbance to cognitive stabil-
ity will vary as a function of whether the survivor has 
suffered the loss of a spouse, child, parent or sibling. 
Each of these relationships offers a different degree of 
cognitive dependence upon the deceased and, therefore, 
variati.ons of structural effect will occur. 
2 ~ Spouse Survivor 
(a) Introduction and Review of Literature 
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The marital relationship tends to be the primary dyadic 
bonding of adults in our society, with a somewhat lesser 
degree of adult's inv Qlv ernent with their parents or siblings, 
With regard to the spousel inter-depend e nce, Parkes(1972,p l 22) 
points out that ",.,husbands tend to occupy a greater propor-
tion of the life of their wives than do wives of their hus-
bands. The wife's roles, plans and problems tend to be 
husband oriented and she i s reliant on him for money, status 
and co mpan y to a grea t er exte nt than he is on her. It comes 
as no surprise, ther e fore, to f ind that t he loss of a hus band 
is the commonest type of ~ l a.ti.ori.shi.p d issolution to give 
rise to psychological difficulti ~s . ";i This is not to say 
that loss of a wife is unwdisturbing for the surviving 
husband, as Parkes himself has concluded elsewhere (Parkes 
et al,1969sParkes & Brown,19i2). Rather,fthe emphasis is 
upon the interdependence of husband and wife in their dealing 
with the world at large~ There is strain placed on either 
of the spouses• coping abilities after the death of their 
~ate. Although the quality of the interdependence does have 
some effect on grief outcome (e.g. 0 Parkes,1971 reports 
greater guilt in widows who indicated greater presdeath 
quarrellingr see also Parkes,1965), even conflicted dyads 
are interdependent. 
The general marital relationship has been considered 
the normative loss against which other intimate relationships 
have been compared because of the relative frequency of 
spouse death and the variance of symptomology~ Both typical 
and atypical grief courses and S}m.('.tans, as described in 
Part III, occur in spouse bereavement, regardless of which 
sex spouse survives (Baler & Golde,19641 Berardo,1968.1970; 
Clayton et al, 1971,1972; Friedman~ Zaris,1964; Frttz,1930; 
Fulcomer,1942r Maddison & Viola,19681 Maddison & Walker,1967; 
Marris,1958; Parkes,1964,196 4a 1 1965,1971,1972; Parkes & 
Brown, 1972; Parkes et al,1Q691 Silvennan,1966,1967,1970,1972). 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation for Effect of 
Spouse Survivor Relationship 
21 0~ 
The development of a marital relationship, as the 
paradigm of any intimate dyad, involves the increasing incor-
poration of the otherh viewpoints and perspectives into eac~ 
spouse's cognitive framework, The individual must give thought 
to the spouse's information input and the spouse's potential 
reaction to his behavior, decisions, ideas and emotional ex-
pressions, This occurs even in conflicted marriages, when 
the main purpose of considering the spousees input may be 
in order to reject it. "What will my husband/wife think, do 
Oi'" feel about X7" is a routine question that married people 
ask themselves many times each day. The result is a cognitive 
matrix that includes a secondary, but integral, perspective 
that parallels one's own perspective and upon which much 
routine activity and decision-making is based, 
Furthermore, there are numerous functional aspects of 
environmental interaction which are contingent on the spouse's 
sharing of the particular event, These include the phone call 
from the office concerning dinner time, or next summer's 
vacation plans, or their wedding anniversary, or parenting 
decisions, or sexual relations. In other words, the spouse 
relationship is the prime example of 'quantitative centrality 9 , 
A myriad of cognitive dimensions are linked to this core 
dimensional relationship. The individual's understanding 
of many events is typically related to or derived from or 
affiliated with this basic cognitive dimension. 
When a spouse dies, the survivo1)s cognitive matrix is, 
therefore, disrupted at many linkages and in many spheres. 
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The disruptive ripples pervade the framework, as did the 
cognitive associations with the deceased prior to the deathc 
Cognitive disarray is massive because so much of one's thoughts 
actions and feelings are contingent on or aL least indirectly 
related to the deceased spouse. And it must be noted, once 
again, that this extensive disruption occurs suddenly, 
making its overall effect that much more traumatic. 
There is also an overload ,potential which should be 
considered. Most marital relationships evolve a separation 
of some functions (e.g., husband as breadwinners wife as 
primary parent). When a spouse diesr the environmental de~ 
mands (financial or parental) which the deceased had previ-
ously dealt with, must now be confronted by the survivor. 
At a time of cognitive inadequacy, the survivor must make 
new decisions • Since each spouse was likely to have depen-
ded on the other in meeting certain role-related demands, 
the survivor may not have developed sufficient cognitive 
capacity for dealing adequately with the necessary, but 
novel experiences. The large number of new demands under 
ordinary circumstances (e.g., a temporary separation) may 
well be stressful and overloading. During a state of cogni-
tive disruption and inadequacy, they are almost certainly 
so. It is for this reason - partial protection from overload -
that social support is a vital intervention for QQ.th widows 
and widowers during bereavement, so that they can gradualize 
their cogni.tive adapt ati on to nov e l -demands. 
3 - Parent Survivor 
(a) Introducti.on and Review of Literature 
As indicated in an earlier section, the anticipated t 
death of a child offers the parents a greatly needed period 
of preparatory time for accepting the loss, and this helps 
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to mitigate some of the impact and the symptomology of grief 
(Albin et al,1971; Binger et al,1969, Bozeman et al,1955; 
Carpenter and Stewart,1962; Chodoff et al,1964, Cobb,1956; 
Hamovitch,1964,1965; Natterson & Knudson 0 1960). However, when 
a child's death occurs suddenly, . there is no temporal cushion, 
and the impact on - the surviving parents is typically devas-
tating. I have already revie wed the pathological influence 
upon parental bereavement of a child's suicidal death (Cain, 
1972; Herzog & Resnik,1968; Pretzel,19721 Whitis,1968) and 
the exaggerated effects of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome upon 
surviving parents (Adelson & Kinney,1956, Bergman e:t: al,1969; 
Halpern, 1972; Salk et al,1971), Other authors, writing of 
non-specific sudden child deaths similarly conclude that 
child loss generates extreme l y disturbing grief reactions 
in the surviving parents (Bibring,1970; Friedman et al,196a, 
Kennell et al,1970; Nolfi,1963; Orbach,1959), 
Cain & Cain (1964) fou nd that replacement of a child 
by conception shortly after the death is a relatively freq-
uent attempt to undo the loss with a substitute, who in 
extreme instances are even given the same name as the dead 
child. The outcome of this ;:ype of grief resolution is 
generally pathological for che parents and psychonoxious 
for the replacement child. Wretmark (1959) found that a 
high proportion of bereaved psychiatric patients who were 
admitted to a Swedish mental hospital experienced child 
loss as a precipitating factor~ Parkes(l972) and Lindemann 
(1944) note that the loss of a child is a unique situation 
that virtually always produces a state of alarm physiologi• 
cally and has a poor bereavement prognosis. Gorer(1965) and 
Kalish (1968) both regard child loss as the most distressing 
and persistenj; of all bereavements. 
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The tlrust of the research on the aftermath of child c: 
death is that such a loss is highly traumatic to the surviving 
parents, more so than any other relationship loss. Grief out-
come is predicted to be poor, with berP~vement symptomology 
typically intense, prolonged and often pathological. 
(b) Cognitive Model Explanation fer Effect of 
Parent Survivor 
Death is something that happens to old peopleo At least 
that is one of our usual conceptions about death. ttln a 
society in which the death of a child is statistically raret 
we are particularly likely to be unprepared for those that 
do occur" (Parkes• 1972 ,p.123 )_. 11 Also, the uniqueness of 
death between the ages of two months and 14 years intensi• 
fies its impact" (Kalish,1969,p~l02). Of all the varying con• 
frontations with a death event, the loss of a child is typi• 
cally the least frequent and least expectedJ hence, it is 
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the most shocking, sur~rising and disruptive to the cognitive 
matrix of the surviving parent. The trauma of sudden death is 
most sever.e in these instances. It rattles the predictive 
basis of the individual's understanding of the world. 
Furthermore, the parent tends to attribute particularly 
negative meanings to the death of a child. A patent-child 
relationship is a dyad in which the major responstbility 
for survival, actually as well as conceptually, falls upon 
the adult member. We don't typically attr5-bute a child!s : 
death to'his own fault' because he's usually not considered 
mature enough . for behavior leading to death. Rather, a prime 
expectation by the parent of himself is care and protection 
for his offspring. Death destroys the relationship and 
grotesquel)l confronts the parent with his own sense of fail ... 
ure and inadequacy in fulfilling this self-imposed and 
fundamental expectation of parenthood••••• a reaction 
previously defined as . guilt. 
Children also have a positional centrality in the 
cognitive matrix of the parent, Whereas spouses may be 
viewed as construing their lives fil.!h their mate, parents 
often, subtlely conceptualize their world around their 
children; for example, getting them off to school, calling 
the baby-sitter, birthday parties, noisy houses, weekends 
with the familye Many activities, decisions and plans are 
indirectly influenced by their linkages to the children. 
The rupture of those linkages sends waves of disruption 
through the cognitive framework, and even into areas not 
thought to be rel ated (€ofS• ~ no i sB l E:vel s in the house, 
chores previously perfonned by the child and taken for 
granted). 
Finally, the individual is postulated as being a predic-
tor and planner of future events. He does this in order 
to increase his adaptive ooilities and enhance his oppor-
tunities for goal attairnnent. Children are inti mately related 
to parental future even t s, directly through parental pla ns 
(e.g., for summer camp~ college studies and career goals) 
and indirectly as conc r ete links to an abstract future beyond 
the parent's own lifetime. A child's death shatters a parent's 
plans and predictions f or the fut(1re. He must re-construct 
an entire premise of his co nceptual understanding of th e 
world as it will be, sh ifti ng and de-limiting previous plans 
and expectations to ac comodate the loss. When a child dies, 
the parent's construct i on,. of the future is invalidated and 
his predictive securit y is undermined. 
Thus, the cogniti ve effects of an especially unantici• 
pated child's death, i t s associated disruption throughout 
the cognitive framework, th e meaning attributions attendant 
to the sense of failur e , in adequacy.and guilt at not meet ing 
the self-imposed expec ta tio ns of parenthood, plus the 
de-struction of predic t .ions and plans for the future which 
must be re-constr ued • • •• combine to yield the hi.gh est po-
tential for pathologic a l be re avement and cognitive breakdown. 
4;. Brief Notes on Othe:!:' Rel a tio n<~hips ---t .. .. ·--·· 
(a) Adult Survivor of Parental Death 
When the parent of an adult dies, there is usually min° 
imal disruption to the life and to the cognitive functioning 
of the survivor. This is apparently due to the partial 
anticipatory effect of the knowledge that the likelihood of 
death increase with age. This awareness reduces the initial 
impact of an elderly persons demise (Blauner,1966; Fulton 5,. 
Fulton,1971; Kalish,1969). In this sense, death fufills rather 
than contradicts expectation, so that even a sudden death 
is perhaps less conceptually abrupt for the survivor than 
it seems on the surface. It does not upset his framework's 
predictive base. 
Furthennore, elderly parents tend to be peripheral 
rather than central to the adult's cognitive matrix, at least 
in contemporary American society (Blauner,19661 Fulton & 
Fulton,1971, Kalish,1969), The emphasis upon the nuclear 
family rather than the extended family, and the greater 
frequency of elderly death occurring in hospitals or homes 
for the aged both contribute to the distancing of the re-
lationship between adult and his parent. When the parent dies, 
the cognitive effect is peripheral, does not affect major 
linkages or dimensions, and is minimally disorganizing and 
de-stabilizing to the structure. 
The meaning attributed to death in later years also makes 
the event easier to cope with, since there ts a sense of 
timeliness about such a death. This is not meant to imply 
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callousness to the sur v i vor, but mere ly an ability to com• 
prehend the event as relativ e ly appropriate and tolerable. 
It is not. necessary for the adult, confronted with the death 
of his parent, to deny or distort h is understanding of the 
event. Such a death usually carries its own reasonable, non~ 
accusatory meaning (e.g., that the parent had lived a full 
life and died inevitably), This reduces the pathological 
potential of ambiguity , (SI DS), i mposed negative meaning 
(suicide) or meaninglessness (accident). 
The possibility of so me exaggerated symptomology does 
occur when the survivor experiences a sense of failure with 
regard to the deceased parent. This may arise from the 
nature of the previous relationship (e.g.,a history of 
unresolved conflicts with the parent); or from the intentioned 
distancing and subtle rejection of nursing home placement 
as the parent grows older and more burdensome. If the adult 
survivor construes the death as a function of his failure 
or inadequacy as a son/daughter, then the self~imposed ex~ 
pectations of being a good or faithful offspring will be 
unmet and guilt/self-bla me will be felt. Generally, this 
negative meaning attributed t o the death is, by itself, 
insufficient to produce a pathological grief syndrome. Most 
bereavements involving adult s who have lost a parent are 
normal, mild and short-term. 
(b) Child Survi vor of Pa r ental Death 
Since this treatise is concern ed with acute grief in 
adulthood, my re marks here and in the next section on sibli ng 
grief will be limited to a few comments on the cognitive 
model's application to children, and then I'll refer the 
reader to other sources of infonnation on childhood bereave-
ment. 
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The proposed cognitive model of grief is a development-
tal model and,therefore, a.pplicable to an analysis of child-
hood bereavement. It is likely that the extent of disruption 
will be substantially dependent on the age of the child and 
his level of cognitive development, While exc ,eptional growth 
strides are possible, it is reasonable to assume that the 
differentiation, organization and·\integration of a child's 
matrix will be less advanced than most adults and, therefore, 
less capable of coping with all th~ ramifications of a death 
event. This is particularly true regarding parental death _, 
because the parental relationship has greater centrality 
for the child than does any single relationship in the 
average adult. Again, this is basically a result of reduced 
( ) 
differentiation, in this case, of the category of others. 
Overall, a parental death must be considered more disruptive 
and potentially more pathological for a child than for an 
adult, with an inverse relationship ·to age. Finally, the 
surviving parent can act as an added stressor to the child, 
and often does this when he (the parent) is having a diff'i-
cult time dealing with his cwn spouse-~grief. Cain & Fast(l966) 
emphasize this latter problem, in very clear tenns, regardin g 
a surviving parent's pathological infuence on the surviving 
child's bereavement following a suicidal death. 
For a critica.1 revi .ew of s om?. of ·the contradi ctory 
literature on childhood grief and some of the methodological 
problems associated wi.t.h this re gearcl;l the reader. is referred 
to Markusen and Fulton (1971). 
(c) Sibling Grief 
In addition to the foregoing comments on childhood 
bereavement, the loss of a sibling may generate further 
disruption, if a dyadic relationship had begun to be formed. 
This might bear some similarity to the conjoint inter-
dependence described under spouse bereavement, though of 
course of a different quality. Ease of identification with 
a sibling may also create the potential for negative meaning 
attributes to the death, such as 'Why him and not me7' with 
intensification of guilt; or 'If him, then possibly me too! ' 
with intensification of fear arul anxiety. 
As with parental death (but in this case both parents 
are involved) the surviving parents may add stress to the 
child as a result of their own bereavement difficulties. 
This was discussed earlier with reference to Halpern's(l972) 
study of SIDS in which the mother's sense of blame was 
explicitly projected onto the surviving sibling. 
Others who have investigated sibling grief includes 
Blum and Rosenweig (1944) and Rosenweig (1943) noting a 
higher incidence of later schizophrenia; Cain et al (1964, 
1964a) looking at the effects of miscarriage; Holland 
et al (1971) on the death of an identical twin; Swanson (1960) 
on an identical twins suicide;Weston& Irwin(l963)respreschool. 
(d) Ganeral 
Viewing the family as a r.mlti-member unit., whose inter-
action and role relationships shift and re-adjust dramat-
i .cally when one of its members dies, provides a systems 
analysis of .bereavement. This approach has been taken by 
Eliot (1932,1935,1946,19?5) 9 Goldberg and Mudd(l968), . 
Jensen and Wallace(l967), Kalish(1969), Orbach (1959). 
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Vollman et al (1971) has offered an insightful description 
of family patterns and their reactions to sudden death, their 
need for and receptivity of crisis counseling intervention, 
the variants of family structure that help or hinder bereave-
ment and the importance of role functions of the deceased in 
grief outcome. 
The medical and nursing professions have a unique and 
significant relationship with both the deceased and the 
survivors, which_is subject to both ~riticisrn and .advice 
by Autton ( 1962), Binger et al( 1961), Boni.ne{ 1967), Feifel 
and Fulton(1966), Fulton and Fulton(1971), Natterson and 
Knudson(l960) and Schoenberg et al {1969). 
Some investigators have reported, as well, on the 
grief response - often paradoxical - of patients in psycho~ 
therapy (Kirtley & Sa~ks,1969; Lightsl972; Litman,1964; 
Rosenthal,19471 Young,1960). And others have observed that 
the death of an L-nportant social leader - such as President 
Roosevelt or Kennedy _- can disrupt the indivtdual to the 
poi:nt of bereavement, as well as disrupt the equilibrium of 
the community, despite the _ abse ·nce of a formal relationship 
with the deceased (Blau ner,1966; Greenstein.1965;Hcckel, 1964; 
Johan."1Sen, 1946; Nemtzow & Lesser,1964; Orlansky,1947; 
O'Toole,1966i Wolfenstein & Kliman,1965; Wolff,1947) 
D • _Characteristics of the Survivor 
1, Age 
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In the last chapter, I noted that the degree of disrup-
tion in children appears to be related inversely to age on 
the basis of his advancement in cognitive development, There 
are also differences reported in cognitive and other grief 
symptoms in adults of different age brackets, However, the 
results are generally not consistent acrbss studies. In 
addition, the cognitive explanation for the age differences 
that are found is not strong. It appears that while age may 
be a factor in detemining the intensity of the grief, the 
relationship between age and pathology in adults is not clear. 
For example, Clayton et al (1968) found no significant 
diff~rences in the symptoms of bereaved widows of different 
ages. However, in a later study (Clayton et al,1970), they 
did find that younger women experienced more guilt in 
association with their grief. Comparing a group of London 
widows under age-65 with a group over age-65, Parkes (1971) 
found the younger women more likely to consult their physi-
cians during the first six months after the death than did 
the older women. The younger widows also increased their 
sedative intake seven-fold during this period, while the 
death pr e cipitated no such change in the older group .. His 
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findin g$ were confirmed by Maddison & Walker (1967) in 
studyi ng · America~ widows between ages 45 and 60. They found 
that the younger widows had a higher illness score than had 
older widows, on a questionnaire about their physical health 
and ment al health. But as I mentioned, the studies are not 
really consistent, for when Maddison & Viola (1968) r~plicated 
the study in Australia~ the finding was not confirmed, They 
offer no explanation., 
Contradictory results are drawn from bereavement 
studies of elderly as well as young widows. Stern et al (1951) 
described the grief _reactions of 25 mourners batween ages 
53 and 70 years old, and found a notable absence of overt 
mental disorders. However. Kay et a1(1955) investigated about 
200 psychiatric patients over the age of 60 who were _diag-
nosed with affective disorders (depression or mania). He found 
that the incidence of bereavement as a precipitant was great• 
er in those whose first attack occurred after age 60, than 
in those who had initial attacks at earlier ages. He attri-
butes this to the vulnerability of the aged to bereavement 
as a trigger for emotional disturbances. Bereavement and 
mental illness was examined by Parkes (1965) who studied 
the relationship between three different age groups of 
adults and the psychiatric diagnosis or major presenting 
symptoms. He found no significant difference&,but Stern & 
Susser (1969) found differences at all age groups _amongst 
those seeking psychiatrtc help for the first time, with 
the: 20-29 age range being disproportionately .high. 
Other studies have reported on select age groups . suqh 
as the elderly (Bellunt,1958; Berardo,19401 Kastenbaum,1969) 
and the adolescent (Laufer,1966). Most investigations of 
the age variable are, nonetheless, limited in their findings 
and there does not seem to be any consistent theme or 
explanation for the distinct conclusions. For example, 
Kraus and Lilienfeld(l959) report an outstanding excess 
of mortality among the young (under 35 years) widowed. Rees 
(1970) finds hallucinations, . sense of presence and il~W?ions 
of presence more frequent in those mourners over age 40. 
And Loveland (1968) concluded that young widows experience 
..., .. 3 :!.I. e 
a greater religious change after a loss than do older widowsa 
While these findings may be of some esoteric interest 
when examined in isolation, as a composite, they appear 
inconclusive and unrelated. The age factor does not offer 
s~fficient explanation for such diverse and inconsistent 
results. It seems that the variable of · age, unlike its 
' 
effect fn childhood bereavement, ls not a significant 
factor)by itsel~ as a determinant of grief course or outcome. 
(b) Sex of Survivor 
Comparisons of grief reactions betwen the sexes are 
more consistent than findings reported for age differences. 
The view that emerges from these studies is that women, 
overall, have a more difficult bereavement period with 
more frequent and more intense symptomology than men. The 
males, however, tend to mask their grief, and this may explain 
some of the disproportion between the sexes. 
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In both studies, Cl ayto n et al (1.968 . 1970) report ed a 
significantl y ·Jhigher . incidenc e of sympto ms in women, inclu• 
ding insomnia, crying and consumption of sedatives and 
tranquilizers. Similar results are found by Kraus & Lilienf e ld 
(1959),Kutscher (1969), Marris(l958), Par kes(l9720, Parkes 
& Brown(1972) and Wretmark (1959). The particular tra uma of 
child loss seems to impact more severely upon the mothers 
than the fathers. Halpern (1972) found that mothers bereaved 
by SIDS were more disturbed than the fathers, manifested by 
more intense and extreme symp~oms, This was attributed to 
the fatherd lower vulnerability tp selfedoubts regarding 
parenting, whereas mothers felt largely responsible for the 
child's death. Lindemann (19l~4) and Wretmark (1959) pro\'ide 
similar conclusions regarding the greater disruptive , effect 
on the female pa.rent following child loss. However, when 
the cause of a child's death is suicide, several authors 
have found a reversal of the relationship between mot}:ler 
and pathological mourning {Cain,1972; Herzog & Resnik,1968). 
In these instances, the father experiences intensified 
denial, guilt, anger and depression for prolonged periods. 
As Parkes(l972) has pointed out in explaining the 
grief proneness of wives over husbands, the female in con '!". 
temporary society has a greater involv ement and commitment 
to family members than do t heir male marital partners. 
Much of her functioning is routi nely and directly involved 
in dealing wi th . the . world o f.; and in in t eracti on with.) these 
others. Her husband, however tend s t:o diff use his involve-
ment beyond the immediate family ( e.g,, to his job). 
While the female~ plans, problems and daily coping issues 
tend to center on the family, the male's life space is usu-
ally more expanded. 
Translating these ideas into the cognitive model, 
the woman's cognitive (and derivative emotional and behavi .or• 
al) functioning is quantitatively centralized around the 
core family dimensions. Her perspectives of the world and 
her cognitive stance vis-a-vis the environment are primari-
ly influenced through these dimensions, Consequently, her 
cognitive abilities are highly developed in these areas of 
mothering and marriage. Moreover, she is likely to identitfy 
herself along these dimensionsal relationships, When a sud-
den death occurs to a familial member, the woman's cognitive 
matrix is especially disrupted because it had been more 
reliant on these core dimensions for its stability than 
had been her husband's cognitive structure, The cognitive 
disruption is more severe, therefore, because the damage 
occurs to a structural component which is of greater critical 
importance to her overall cognitive integrity than _is the 
' same component in her spouses framework. Similarly, there 
is greater identity disruption fo::- women than for men, since 
she had more fimly based her knowledge of herself on her 
relations.hips with these particular family others. When death 
involves a childf the pathological grief experienced by --
mothers appears related to the above factors. Also important 
regarding berea.vement for a child, however, is the unique 
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negative meanings that 8'l..1ch a de a.th imposes upon the mother. 
Care and protection of offspring are typical self-imposed 
expectations of both parents. However, fathers a.ppear to 
conceptualize this role expectation at a more abstract and 
generalized level (e.g., earning a living, influencing major 
decisions affecting the family). Mothers, on the other hand, 
construe and function within the car~ and protection role 
expectation at a concrete level of routine functioning 
and interaction with the .children (e.g., feeding,bat~ing, 
nursing their illnesses). When a child dies suddenly, a con-
crete event, the woman experiences this as meaning that 
she has been an inadequate protector; she has a sense of 
failure in her concrete role expectations of motherhood. 
'fhis generates in.tense guilt feelings. 
In sum, there are differences in the male and female 
response to sudden death, with women apparently more prone 
_ to both normal and pathological mourning. This is partially 
due to her cognitive matrix' greater structural reliance 
upon ~ore familial dimensions than is her husband's framewrk. 
Hence, she experiences a heightened disruption when death 
damages one of these dimensions. 
3; Other Characteristics 
There are numerous other individual characteristics which 
~an potentially influence bereavement following sudden death, 
However, little research ha~ bee n done in an attempt to cor-
relate these characteristics with either specific symptoms 
or the normal/pathological course of bereavement. 
Lindemann(l94 4 ) has suggested that certain personality 
types are more likely to su f f er pa.thological mourning, 
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such as the obsessive or depressive. He feels, however, that 
a history o°f neurotic symptom reactions were not that 
important in determining atypical reactions. However, this 
is contradicted by Bergler(1948) who reports a greater inci-
dence of psychopathology and prolonged grief in neurotically 
diagnosed individuals~ Parkes (1972) believes that some people 
ar~ 'grief~prone' and react excessively to a loss. He suggests 
that previous excessive guilt and depression may progn os ti-
cate a poor mourning outcome. Nonetheless, Parkes does em• 
phasize that cultural and incidental factors may also play 
a role in determining the particular form a reaction will take~ 
In addition to pre-grief mental -st ates, other personal 
variables which mc¥affect the bereavement process include 
other recent losses or stress (P~rkes,1972); religious 
beliefs and attitudes (Adlerstein, 1958; Alexander & Adlerstein, 
1959); socioeconomic class (Birtchnell,1972); history of 
childhood bereavement (Archibald et al,1972; Birtc~nell,1969; 
Bowl~y,1960,1963; Hilgard &_Newman,1961,1963; Hill,1967,1969, 
1970,1972; Markusen &Fulton,1971); and the quality of the 
relationship prior to the death (Hinton,1967; Parkes,1972). 
the determinants of grief symptomology discussed in 
this section have, by necessity of presentation, been arti-
ficially de lineated. I wish to emphasize in closing this 
section that individuals suffering from the abrupt loss of 
a significant other person in the i.r livesare affected ·· 
by many influences si multaneously. There is consi.derable 
interaction bet ween the specific variables and general 
228. 
factor groups I've outlined. A sudden death leaves behind 
mourners who must experience the loss , due · to _a specific mode 
of death, who are of varied ages, either sex, with a particu-
lar relationship to the deceased, each having their own 
personality characteristics and histories with which they 
confront the traumatic event. They also understand the 
experience with their own unique cognitive matrix. While 
the scientist or theorist, for his purposes, may hypotheti• 
cally di~sect these variables to note -their particular in-
fluences, it must be emphasized that the mourner himself is 
the reality composite.- who is currently experiencing whatever 
influences these variables impose. 
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The foregoing cognitive model of acute g:c-ief, along 
with the supportive sectio ns which a.pp lied the model to 
actual grief symptoma logy and determinant factors, has been 
developed and presented with a clinicalpurpose in mind. 
~tis my belief that these ideas can serve the grief counse-
lor by allowing him to conceptualize the bereavement problem 
from tl).e most functional perspective. In that way, . he may 
use those techniques which will be most functional, effective 
and appropriate. 
The evolvement of a cognitive clinical approach has 
already been accomplished by others (see Parad,1965,1969) . 
in the field of 'crisis intervention' methodology. Indeed, 
this methodology has been used by the helping professions 
in aiding the bereaved toward healthy grief resolution. _ ,, -
However 1 the application of crisis intervention techniques 
to the proble~s of grief have been globally justified on 
the basis of the 'crisis' nature of a death event. It is my 
contention that such a global rationale is a weak and 
insufficient reason for a clinician to intervene with speci-
fic techniques. Rather, clinical intervention should be se-
lecttvely applied in ways which match a particular technique 
to a particular problem, in which both problem (as it is 
conceived) and technique sh are basic assumptions about man. 
While crisis interventi on (a cognitive approach) has 
been demonstrat ed to be a ht gh ly successful approach to the 
treatment of grief probl ems, grief itself had not been 
analyzed from a cogniti ve standpoint~ Therefore , an under • 
lying purpose of this di~sertation has been to provide such 
a~ ~nalysis. In this way, it is intended to clarify and 
eolidify the linkage between the problem (bereave a ent) and 
its preferred mode of solution (crisis intervention). 
Furthermore, the analysis offers some novel perspectives 
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on the cognitive aspects of the grief process which will 
permit the cognitively oriented crisis counselor to incisively 
rather than globally, apply his available techniques. 
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